Facing
the Challenge of Extreme Nationalism in Ethiopia
Abay Beneberu Qeneni
March
2002
PART IV
In
part III of this article I presented two of the six points I believe
would contribute to peaceful co-existence. Starting with my third point,
I now discus the remaining four points and conclude the article.
Third,
I am saddened by the time and energy wasted as a result of the laughable
points of argument on which the two camps deliberately fail to agree.
The Oromo extremists often talk about the
empire, in an attempt to imply that Ethiopia colonized sovereign
states, one of which they believe was Oromia, though they lack the
evidence for that. The Amhara extremists on their part do not
surprisingly want to hear such words as emperor or governor, as though
they were not proudly using those terms in the past. We did not know
they meant that the emperors existed without an empire. Those who say Habesha-Abyssinia-Ethiopia_Finfiné-Addis
Ababa are not, however, trapped as easily. Unless we know the
historical genesis and meanings of these five terms as well as
contextualise their use and purposely continue to confuse, then we will
end up fighting not just against history but also against our own
conscience. We know that it is not a mystery why foreign Zionist names
are attached to Nazareth-Adama, Debre Zeit [Mt. of Olives]-Bishoftu,
Hossa’ena, Debre Sina, Ephesson, Wollisso-Ghion. And those who chose
those names are not alive today. It is laughable that our extremists are
wasting time and energy fighting over the right to inherit names that
have no claimants. This is so insignificant that this generation does
not have to get absorbed in it. It is comparable to a situation where a
family christines a child with two names and uses which ever of the two
names to refer to the child; similarly, it is advisable that we use the
place names of our own preference and leave the matter at that. Some
deny the reality that was; others tend to become pretenders to the
throne that is long gone. Still others seem to be preparing to settle
scores against names they once scrambled to adopt, realizing that they
have failed to fulfil their wishes. But had the OLF managed to enter
Menelik’s Palace, it would not have had time for such trivial issues.
It would never have made references to the
empire, for opportunity never knocks twice at any man’s door.
It cannot cleanse itself of the secessionist taboo. Neither will it
develop into a nation nor is it showing efforts to work with other
organizations that have an Ethiopian agenda. It is failing to realize
that it cannot succeed without working with popular forces. The OLF is
likely to go into the dustbin of history without benefiting either
itself or others it claims to serve. I think it is persisting with its
secessionist agenda as a protest against its failure to enter
Menelik’s Palace and a sign of despondency. It is the responsibility
of the Oromo to force it into correcting this weakness. Other
Ethiopians, too, have the responsibility of helping by responding
positively to its genuine demands.
Fourthly,
we were eyewitnesses to the fact that Ethiopians in the South were
losing their land ownership rights to henchmen of the system at the time
under the smallest of pretexts until the practice (of communal
ownership, usufructory rights, tenancy, church endowments-sämon-)
was abolished by the Dergue’s land proclamation of 1975. I know, for
instance, that in Balé Region, no less than 100 gashas
of the Sinana-Débisa plains were in the hands of three families,
including that of the Emperor’s mouthpiece. Though we are not privy to
their true identity, they all passed by as Amharas. When we saw them
come from afar, we used to say: attend
to the cattle the Amhara are coming. The reason was that if one of
the local herdsmen (I was one of them) failed to be attentive and
allowed the cattle to stray into those lands, the local inhabitants had
to pay birr 2-3 per beast. Note that at that time a heifer cost birr
20-30. The main purpose of owning a chunk of the plains was to use it as
a trap for tress-passing; imagine how many heifers a local owner of,
say, 60 cattle would pay if one of them trespassed. The cruelty of the
landowners and all the ordeal the locals had to go through as well as
the disciplinary actions a family would take against the herdsmen were
all trivials. Who would blame them if children grow up hating Amharas?
The Oromo of the area did not normally treat the poor Amhara that used
to suffer with them as Amharas, but often at times of trouble. The
reason for all that sordid situation was the owners of that extensive
land, who neither bought nor inherited it. But then, how did they manage
to get hold of it? It would be too much if they tell us that they
deserved it as a favour. In this connection, we would be grateful if one
of the children of those landowners, who in 1971 was my teacher at
Azmatch Deglehan (Batu Terarra) High School and who is still alive,
could impart his thoughts to us on the matter. The reason for the 1964
uprising of Balé Oromos, led by Waqo Gutuu and Waqo Lugo, was the
forced confiscation of the rich lands of Arena-Buluq and the Dello Menna
Jungle, famous for its wild coffee, timber, etc., and its distribution
to ministers, senior army officers, the royal family, etc.
The ordinary Amhara did no harm. It is one thing to call for a
contextual analysis of the situation, but quite another to trivialise
the truth. Another shameful behaviour is to try to champion a dead
cause. Our reference to the past should not aim at killing what has
already died, but to enable us to come to terms with the truth so that
we can chart the future together.
Fifth,
although the war between Christian Emperors Libne Dengil and his
successor Gelawdios, on the one side, and the leader of the Adal, Imam
Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al Ghazi (Mohamed
Gragn) in 1529-1543 ended in the latter’s death and defeat at the
battle of Woina Dega in Wollo, it is known that the debilitating effects
of the war enabled Barentu and Borena Oromos initially and, starting
1543, the Metcha-Tullema branch of the latter (Borena) from the
southeastern part of our country in a second round, conducted an
extensive and coercive expansion to the west and north and managed to
settle in areas which today are inhabited by Oromifa speakers. Those who
do not today speak Oromifa, due to assimilation into the majority local
population in such regions as Wollo, Gonder, and Gojjam are known as
Amhara. In other regions, too, such ‘Oromos’ are identified by the
names of the local ethnic groups. Putting aside, for the moment, the
main question of as to whom Oromia belongs, what would one feel being
regarded as an immigrant in one’s own country one example of which is
‘the Oromo Migration’? Bear in mind that this word [immigrant] has
subjected us to humiliation. Fable turned into history: over time, the
word filsset [immigration
/migration] gave birth to felasha
[immigrant] and led in 1991 to the loss of our kin and kith who adhered
to the Old Testament, under the pretext that they were Israeli Jews.
Judaism may have come to Ethiopia by way of immigrants, traders, etc.,
but the term felasha gave
the impression that even Ethiopian converts to Judaism were foreigners,
providing a perfect excuse for, on the one hand, the Israelis who mainly
wanted the Ethiopians to supplement their meagre manpower resources in
their never ending confrontation with the Arabs and the Woyané, on the
other, for making money out of the misery of the Ethiopians. Moreover,
who is to blame if a marginalized people chooses to deny its identity
and opts for another? I am saying this in the context where we have
bolted out of our political sleep to realize the sly political
interpretations of the time, not to relish the stretched version of filsset
that taunts the people of Wollo Region as ‘eternal migrants’. My
point is that we have to desist from and correct expressions and acts of
marginalisation or misconception that hurt the feelings of others. It is
not unusual to listen to Amhara extremists brag about civilizing and not
harming others, about letting others go if they wish and about the
fictitiousness of Oromia, etc. The trash about civilizing others is a
result of ignorance about one’s history. While one born in Debre
Marqos calls those across the Abay River Galla and baria,
slaves, a Moslem Oromo from Balé calls the Amhara flat-headed
infidels, while those who come from the central parts of the country
refer to the Amhara in the north as buda,
evil-eyed. Such name-calling may cancel out each other, but it has to be
corrected for, firstly, we know it is being exploited to create and /or
aggravate contradictions among the people and, secondly, for it does not
encourage mutual respect. Telling others to go (secede) and trivializing
the name of a region are harmful practices. The term ‘Oromia’ may
not be a historically well-grounded name, but accepting it – so far as
the Oromos themselves like it – is the least non-Oromos can do both as
a gesture of respect to them, considering the derogatory connotations
with which the term ‘Galla’ or ‘the land of Galla’ was used, and
a matter of minor compromise. The term may be fictitious, but every
nation is built on its own bit of myth and fiction. We have to pay attention to such practices, as in fact, they form
the foundation to correcting similar shortcomings in the interest of
coexistence. In the first place who are they [the Amhara extremists] to
tell others to go or to stay, to even dare choose names for others? One
has to know that a united Ethiopia where the integrity of any nationals
and regions – let alone that of such a huge section as the Oromo or of
Tigray, an important part of our history – is questioned is another
destructive characteristic of the Woyané.
Let alone fundamental matters of history and identity relating to the
names of a people or a region, who is to impose their will even on an
individual who opts for a name of his or her own choice so long as he or
she fulfils relevant legal requirements? We have to remember that
reciprocity is fundamental to respect and love being mutual. We, too,
have to get used to the political correctness practiced in the west.
Sixth,
The expansion of Amhara and Tigre Emperors is often regarded positively
as an expression of their strength and of pacification. Emperor
Menelk’s southward expansion by defeating local leaders and kings (in
Arsi, Harar, Wolayta, Keffa, etc.,) is seen as a territorial expansion
intertwined with sovereignty, an act of centralization, and of defending
the system of the time and of pacification. I have no problem with that,
as no nation in the world came into being without the sword and the
spear. Ethiopia should not be expected to be an exception. My problem is
the tendency to regard other aspirants to political power than the
Amhara and Tigre as demons. We know, for instance, that the explanations
given to Imam al Ghazi’s (Gragn
Mohamed’s) northward expansion were not the same as those given to
Menelik’s. The former was described in both oral and written history
as an invader, an infidel and a Satan-sent messenger of destruction.
Why? What was the rational behind describing the expansion of Amhara and
Tigré Emperors in a positive light while demonising that of Mohamed Gragn’s?
For obvious reasons, it was meaningless to raise such a question in the
past. My argument is that we have to be ready to correct this
misconception and distortion now. Corollary to this is the tendency to
regard the formation of the modern Ethiopian state as a result of a uni-directional
southward expansion, rather than a synthesis of a collision-collusion
process involving actors from all directions, including Mohamed
Gragn’s northward expansion. The bullets of Mohamed Gragn
and Emperor Menelik were equally deadly. What is the difference between
the former burning Churches in the 16th century and the
latter Mosques in the 19th century, other than an indication
of the influence of religion on the outlook of those leaders, seen from
a perspective of human rights violation? What would have happened if Gragn
Mohamed succeeded in his efforts other than making Islam a state
religion, just like Menelik and his predecessors made Orthodox
Christianity a state religion, for reasons of political expediency, and
hence pre-empting Emperor Yohanness IV following in the foot-steps of
Menelik? I even have a hunch that Gragn
Mohamed might have continued with Amharic as a working language by
virtue of its written script. It is not unreasonable to think that he
could have also been tempted by Arabic, though it would have been
limited to religious use, just like Ge’ez, considering the fact that the
people did not speak it. But because of religious affinity, the
relations with the Arab world would have been much different. And if we
could have been better off than today because of closer ties with Arabs
is a moot question, which even experts may have problem knowing with
certainty. Incidentally, though, there is little doubt, contrary to
conventional wisdom, that we are closer to the Arabs than to the Jews
(historically, culturally/psychologically, linguistically, in belief
systems, in geo-political and economic ties and in appearance). The
problem is bad politics.
I do not believe that our situation would have
been significantly different if from the centre or the south, for
example, that King Tona of Wolayta, Abba Jiffar of Jimma or the
King of Keffa defeated Menelik and took control of the central
government. The lessons from the failure of Emperor Yohanness and of Gragn
Mohamed to impose a single religion and the development that
gradually led to a virtual evening out of the number of Christians and
Moslems could have perforce resulted in a seminal realisation of a
common country and of leaving religion to the private sphere. One can
assume that the social-psychological influences of the communities in
the centre coupled with the lax manners and limited opportunities they
had, relative to Gragn
Mohamed, could have constricted their chances of imposing the will of a
single group, leading to a sense of Ethiopiannes similar to that we have
today. This, too, is what happened under Menelik, without prejudice to
the fact that the culture of those at the helm imposed itself on others.
As such, the administrative ability and dexterity of individuals, the
role of their advisors and foreign influences, especially as pertains to
religion, determined the length of one’s reign at that time.
Although the best evidence they can provide is
mythology, the Solomonites had a reason to re-trace the genealogy of the
Emperors since the beginning (1270) of the reign of Yekuno Amlak, who
dethroned the Zaguwé dynasty, until the end of the reign of Emperor
Haile-Silassé I (1974), to King Solomon and the Lion of Judah. Though
we were told that Menelik’s father was from Ankober, we knew little
about his mother being a southerner (perhaps from the Bulgo or Menzo
tribes of Wolayta or Bulgo. Likewise, Emperor Haile-Silassé I tried day and night
through out his life to inculcate in our minds that he was a Lion of
Judah while he kept us in the dark about his mother being a Guragé or
about the Oromo blood of his father, Ras
Mekonnen. This was a ploy to convince political rivals from the
Sultanate of Harar, the Kingdoms of, Keffa, Wolayta, Oromo, Hadya, etc.
that they were not chosen by God/Allah to rule and hence to make the
people – including the Amhara and Tigre- subservient. Those who managed
to break the shackles would rule for a time, and some did succeed. And
such shackles serve as mere political manoeuvres, regardless of where
one comes from. In the first place, nature has provided no one with the
right to choose one’s origin. No one is inferior/superior to any one
by reason of blood or innate ethnic prowess, except that one on whose
side are time and circumstances succeeds to establish political
dominance. True heroism comes to
light when one in trying times stands tactfully for the truth and
exploits opportunities for eternal good deeds.
Accepting this axiom not only brings agreement with our Oromo,
Amhara, Afar, Tigré, Anuak, Wolayta, etc., brethren and with all
Ethiopians, but also entails that we make it a priority to free
ourselves from being prisoners of historical misconceptions and impart
the truth to our extremists both on the left and right.
In
this connection, the attempt to classify people on racial lines – in
line with the political vogue of the times by allocating percentages to
former leaders – for instance, Haile-Sellasé was 75% Oromo – to give
the impression that others had an equal share of power as the Amhara and
Tigré, has to stop, for it is wrong. In the first place, the Emperor
himself was known, in order of importance, by his closeness to the
relatives of Jesus, i.e., as a descendant of the Jews (to convince
others of his divine power), Christianity (to win the Church and the
Shewan nobility) and by his identity as a Menz-Beza Sefer Amhara and not
by his links to the Oromo and the Guragé. No one dared to utter a word
about his Oromo and Guragé connections either, until he was removed
from power. Until he died at the age of 83, the Emperor himself was only
once rumoured to have quipped, prior to the hanging of Tadesse Biru: Is it because you are more Oromo than We are that you are so concerned
about the welfare of the Oromo? I do not think he was allowed to
talk of his Oromo origins, he ruled in the name of the Amhara as long as
he lived. There were many senior Oromo officials next to the Emperor.
Nevertheless, they were hardly in a position to make the ordinary Oromo
feel an equal beneficiary of the system other than the fact that Oromos
of Wollo and Shewa were interlinked with the royal court through
intermarriages, etc.
With regard to Col. Mengistu, we have not
heard anything from him even though we have been thinking of him, on the
basis of his appearance, as some kind of hybrid from the south. He did
not bring about fundamental changes regarding the issues we are
discussing, though circumstances forced him to introduce reforms that
suited his rule. Former President Dr. Negasso and Mr. Meles, on the
contrary, have not hidden from us the details about their race. After
the TPLF began ‘rotting down from the head’ resulting in its split,
though, rumours have emerged tying Meles not only to the ‘Golden
race’ [Tigré] but also, through his father, to ‘the lowly’ (Cherq)
Amhara in Wollo. Regardless of whether the rumours are true it is
here that one should admire Meles’ shrewdness. If he establishes a
link to Wollo, he can then stretch it further, through the Borena-Kemissé,
etc., to claim Oromo blood. Thus the trinity of Tigré-Amhara-Oromo
qualifies him, not through elections but by virtue of his innate natural
quality, to be a leader of a new multi-ethnic organization and hence of
Ethiopia, in the event of the dust in Tigray turning into a desert storm
and his politics of race breathing its last. As things stand now,
though, the changes that Meles has brought about are calling his ruling
machinery nation-nationality-peoples-EFDR, depriving the country of its
Red Sea outlets and transferring his capital from Meqelé to Addis
Ababa.
The main political systems we have had so far
have essentially reflected the social psychology of Amharic and Tigringa
speakers, which undeniably has been a matter of priceless satisfaction
to the latter. True, the consequences of mal administration can equally
affect the ordinary people. But a destitute peasant from Menz feels much
more proud in public places than a hugely rich Oromo landlord from Kofelé.
Similarly a Tigré today feels as though he or she were endowed with
natural superiority and entertains a perception of being a ruler. Their
children imitate them and they, too, grow up with the same perception.
For Amharic speakers, the fact that they could express themselves with
out interpreters at such places as government offices and market places,
as well as expressing their sense of national identity and that their
children could study with their mother tongue as the medium of
instruction had clear spiritual and material benefits. The Kefitcho,
Dawros, Oromos, Kembatas, the Afar, etc., were, however, deprived of
this means to fulfilling their human dignity. Allowing for some
variations, their opportunity to identify themselves with the central
government, power sharing, equality, access to such social services as
education and employment were limited – and still are. Even though the
Woyané regime today is making
a mockery of these ethnic groups by telling them it has enabled them to
use their languages and have regional states, which it tends to see as
its ultimate gift, the fundamental problems remain unresolved. They
still have no say in matters of national importance, cannot use regional
resources, and are not regarded as equals and mutual love and respect
need reinforcement. Denying these and confusing them with other issues
is futile and does no good to any one. It is paramount that we make
amends and shape a better future through mutual efforts. Those who were
oppressed should focus on effecting a promising tomorrow for all and not
be driven by rancour and a desire for vengeance. This is the magnanimity
of learning from history. Only the realization of a political system
where free and fair elections on the basis of a one-man one-vote
principle and the rule of law guarantees long-lasting peace and respect
for every one. In addition, I also believe a constitutional device that
in future effectively protects minorities from ‘the tyranny of the
majority’ is required (as a supplement to the one-man one-vote
principle). That is why Group interests based on the rights of the
individual should also work towards that goal. That is how we can
achieve solutions to our problems.
Unless we move ahead or want to move ahead
along these lines, it means that an end for the misery of our people is
not yet in sight. To repeat, theologian Isaac Barlow’s views on the
incompatibility of human kind and this world reflects the situation in
today’s Ethiopia:
How like a paradise the world would be,
flourishing in joy and rest,
if men would cheerfully conspire in affection
and helpfully constitute
to each other’s content: and how a savage
wildness now it is, when like
wild beasts, they vex and persecute, worry and
devour each other
(Isaac Barlow, Doctor of Divinity Sermon,
Works, 1683).
It is not without reason that I chose to open
and close this article with Dr. Barlow’s words. It is my way of
drawing attention to their importance as relates to the monument we will
set up at our final day of victory over Woyané’s
politics of hate, which we have instinctively joined, being pushed by
extremists and losing a grip on our roots and destination in the
process.
Comments to A.
B. Qeneni