Almost a revolution
By Mankelklot Haileselassie
Ethiopian Review, October 2001
What took place in the month of April 2001 has to be analyzed and be given proper perspectives. Had the movement of April 17, 2001, been handled politically and accordingly, today, we would have been witnessing a different course of history.
What took place on April 17, 2001 was a litmus test. It has measured two aspects of the political struggle that took place within the last ten years within the opposition forces:
a) the level of the ripening of the political struggle, that is, whether the opposition forces in Ethiopia were ready and in a position to take advantage of the political crisis and just step into a different and a higher level of confrontation with TPLF. In other words, putting what they were vehemently expressing in their press releases continuously, into practice. The opportunity was there.
b) it has also shown the extent to which the opposition forces have really penetrated, and interacted with the society where they can call on them for any defensive, and, or, offensive measures. In any case, it was the end of one of the chapters of the political struggle that started in 1991, and the beginning of another chapter. A lesson to be used in the future has to be drawn from this historical juncture. Many weaknesses were exposed.
What will be discussed should not be taken as discrediting the historical input made by the Addis Ababa University students and the opposition forces in Ethiopia. The movement that was ignited by the AAU students and permeated into the society, particularly of the Addis Ababa, unequivocally raised the level of defiance from that of March 21, 2001, to that of April 17, 2001. Even though the level of the defiance and civil disobedience was limited in scope, the society, one can safely contend, started to vent the pressure inside it, by rebelling against the regime as manifested on March 21, 2001, the day Egypt youth met the Ethiopian youth in the 12th African Youth Football Championship in Addis Ababa Stadium.
The sincere hope is that the next uprising will be more radical and more thorough, with the right and stepped up leadership by the opposition forces, both inside and outside of Ethiopia, than the one exhibited on March 21, 2001. Once the type witnessed on April 21, 2001, started, it must continue until Ethiopia establishes a government by the people of the people and for the people.
One, the split within TPLF; two, the culmination of ten years political, economic and social crisis; and three, the student protestation that sparked the society to defy the regime and rebel, were sufficient conditions that could have and should have led to a full-fledged revolution. A revolution that could have and should have led to the removal of the regime.
The revolution of April 2001 was nipped at its budding stage because of (a) lack of leadership, on the part of the political and civic organizations, (b) lack of proper and timely slogan. In my view, it was imperative to come up with a long-term slogan to be handed over to those who started the civil disobedience. In this kind of frustration driven movement of the mass an immediate provision of fitting slogan would have led the struggle to a higher level. The mass that came out on the street should have gone back to their homes equipped with a long term and properly defined slogan. The slogan would have not let the people to stay home. The slogan handed to them would have made them restless. They will come out the next day, and the next day, and the next day, perhaps until the slogan became effective in resolving the issue at hand.
The slogan as TEGBAR (The Ethiopian Democratic Action League) clearly articulated it, should have been: “The immediate resignation of Meles Zenawi followed by the establishment of an all inclusive transitional government.”
Political organizations in the Diaspora, who claim to have their movements inside Ethiopia, too, were also exposed. Yes, the April 2001 movement did expose them, too. What took place in April 17, 2001, was an ideal situation for an underground organization to have had led the struggle very effectively and perhaps to its ultimate conclusion. In fact, that was the best opportunity for the political organizations in the Diaspora to have played a decisive role and come out gaining the upper hand in the struggle. Unfortunately, they were nowhere to be of any service. They were, and are, not there in Ethiopia as they claim to be. Or, as usual they were caught flat footed. Either way, they were not of any benefit to the people of Ethiopia. It appears they exist for themselves. The political organizations in the Diaspora have missed a rare opportunity to lead.
The opposition forces
As indicated earlier, the opposition forces, particularly those inside Ethiopia, should have played a very decisive role. Given the defiance and the civil disobedience exhibited by the people in Addis Ababa, as a force to reckon with, and the defiance of the students, the environment was there for the opposition forces to come out with the kind of ultimatum-oriented decisive demand, such as, “we demand now this, we demand now that….” But, unfortunately, they were not ready to provide effective leadership to the movement and bring it to its conclusion. Nor were they able to equip the students and the mass with a well-thought out slogan. The only slogan most of them came out with was, “Peace and National reconciliation.” For opposition forces who opted for the use of ballots instead of bullets, their slogan should have been attached to anything that has to do with the removal of the regime.
To raise powerful slogans, the opposition parties have to have the full backing of the students, labor unions and above all the community at large. Unfortunately, the opposition forces did not prepare these forces with an anticipation of such a movement. The slogan “Peace and National Reconciliation” is relevant only for those opposition forces in Diaspora, who are unable to enter Ethiopia physically and share the struggle in the way they see it fit to remove TPLF.
Finally, here, with regard to the opposition forces, the main point is to humbly indicate that a mistake has been made. At the same time to suggest to them to part with it with a fundamental lesson learned from it and resolve that the same mistake will not be repeated.
It seems to me, a revolution that could have extended up to the removal of the regime is, unfortunately, miscarried.
The students
Here, what can be said from the outset is that, it appears, as the result of the April 2001 movement, the division among the students along ethnic line is shattered. I hope it will remain so. Even students in Mekele declared their support to the fulfillment of the demand of the students of Addis Ababa University. As indicated earlier, as a result of the move taken by AAU students, the society have entered the struggle, physically, against TPLF and have broken the submissiveness to a certain extent. Therefore, the sacrifice paid in blood, life and imprisonment will not be in vain. In the future, provided the opposition forces pick it up at the right moment, and carry it forward, any spark from anywhere will lead to a better and larger participation of the society, including those in the provinces.
Here, too, it is critically important to indicate that the Addis Ababa University students could have played a better and a far reaching role. They could have kept the revolution burning by raising relevant social issues slogans. If one had noticed it carefully, for a long time, the college students’ protestations, including this one of April 2001, consistently had to do with their specific rights that included their health and living conditions. They were and are doing the protestations dealing with their specific interests, in the midst of the social and economic crisis. The blatant human rights violations, the question of territorial integrity, the border and the sea outlet issues were not raised by the students. Even now, their consistent demand is the release of the students in prison and the resolution of their specific democratic rights. They did not want to step up and connect it to the demands of the society at large.
To that effect, they appealed their case to representatives in the parliament, a parliament totally controlled by TPLF.
The behaviors being exhibited and the measures, such as appealing to the parliament, being taken assumes, on the part of the AAU students: (a) the nonexistence of the economic, health, education, human rights sufferings of the society outside of the four walls of AAU, and (b) the existence of democracy and the rule of law under the regime controlled and run by TPLF.
It is incumbent upon the AAU students, in particular, and students throughout the country, in general, to raise the slogan calling for the immediate resignation of Meles and the formation of an all inclusive transitional government.
The opposition forces, particularly those in Ethiopia, and the AAU students have failed the call of Mother Nature. It is up to them to make it up.
The civic organizations
The unimaginable economic, educational and health sufferings brought upon the people of Ethiopia; the dividing of Ethiopia into ethnic groups, thereby inviting all sorts of economic and social problems that cripple the economic development; the blatant violation of human rights taking place in Ethiopia under their noses; and the systematic killings and executions of social and political activists did not move the labor unions and the Teachers’ Association to rise up and side with the students and the society at large. These civic organizations did not have the will to come forward and take advantage of the political crisis and provide leadership. These two organizations, the highly organized sector of the society, should have availed themselves as the back bone for the April 17 movement that took place in Addis Ababa. Unless they take the steps to redeem themselves, the blood of the students that were murdered, executed and thrown on the streets to rot is on their hands. TPLF is the primary culprit and the labor unions as well as the Teachers’ Association are the secondary culprits.
Clearly knowing what TPLF is doing to the country and to the society and not taking the necessary measures to correct it is a crime against the people of Ethiopia. History will record it as such.
The radio stations in the Diaspora
There are three radio stations that disseminate information into Ethiopia from outside. It is important to note that all of them are run by political organizations. How is one to measure the impact of these radio stations, some of them functioning for a long period of time, on the society in Ethiopia? It can and must be measured by the level of the participation of the society, in terms of persistency, stamina and duration, in the struggle in Ethiopia. For example, how and what was the turn out during demonstrations? What was their impact during elections? How many people from the oppositions forces were elected? Shouldn’t we be able to see their impact even during this April 2001 student movement that permeate into the community in Addis Ababa?
When one looks into the few matters I just itemized, their impact was literally nothing. Suppose all of them stop broadcasting to Ethiopia, would the struggle be affected? Absolutely not. Have they tried to synchronize their struggle with the opposition forces in Ethiopia and agitate, in order, for example, for the revolution of April 2001 to continue and be successful? Had they tried anything to that effect, it could have been observed.
The radio stations broadcasting to Ethiopia from abroad have simply become a recreational stuff for the people in Ethiopia. Or, perhaps the information is so routine and repetitive that it has become a numbing factor. More detectable and measurable impact is expected from the radio stations.
Is TPLF replaceable?
This point is treated here, in relation to this retired revolution, because it was and still is the most consistently raised matter every time the question of power is raised. It has become the function of “power holding,” or “power seeking” in today’s Ethiopia. Yes, TPLF is replaceable. Any one of the political organizations, individually or in unityas in a multiparty system of governmentnamely, AAPO, ONC, EDP, SEPDC and others, can replace TPLF. Due to frustration, individuals argue that there is no organization that can replace TPLF. This kind of statement is playing into the hands of TPLF. TPLF is using it very effectively. The hustle to form “a government in exile,” or, “a shadow government” is also part of this frustration and lack of confidence on the opposition forces in Ethiopia. This misguided exercise is also playing into the hands of TPLF as well as into the hands of the Western countries, and perhaps will affect the opposition forces, too.
The business sophisticated TPLFaccording to Tobia of Hamle 5, 1993, EPRDF, the ruling party, has built a business empire of 3.5 billion Birrwhen it entered Addis Ababa in 1991 was not prepared to rule a country of fifty-some million people. If one simply compared the status of the current opposition forces with that of the ability and the skill of TPLF of 1991, one would undeniably find the current opposition forces in Ethiopia to have the skill, the managerial ability and the potential to run the government of Ethiopia. What they lack is the will to take the power from TPLF. Craving to replace the most destructive regime on the face of the eartha regime that hates and contemptuously ignore the people it claimed to governand vow to correct the course of events so destructive to the society is a genuine hunger-for-power. It has to be noted very clearly that discouraging power-seeking motives is robbing the essence and the driving engine of political struggle.
The other critical issue is mixing “unity-formation” with that of “power seeking,” or “striving for political power.” The most uttered phrase in Diaspora, namely, “first unity and then power seeking” is draining the juice out of the political struggle. Even though both are important, one should not be at the exclusion, or, at the expense, of the other.
In a political struggle, the know-how and the skill of politics without the will and the hunger for power is useless. These two factors, namely, GUT and THIRST FOR POWER, are lacking in the opposition forces in Ethiopia. It requires the gut and the hunger for power to penetrate the society in the most forceful and determined manner and turn them into militant forces that are dependable and ready to stand by one’s side when they are called upon.
It requires the gut and the hunger for power to come up with timely and radical slogan to arm the society and continue the struggle, because it is done in defiance of the regime.
Above all, it requires the gut and the hunger for power to come forward and lead the society when it is called upon by circumstance, such as the one that took place in Ethiopia in April of 2001.
What should be done?
The first step must be, for the opposition forces in Ethiopia, the labor unions that includes the Teachers’ Association, the students, and the radio stations in the Diaspora should and must coordinate their work. Since the contradiction between the regime and the society is clear, the opposition forces don’t need to waste their effort for preparing the environment.
The second step must be, for the opposition forces in Ethiopia to have to start focusing on the use of civil disobedience as their means of struggle. To do this, the opposition forces must penetrate the society for the purpose of cultivating this civil disobedience through their cadres. It appears, unless the military takes over, a popular uprising is the only hope left to remove and replace the TPLF regime.
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Mankelklot Haileselassie, Ph.D., resides in Mayland.