A couple of months ago, you may remember that we mentioned why Rebtel’s international call service to Ethiopia was a hit with customers. Now startling new evidence has become known that sheds light on why so many customers from African, Sub-Continent and Caribbean nations like Ethiopia are flocking to companies like Rebtel.
Research about calling cards shows unhappy customers
Research published by the Swedish call firm has painted a stark picture for customers who are making their international calls using calling cards, especially to countries in the Caribbean, like Trinidad and Tobago, or Africa, such as Liberia, Ethiopia and Ivory Coast.
A staggering statistic revealed that 90.9% of respondents on a questionnaire for Rebtel customers who had made calls to Liberia via a calling card, had received far fewer minutes on their calling card than they had initially paid for.
Unsurprisingly, less than a third of those questioned felt that calling cards were a fair or reliable method of making international calls. Interesting facts for all Ethiopians living abroad, considering that calling cards still are pretty popular for making international calls.
However, in isolation that statistic may not be particularly impressive or relevant and can be dismissed as an anomaly of statistics, however what is truly shocking is that large numbers of Rebtel customers are all reporting similar levels of calling card misery.
Fewer minutes than advertised from calling cards
To back up these findings, Rebtel conducted similar research into the calling patterns of its customers calling the Ivory Coast and Trinidad and Tobago. 82.2% of respondents who called the Ivory Coast on calling cards felt that they had received far fewer minutes than advertised, while 75.3% of those who called Trinidad and Tobago reported similar findings.
Such a trend is not so easy to explain away statistically. Certainly, there does seem to be a very real issue with calling card honesty and it is the scale of this which is truly disconcerting for anyone seeking to call Liberia, Ivory Coast or a host of other Africa, Sub-Continent or Caribbean countries.
When asked to estimate how much they had been overcharged by calling card companies, Rebtel’s customers estimations were frightening, the average reported loss to a customer who used international calling cards regularly was estimated to be around $125. A huge figure, but there are isolated claims from individuals who feel they have been cheated out of $500 worth of calls.
Large increase of Ethiopians living abroad using Rebtel
Ethiopians living in the US seem to be a large group of customers that appreciate Rebtel’s service. Since Rebtel lowered rates to Ethiopia to USD 0.205 to landline and USD 0.225 in February 2010, Rebtel has reported an increase in traffic of 100% for international calls to Ethiopia
From these figures, it certainly seems like large numbers of international calling card users are becoming increasingly annoyed with the rip-off service that many of these unscrupulous companies provide, and are switching, in their thousands, to companies like Rebtel.
When asking Rebtel’s operational controller Mikael Rosengren if he thinks calling cards are a rip off he says: “All we can do is try to provide the best call rates, call quality, charge the individual for the calls that they actually make in a fair, honest and open way, which is possible thanks to our great customer service. In the end it’s always up to the customer to choose the best alternative.”
Col. Asrat Bogale, a prominent and long time opponent of the Woyanne regime in Ethiopia, has passed away early Friday morning after receiving medical treatment in Paris.
Col. Asrat Bogale left Ethiopia over 30 years ago when the Derg military regime came to power. He hijacked an Ethiopian Airlines plane and forced it to land in Djibouti. After 2 year in jail, he was granted political asylum by the French Government and joined Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU).
When Woyanne came to power 17 years later, he joined Kefagn, an armed resistance group that was formed by Shaleqa Atana Wassie and others to fight the ethnic apartheid regime.
Later on, he formed his own clandestine group, and worked closely with the late Dr Kitaw Ejigou’s Ethiopian National United Front (ENUF).
He also took time to author 7 books, according to his daughter Rebecca Asrat who is currently living in Canada.
Col. Asrat is survived by his wife Wzr. Almaz Bantirgu and 8 children.
Memorial service for Col. Asrat will be held Thursday in Paris.
“Oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive,” said Sir Walter Scott, the English novelist and poet. It looks like the U.S. of A is really in a pickle tangled in a web of lies, deceit and diplomatic chicanery about its role and involvement in the 2006 invasion of Somalia by the dictator in Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi. The truth about the “fantastic Somalia job” (invasion), as the crown prince of Abu Dhabi called it, is now coming to light in the diplomatic cables acquired by Wikileaks, the organization dedicated to publishing sensitive documents from anonymous sources and whistleblowers. David Axe (Wired.com) citing Wikileaks cables last week argued that the U.S. had actually hired Zenawi to “do its dirty work” in Somalia. Axe wrote[1]:
It was an off-hand compliment during a January 2007 dinner [the month following Zenawi’s full scale invasion of Somalia] meeting between Abu Dhabi crown prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, plus staff, and then-U.S. Central Commander boss General John Abizaid…. ‘The Somalia job was fantastic,’ Al Nahyan interjected… At the time of Al Nahyan’s comment, the dust was just settling from Ethiopia’s Blitzkrieg-style assault toward Mogadishu. Some 50,000 Ethiopian troops… had cut a bloody swath through the lightly-armed forces of the Islamic Courts Union…. Washington certainly had a motive to get involved in Somalia… Already with two escalating wars on its own plate, the U.S. was in no position to openly lead its own large-scale attack on Somalia. It’d have been far simpler to simply sponsor somebody else to do the dirty work. Enter Ethiopia…. All the same, evidence was mounting that the U.S. had played a leading role in the Ethiopian invasion. Journalists only strongly suspected it, but Abu Dhabi prince Al Nayhan apparently knew it for certain, if his praise of “the Somalia job” was any indication…. Today, U.S. Special Forces continue to target terrorists in Somalia. There are arguably more of them than ever, thanks in part to the botched Ethiopian invasion. ‘We’ve made a lot of mistakes and Ethiopia’s entry in 2006 was not a really good idea,’ U.S. diplomat Donald Yamamoto said in March.
Blowback and Plausible Deniability
There appear to be two parallel cover stories invented from the beginning to explain U.S. involvement (and alternatively, non-involvement) in Zenawi’s invasion of Somalia. The first story is that Zenawi presented the U.S. a fait accompli (done deal) to invade Somalia. The U.S. advised against such an invasion but reluctantly supported it after it became clear that Zenawi’s decision was irreversible. The second is what may be called “throw-Zenawi-under-the-bus” story. If there is a blowback on the U.S. from Zenawi’s invasion because of high civilian casualties, other humanitarian disasters or prolonged stalemate, the U.S. could simply dump the entire blame on Zenawi and claim plausible deniability. In other words, “Zenawi did it on his own. The U.S. had nothing to do with it. The U.S. advised him not to invade. Blame Zenawi.” The straight story is that the U.S. not only supported the invasion but was actually snagged into supporting the invasion by the clever, calculating and cunning Zenawi.
The available evidence suggests that Zenawi had been spinning his own web of deceit and lies to entangle the U.S. in a Horn war in 2006 for two purposes: 1) to ingratiate himself with the U.S. and panhandle for more aid handouts, and 2) effectively deflect criticism of his miserable human rights record in the aftermath of the stolen May 2005 elections. In the run up to the Somali invasion, Zenawi was facing withering criticism and condemnation for his massive repression, massacres of hundreds of unarmed protesters and jailing of nearly all the opposition leaders, independent newspaper publishers, civic society leaders and human rights advocates in the country. By the Spring of 2006, an unprecedented bill was introduced in the U.S. Congress to cut off aid to Zenawi unless he improved his human rights record. Zenawi clearly understood that significant American support was essential for the very survival of his repressive regime. Zenawi was also keenly aware of American obsession, fixation and preoccupation with Al Qaeda in the Horn. Zenawi calculated that if he could seduce and snag the U.S. in an invasion of Somalia by presenting himself as an “Al Qaeda Hunter in the Horn”, he could have the best of all possible worlds. He could make best friends for life with the U.S. and forever forestall any actions that could result in a cutoff of U.S. aid to his regime or other unpleasant diplomatic pressure.
The evidence suggests that to accomplish this objective Zenawi concocted “false intelligence” to entice the U.S. into supporting his invasion of Somalia by essentially sounding the siren call that will always catch America’s attention: “The Jihadists are coming!!!” On June 6, 2006, six months before the full-scale invasion that led to the siege of Mogadishu and one month before a small contingent of Zenawi’s troops were sent to defend the Somali “Transitional Federal Government” (TGF) in Baidoa, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, who incidentally facilitated Zenawi’s takeover of power in Ethiopia in May 1991, shared an illuminating and well-informed insight:
Also, there are friends in the region, like the Ethiopians, who probably are feeding false intelligence about terrorists being hidden and that sort of thing, because the Ethiopians are deadly afraid of Moslem control and also they have their own Moslem problem among the Oromo ethnic group in Ethiopia. So they want to keep the Islamists out of power, and they will bring the U.S. into it, if they can.
By early Summer of 2006, former Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, who advised the U.S. Secretary of State and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs on African matters, was quietly working behind the scenes to facilitate the invasion of Somalia and spinning a web of lies and deception to conceal the nature of U.S. involvement. By mid-July 2006, the die had been cast and the initial invasion of Somalia had occurred when Zenawi deployed a contingent of his troops to prop up the TGF. In the preceding weeks, Frazer was priming the diplomatic circles and mollifying world public opinion by claiming that while the U.S. does not support an invasion of Somalia, it will not allow the “disintegration” of the TGF by jihadists and will “rally” to support Zenawi if he were to invade.[2]:
A confidential UN cable obtained by Human Rights Watch indicates that in a conversation with UN officials in June 2006, US Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer noted that the situation in Somalia was ‘uncertain.’ According to the notes, she presented the view that Eritrea had stepped over the line and that Ethiopia viewed Eritrean action in Somalia ‘as tantamount to opening a second front against Ethiopia.’ Dr. Frazer’s best-case scenario was that the ICU and TFG would engage in dialogue; the worst-case scenario was the expansion of the ICU throughout Somalia and the disintegration of the TFG. Dr. Frazer noted that the latter scenario would have a major negative impact in the Horn and that the US and IGAD would not allow it. She allegedly expressed the view that while the US feared an Ethiopian intervention could rally ‘foreign elements,’ the US would rally with Ethiopia if the ‘Jihadists’ took over.
By mid-December 2006, less than two weeks before Zenawi fully unleashed his “blitzkrieg” on Somalia and rumbled into Mogadishu, Fraser was setting the propaganda stage to convince the world that jihadists were provoking an Ethiopian attack. The N.Y. Times reported on December 14, 2006, that Frazer “said that diplomatic and intelligence officials believed that the Islamists could be trying to provoke an Ethiopian attack as a ‘rallying cry for support’ to their side.” On December 27, 2006, just as Zenawi’s troops were storming through the desert to Mogadishu after capturing the strategic town of Jowhar ninety miles to the north, the U.S. State Department endorsed the invasion by declaring that Islamist forces were creating “genuine security concerns” for Ethiopia. U.S. State Department spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos said: “Ethiopia has genuine security concerns with regard to developments in Somalia and has provided support at the request of the legitimate governing authority, the Transitional Federal institutions.”
All along, the U.S. had been working quietly with Zenawi providing training and military aid in manifest anticipation of the Somalia invasion. The invasion deal was sealed on December 4, 2006, when General John Abizaid, Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), met with Zenawi in Addis Ababa on what was billed as a “courtesy call to an ally”. Following Zenawi’s invasion of Somalia three weeks later, it became clear that the “courtesy call” was actually “the final handshake” to go forward with a full scale invasion[3]. On January 8, 2007, a little over a week after Zenawi’s troops had triumphantly captured Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, U.S.A. TODAY reported[4] :
The U.S. and Ethiopian militaries have ‘a close working relationship,’ Pentagon spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Joe Carpenter said. The ties include intelligence sharing, arms aid and training that gives the Ethiopians ‘the capacity to defend their borders and intercept terrorists and weapons of mass destruction,‘ he said. There are about 100 U.S. military personnel currently working in Ethiopia, Carpenter said.
Two weeks earlier on December 24, 2006, as heavy shelling and air strikes were directed at “jihadist” forces in border areas and the town of Beledweyne was being bombarded, Zenawi had described his decision to invade Somalia using almost the same words as the Pentagon. In a televised address Zenawi said, “Ethiopian defense forces were forced to enter into war to the protect the sovereignty of the nation and to blunt repeated attacks by Islamic courts terrorists and anti-Ethiopian elements they are supporting.”
By August 2007, Zenawi’s troops were bogged down in Somalia and the human cost was proving to be horrendous: Tens of thousands of civilians had died and over 870,000 Somalis had been forced to flee their homes in Mogadishu alone. By then, Somalia could only be described as “as one of the worst humanitarian situations in Africa.” The U.S. could see a huge blowback heading its way; it was time to take cover. Fraser did not blink once when she threw Zenawi under the bus. She said it was all Zenawi’s fault. On September 6, 2007, TIME Magazine reported[5]:
But, as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer has said, Washington opposed the invasion of Somalia. ‘We urged the Ethiopian military not to go into Somalia,’ said Frazer last month. ‘They did so because of their own national-security interests.’ This version of events, contrary to a common perception that the invasion was backed or even initiated by the U.S., is supported by accounts of a November 2006 meeting in Addis between Meles and the then head of U.S. Central Command, General John Abizaid. Sources from both sides relate that Abizaid told Meles he was ‘not allowed’ to invade Somalia, adding Somalia would become ‘Ethiopia’s Iraq.’ (An official in Washington disputes the precise language, but confirms the essence of the discussion.
Fraser repeated the same story line on February 12, 2008, when she told Newsweek Magazine[6]:
We told them [Ethiopia] that they should not go in. Once they went in absolutely we had to try to assist them and the [Somali] transitional federal government, which had invited them in. We support the transitional federal government and its decision to ask the Ethiopians to assist them.
The web of lies and deception had come to a complete circle in late 2007, and the “fantastic Somalia job” had managed to create a grotesque theater of death and destruction throughout Somalia.
The Jihadists Are Coming!
As many of my readers are aware, I have written extensively on the illegal invasion of Somalia on a number of occasions. I will reference three columns that I wrote on the issue. On November 28, 2006, a month before Zenawi’s tanks “blitzkrieged” their way into Mogadishu, I wrote a column entitled, “The Jihadists are Coming!”, arguing that Zenawi had fabricated the Somali jihadist threat to deflect attention from his dismal human rights record and repression and to buy the good will and diplomatic support of the U.S.[7]:
But the whole jihadist business smacks of political fantasy. It’s surreal. Mr. Zenawi says the Somali jihadists and their Al Qaeda partners should be opposed and defeated because they are undemocratic, anti-democratic, oppressive and authoritarian. The jihadists don’t believe in human rights and do not allow political or social dissent. They are fanatics who want to impose one-party rule, and do not believe in a democracy where the people elect their representatives. Duh!!! Has Mr. Zenawi looked at the mirror lately?
On October 2, 2008, in a column entitled, “The End of Pax Zenawi in Somalia”, I questioned whether the military effort to impose “Zenawi’s Peace” on the Somali people had finally collapsed[8]:
The situation in Somalia has turned Code Red. Things are deteriorating very fast for Zenawi’s troops. The Al-Shabaab “jihadists” have taken over Southern Somalia, and are ravenously eyeing Mogadishu. It is no longer “hit-and-run” guerrilla warfare. It is capture-and-stay…. Zenawi’s forces are in full “strategic retreat” to Mogadishu. After nearly two years of intervention and occupation of Somalia, there are no signs of success; and an anniversary of total failure in the quicksand of Somalia awaits Zenawi this coming December. Could this be the end of Pax Zenawi in Somalia?
On November 3, 2008, I followed up with another column entitled, “The 843-Day War”, based on a systematic content analysis of Zenawi’s public statements, and laid out the intricately fabricated sophistry Zenawi had used to justify his invasion of Somalia. I concluded:
It appears Zenawi completely underestimated the insurgents and the Somali people and overestimated the military prowess of his troops. He really did not know the Somalis as much as he thought he knew them. He underestimated their resolve to fight a force that had invaded and occupied their country.
Unmitigated Catastrophe in Somalia
Perhaps there is nothing surprising about disclosures of use of deceit and trumped-up intelligence by the Bush Administration to justify a proxy preemptive attack on a shattered nation that presented no credible threat to the United States. The tragedy is that by the time Zenawi had announced his decision to pull out his troops by December 2008, Somalia had become an “unmitigated catastrophe.” According to Human Rights Watch:
In 2008 the human rights and humanitarian situation in Somalia deteriorated into unmitigated catastrophe. Several thousand civilians have been killed in fighting. More than one million Somalis are now displaced from their homes and thousands flee across the country’s borders every month. Mogadishu, a bustling city of 1.2 million people in 2006, has seen more than 870,000 of its residents displaced by the armed conflict.
Someone, someday will be held accountable for all of the crimes against humanity, and the Almighty committed in Somalia.
The fact of the matter is that Zenawi would never invade Somalia except with the blessing and full support of the U.S. He is too cunning, too calculating and too sly to invade Somalia all by himself and at the explicit and strong disapproval of the U.S., as it has been claimed by Frazer. It is interesting to note that the U.S. has never condemned Zenawi’s invasion of Somalia, despite protestations that the U.S. had strongly advised against invasion and warned Zenawi that “Somalia would be Ethiopia’s Iraq.” Suffice it to say that the story of the Somali invasion of 2006 is akin to two spiders spinning their webs to entangle each other and suddenly found themselves in the middle of a hornet’s nest.
On March 12, 2010, former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia, Donald Yamamoto said, “We’ve made a lot of mistakes and Ethiopia’s entry in 2006 was not a really good idea.” He did not clarify the nature of the “mistakes”. Could it be that it was “not a really good idea” because the U.S. was exposed as a not-so-silent partner in the outsourced invasion of Somalia? Or could it be that it was a mistake because the hired gun botched the Somalia job? Perhaps the U.S. still supports Zenawi to the hilt because he did and continues to do such a “fantastic job in Somalia”.
As they say, “Truth is like the sun. You can shut it out for a time, but it ain’t goin’ away.” Well, it looks like Wikileaks is slowly lifting the curtain on the funny business the U.S. and Zenawi have been doing in the dark all these years.
RELEASE ALL ETHIOPIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS.
[1] http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/wikileaked-cable-confirms-u-s-secret-somalia-op/
[2] See “Shell-Shocked: Civilians Under Siege in Mogadishu,” Human Rights Watch, Vol. 19, 12(a), August 2007, p. 22, fn. 63.
[3] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/13/alqaida.usa
[4] http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-01-07-ethiopia_x.htm
[5] http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1659389,00.html#ixzz173rg1uwr
[6] http://www.newsweek.com/2008/02/11/fragile-institutions.html
[7] http://almariamforthedefense.blogspot.com/2006/11/jihadists-are-coming.html
[8] http://www.abugidainfo.com/?p=6175
[9] http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/6041
[10] Human Rights Watch, “So Much to Fear: War Crimes and the Devastation of Somalia,” December 2008, p.19
The Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), a puppet group that was created by Ethiopia’s despot Meles Zenawi to subjugate the Amhara ethnic group of Ethiopia, held a dinner party last night at the Woyanne-controlled Ethiopian embassy.
The party had attracted the usual {www:bottom feeder}s who have sold their soul for crumbs that Woyanne throw them.
Upon receiving information about the party, patriotic Ethiopians in the DC area quickly gathered and confronted the {www:crumb} collectors outside.
One of the hodams who arrived at the embassy decided to show his Woyanne puppet-masters how loyal he is by approaching the protesters with a camera. Seconds later he left with a smashed camera and a headache (see the video below).
The demonstration outside the embassy caused many of those who arrived for the dinner party to turn around and leave.
The protesters took photos of those who entered the embassy.
The fight against the Woyanne vampire regime is intensifying with new strategies and tactics. Ethiopians are getting themselves organized every where to confront and challenge Woyanne. In the past few weeks alone, brave Ethiopians have derailed Woyanne gatherings in Seattle, Las Vegas, Dallas, Atlanta, and London.
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000163
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/01/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KDEM, MOPS, ECON, KE, ET
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY OTERO’S MEETING WITH ETHIOPIAN
PRIME MINISTER MELES ZENAWI – JANUARY 31, 2010
Classified By: Under Secretary Maria Otero for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (SBU) January 31, 2010; 4:15 p.m.; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
2. (SBU) Participants:
U.S. Under Secretary Otero Assistant Secretary Carson NSC Senior Director for African Affairs Michelle Gavin PolOff Skye Justice (notetaker)
Ethiopia Prime Minister Meles Zenawi Special Assistant Gebretensae Gebremichael
Summary
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3. (C) Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero his government placed no restrictions on its citizens’ democratic and civil rights, only the right of foreign entities to fund them. Foreign funding of civil society organizations (CSOs) is antithetical to democratization, he said, as it makes civil society leaders accountable to foreign entities rather than their own members, turning the concept of democratic accountability on its head. Democracy in Ethiopia must develop organically, and Ethiopians must organize and fund themselves and defend their own rights. Meles assured U/S Otero that Ethiopia’s upcoming elections will be free, fair, transparent, and peaceful, and elaborated steps his government has taken to ensure this. While opposition groups may resort to violence in an attempt to discredit the election, the GoE will enforce the recently enacted Electoral Code of Conduct and its existing election laws without regard to party affiliation. Meles said he has warned opposition leaders that the international community will not be able to save them should they violate Ethiopian law, but rather if they do so they will face the same fate as opposition leader Birtukan Midekssa, who will “vegetate in jail forever.” The U.S. delegation noted that Ethiopia’s forthcoming elections would be closely watched in the U.S., and urged Meles to exercise wise judgment and leadership, give the opposition more political space, and consider the release of Birtukan Midekssa.
4. (C) Meles said the GoE is not enthusiastic about Kenya’s Jubaland initiative, but is sharing intelligence with Kenya and hoping for success. In the event the initiative is not successful, the GoE has plans in place to limit the destabilizing impacts on Ethiopia. On climate change, Meles said the GoE fully supports the Copenhagen accord, but is disappointed with signs the U.S. may not support his proposed panel to monitor international financial contributions under the accord. Meles made no substantive comment on inquiries regarding the liberalization of banking and telecommunications in Ethiopia. End summary.
Foreign Funding of CSOs Antithetical to Democratization
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5. (C) Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told U/S Otero the development of a strong democracy and civil society is the only way Ethiopia can ensure peace and unity among an ethnically and religiously divided population. He noted that the Government of Ethiopia’s (GoE) commitment to democracy is directly related to stability, adding that for Ethiopia, “democratization is a matter of survival.” Responding to U/S Otero’s concern that Ethiopia’s recently-enacted CSO law threatened the role of civil society, Meles said while the GoE welcomes foreign funding of charities, those Ethiopians who want to engage in political activity should organize and fund themselves. The leaders of CSOs that receive foreign funding are not accountable to their organizations, he said, but rather to the sources of their funding, turning the concept of democratic accountability on its head. Meles asserted that Ethiopians were not too poor to organize themselves and establish their own democratic traditions, recalling that within his lifetime illiterate peasants and poor students had overthrown an ancient imperial dynasty.
6. (C) Meles said his country’s inability to develop a strong democracy was not due to insufficient understanding of democratic principles, but rather because Ethiopians had not internalized those principles. Ethiopia should follow the example of the U.S. and European countries, he said, where democracy developed organically and citizens had a stake in its establishment. When people are committed to democracy and forced to make sacrifices for it, Meles said, “they won’t let any leader take it away from them.” But “when they are spoon-fed democracy, they will give it up when their source of funding and encouragement is removed.” Referencing his own struggle against the Derg regime, Meles said he and his compatriots received no foreign funding, but were willing to sacrifice and die for their cause, and Ethiopians today must take ownership of their democratic development, be willing to sacrifice for it, and defend their own rights.
7. (C) Meles drew a clear distinction between Ethiopians’ democratic and civil rights on the one hand, and the right of foreign entities to fund those rights on the other. There is no restriction on Ethiopians’ rights, he asserted, merely on foreign funding, adding that the U.S. has similar laws. U/S Otero countered that while the U.S. does not allow foreign funding of political campaigns, there is no restriction on foreign funding of NGOs. Ms. Gavin noted the examples of foreign support for the abolitionist movement in the U.S. and for the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa as positive examples of foreign engagement of civil society, and expressed that aside from the issue of foreign funding, the ability of local organizations to legally register, operate, and contribute to democratic discourse was of tantamount importance.
GoE Will Hold Free and Fair Elections, Despite Opposition
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8. (C) Meles assured U/S Otero that Ethiopia’s upcoming electoral process will be free, fair, transparent, and peaceful. The GoE has learned from the violence that followed the 2005 elections, he said, and taken action to ensure that violence is not repeated. Meles said the recently signed Electoral Code of Conduct (CoC) was not done for the benefit of political parties, but for the Ethiopian people. The people will ultimately judge political actors, he said, and they must have parameters agreed to by the parties by which they will judge those actors. After the CoC was passed, Meles noted, the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) gathered over 1,300 of its senior leaders to discuss party strategy and train all leaders on the CoC. The EPRDF knows violations of the CoC by its members will hurt the party and provide a rallying cry for the opposition. This message will flow down to all EPRDF members, he said, so that they know what is expected of them, and know both the courts and the party will hold them accountable to the CoC.
9. (C) Meles told U/S Otero he feared a repeat of the 2005 violence, and that many opposition members were not interested in peaceful elections, but would rather discredit the electoral process. As such, the EPRDF cannot give them any excuse to resort to violence. Meles noted that in addition to opposition political parties, the GoE had intelligence that the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki were all directly or indirectly involved in plots to discredit the elections. The EPRDF, he said, would “let them be” to show the population that even though their opponents’ goal is not peace, the EPRDF will abide by the law.
10. (C) Meles recalled that in 2005, he had told opposition leaders in the presence of the diplomatic corps that they should not believe foreign allies would protect them if they violated the laws of Ethiopia. Opposition leaders were right to believe the diplomatic corps would try to protect them, he said, as evidenced by the statement they issued demanding the release of opposition politicians upon their arrest in 2005. Today, Meles said, foreign embassies are inadvertently conveying the same message, that they will protest the jailing of opposition leaders and potentially take action against Ethiopia to secure their release. However, the GoE has made clear to both opposition and EPRDF leaders that nothing can protect them except the laws and constitution of Ethiopia, and the GoE will clamp down on anyone who violates those laws. “We will crush them with our full force,” Meles said, and “they will vegetate like Birtukan (Midekssa) in jail forever.”
11. (C) In an extended discussion in response to Meles’ comments, U/S Otero, A/S Carson, and Ms. Gavin noted that Ethiopia’s forthcoming elections would be closely watched in the U.S. and that the GoE’s treatment of the opposition would be subject to public criticism by the Ethiopian diaspora and U.S. political figures. The U.S. delegation urged Meles to exercise wise judgment and leadership, give the opposition more political space, and consider the release of Birtukan Midekssa. A/S Carson stressed the importance of putting Ethiopia’s democracy on an upward and positive trajectory, and not letting it atrophy or slide backward, using the suffrage and civil rights movements in the U.S. as an illustration of challenges the U.S. has faced as it improved its own democratic system. (Note: Three quarters of the nearly two-hour meeting focused on democracy. End note.)
Ethiopia Not Enthusiastic About Jubaland Initiative
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12. (C) Meles said he had been briefed extensively regarding Kenya’s Jubaland initiative. Because Ethiopia had previously intervened in Somalia without seeking Kenyan approval, he said, the GoE would not presume to analyze the Kenyans’ chances for success in their own intervention. The GoE is sharing intelligence with Kenya, but Meles expressed a lack of confidence in Kenya’s capacity to pull off a tactical success, which he feared could have negative regional impacts. The GoE is therefore working to minimize the likelihood of a spillover effect in Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State. Noting that Ethiopia might have underestimated Kenya, Meles said, “We are not enthusiastic, but we are hoping for success.”
GoE Prepared to Move Forward from Copenhagen
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13. (C) U/S Otero urged Meles to sign the Copenhagen accord on climate change and explained that it is a point of departure for further discussion and movement forward on the topic. She noted that while the agreement has its limitations, it has the international community moving in the right direction. Meles responded that the GoE supported the accord in Copenhagen and would support it at the AU Summit. However, he expressed his disappointment that despite President Obama’s personal assurance to him that finances committed in Copenhagen would be made available, he had received word from contacts at the UN that the U.S. was not supportive of Ethiopia’s proposal for a panel to monitor financial pledges regarding climate change. Ms. Gavin assured the Prime Minister that she would look into his concerns.
No Promises on Liberalizing Telecoms, Banking
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14. (C) U/S Otero and A/S Carson encouraged Meles to hasten steps to liberalize the telecommunications and banking industries in Ethiopia, and highlighted both the micro- and macroeconomic benefits of liberalization. Meles offered no substantive response to A/S Carson’s query whether any progress had been made toward liberalizing or otherwise improving telecommunications, joking that Americans’ concept of time was much faster than Ethiopians’. In response to U/S Otero’s recognition of the important role of private banks in microfinance projects that directly benefit the poor, and assurance that private and state-owned banks could thrive side-by-side, Meles said he would be happy to discuss the issue in the future. YATES
Five year ago, though there were feelings of uncertainty and fearfulness about the future direction of Ethiopia itself, as well as its politics – including the possible transfer of power from the regime of Meles Zenawi to the then opposition parties – a good number of Ethiopians both at home and in the Diaspora were not just active but were energized and determined to fight against the factors and actors that divide us, to cultivate and expand a sense of togetherness and unity, and to do everything in our capacity to be sincere and respectful to each other, helping our country with collective hands and fresh thoughts. Yes, even though some of us felt a growing anxiety, especially due to the absence of well structured, professionally functioning and legally framed organizations in the Diaspora, a disproportionately high number of Ethiopians indeed anticipated that a harmonious society and a relatively peaceful, free and economically prosperous Ethiopia were being shaped and set on the right path for the first time in the entire history of our country. Consequently, the period was marked by plentiful, memorable sights and sounds of Ethiopian get-togethers, the publication of enormous number of articles, radio transmissions and demonstrations held throughout the international community protesting against the brutal killings of Ethiopians, including women and children, in support of what was then Kinijit and its leadership, from which Ethiopians were enthusiastically and with excitement awaiting relative freedom and democracy, expecting to face and test both its fruits and challenges.
Unfortunately, however – even though many of my compatriot politicians and political activists might not want to recognize this, to avoid creating impediments to their short term political agendas – whether we live in Ethiopia or in the Diaspora, and whether we belong to the ruling regime or opposition groups, one tends to feel that our blood, cultural behaviours and attitudes seem immune or perhaps inappropriate to the concepts of democracy, equality, individual freedom and human rights. Indeed, as the past two or more decades of political upheavals and experiences have shown, family affiliations, comradeship, group interests and regionalism are more urgent, more imperative to us than the complex collective issues and problems of the people of Ethiopia as a whole.
Yes, in Ethiopian culture equality, individual freedom and democracy are unknown quantities; they are strange to us, even though most Ethiopians expressed repeated wishes and uninterrupted prayers that the fears and anxieties voiced by a few concerned Ethiopians were wholly unfounded, and that instead the winds of change and democracy blowing above the mountains of Ethiopia would become more rapid and powerful. Meanwhile, the actual fashioning of implementable democratic strategies and the possibilities for working hand in glove with all stakeholders, while maintaining a sense of integrity and accountability, quickly became a tricky business, difficult to integrate with the mindsets and cultures of Ethiopians. Everything related to the opposition movements was emotionally loaded; once group oriented, they soon became to be dominated by personal and group interests and rivalries. Consequently, internal conflicts, infighting and rifts within the various movements and groups were rife, both in our homeland and in the Diaspora. This contributed to the untimely and complete dissolution of Kinijit and its disappearance from the political landscape of Ethiopia, which in turn left us today in complete darkness and confusion, with no a single reliable political party or socio-political movement to engage with and support.
Chronicling the Forgotten and Unrecorded Recent Events and Wars
As if writing up crucial historical and political events is forbidden by God or culturally restricted, we Ethiopians in general remain apathetic, appearing unconcerned about recording our own socio-economic and political processes and events, including the origins and dissolution of political parties and movements. This is notwithstanding that these political parties or movements are part and parcel of the political landscape and history of our country. They were established with the objective of adding helping hands and voices to support the process of democratization of the country, even though the opposition leaders and their supporters have been unable to communicate effectively and tirelessly and to avoid repeated confrontations and infighting. The recent unexpected dissolution of Kinijit and the unhappy split among its top leaders is a case in point. In fact, no one among those involved in Kinijit politics and activities knew in advance about the measures undertaken by Engineer Hailu Shawel during that chilly winter season, except a very few insiders or others very close to him.
Indeed, while most of us living in the western world were enjoying the approaching Christmas and New Year holiday shopping so quietly and happily, some holding firmly the hands of lovely little children or someone we love dearly, the unexpectedly speedy winds of the long smoldering rift among Kinijit leadership reached its ultimate climax. And, much to the astonishment and shock of politically conscious Ethiopians, the chilly December Winter season of 2007 marked the end of the main opposition party, Kinijit, when the Chairman of the party, Engineer Hailu Shawel abruptly announced the suspension of five top leadership figures, including Judge Birtukan Mideksa, then Vice Chair of the party; Mayor-Elect of Addis Ababa city, Dr. Berhanu Nega; Kinijit Spokesperson, Dr Hailu Araya; Engineer Gizachew Shiferaw and Brook Kebede. The announcement of the suspension was posted and/or transmitted through the Ethiopian Diaspora media outlets.
As can be imagined and as is always the case in Ethiopian political culture, the suspended individuals felt deeply offended, that the actions undertaken by Engineer Hailu Shawel were unfounded, and that the words and tone of the announcement were antagonistic, disparaging and autocratic, they responded instantaneously and heavy handedly – much to the displeasure of Engineer Hailu Shawel and his supporters – by establishing their own political party and movement, at home and in the Diaspora. The end of 2007 and the subsequent years were not marked just by the suspension of five key Kinijit figures and the establishment of a new political party and movement; more damagingly, there was also a declaration of a highly intense cyberwar among the supporters of each political group – each firing its tanks and guns from its own warzones and hidden fortresses, unknown and remote from its targeted enemies. As understood by most of us, the announcement of the suspensions and the subsequently established movement and political party marked the final dissolution of Kinijit, thereby dashing the immeasurable and intense, though short-lived, hopes and expectations Ethiopians had for both Kinijit and its leaders.
A related event took place some six weeks prior to the suspensions carried out by Engineer Hailu Shawel. Strangely, almost unbelievably, even the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) activists – with almost four decades of experience in politics and conflict resolution, and who had managed to regroup, primarily during the campaign and the aftermath of the May 2005 Ethiopian parliamentary election – were not spared by the spreading cruel, unforgiving disease of divisiveness. One would certainly not imagine that the hostile winds of division would dare to shake and tear the rocky houses built by those who were the direct victims of both the Dergue and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and suffered so tremendously at their hands – those who had held secret and dangerous meetings in various Ethiopia cities, waged urban wars, and who spent time together so closely and intimately as brothers, sisters and comrades under the chilly winters and summers of the Assimba mountains. Unfortunately, however, we who envisaged that the houses of EPRP were built upon heavy, immovable rocks and that decades of life and political experience and wisdom would not be so easily and so simply cracked were wholly in error. Yes, we were utterly wrong because, notwithstanding the incalculable sacrifice made by the generation that withstood the early years of Ethiopia’s socio-economic and political upheavals, accompanied by a climate of irreversible and irreparable destruction and of trust and confidence in each other, and the wisdom and life experience built up by the EPRP over decades, including their unhurriedly, carefully constructed rocky and immovable houses, appeared full of holes – weak and unable to hold back the strong, speedy winds carrying both long existing animosities and newly conceived hostilities and resentments among Ethiopian political activists.
Many politically conscious Ethiopians, especially those who belong to the generation had hoped that the long-held ideology of EPRP, the lost comrades, brothers and sisters in the cities of Ethiopia and in the vicinity of the mountain of Assimba, and the deep-seated and painful memories of the struggle would serve the entire EPRP, activists and other sympathizers, as sources of motivation, as fuel providing energy, and as a vital linkage, keeping them together and united for as long as the resistance requires them, and even beyond. Unfortunately and sadly, however, the hopes most us associated with both the blood and the ideology of the generation did not materialize. After some months of rumors in some Diaspora media outlets about increasing disagreements and wrangling, the actual split of EPRP into two camps became a reality at an Extraordinary Congress held on 29 October 2007 in Washington DC, which was marked by a fierce debates and the exchanges of unpalatable words, statements and accusations among long-time friends and war comrades who together had survived repeated attempts on their lives in the cities, the bush and the deserts of both their country of origin and their countries of exile within the region of the Horn of Africa. As can be imagined, the news was received by member activists, sympathizers and by others who belong to the generation with astonishment and sadness.
As if the shock and astonishment experienced by Ethiopians at the split of the EPRP and the measures undertaken by Engineer Hailu Shawel had not been enough, the unforgiving, cruel winds of divisiveness continued, spreading into the bodies of other political activist groups like a contagious disease. Even though society regards women, in comparison to their male counterparts, as more tolerant, sensible and capable of resolving disagreements and conflicts through softly, wisely and diplomatically crafted talk and other means of communications, due to an apparent absence of training in effective communication and conflict resolution within organizations, and also due to the affiliation of most of the leading members of the International Ethiopian Women’s Organization (IEWO) to one or the other of the political groups, there was no way to prevent the powerful and spreading disease of separation from entering the body of this group as well. Consequently, within just a few months after the split within EPRP, the IEWO group, to which I was once invited to speak, giving an overview about the future role and direction of Ethiopian opposition parties, made its irreconcilable decision to follow the footsteps of Kinijt and EPRP. It became two IEWO groups in early 2008, and exactly as other Ethiopian social and political groupings, they too decided to create two separate groups, each with its own website, but with significantly fewer activities, including face-to-face gatherings, and with fewer activist members, especially in comparison to the initial months of the IEWO.
The three tragic events described here, which took place in just under six months, illustrates how we Ethiopians evidently find it extremely difficult to work together on issues related to our country, unless we are forced to it either by extreme economic hardships or political and other pressures. These three most unfortunate examples show also how far removed our political culture is from becoming mature. What is more confusing, even embarrassing, is that – while we are not even in a position to maintain a friendly and peaceful climate while engaging each other in mature political discussions, and to manifest integrity and democratic minds while working together in groups – individual Ethiopians, even those who have already split up and established their own talking shops and groups are still talking so boldly and so loudly about their irrevocable determination to free Ethiopia from the entangled chains of the repressive regime of Meles Zenawi. They also repeatedly raise billion dollar questions, such as what exactly would be the best strategy and the shortest road to travel to destroy Meles Zenawi and those around him? Instead of first asking themselves why on earth we Ethiopians are so culturally stubborn, so unable to work together on the issues of our country and to sort of what exactly went wrong with us, including how we can be cured of our culturally inculcated diseases of family and group orientation and regionalism in relation to Ethiopian politics? Why, actually, do we still talk about destroying the power structure of the tyrannical regime when over ninety percent of us cannot even look at and talk to those who belong to other opposition political groupings in civil terms, genuinely, and with clean and clear minds?
In summary, though difficult to measure in objective terms, I would nonetheless dare to say that the price to be paid for the direct and indirect repercussions of these tragic events and related infighting would be, as has already been witnessed, the gradual disappearance of political movements and politically active community members, the breakup of already weakened social relationships and work within the Ethiopian Diaspora community, and unquestionably – and more essentially – the extension of the lifespan of Meles Zenawi by an additional two or more decades, unless some kind of coup d’état within his own circle, possibly by the armed forces, were to occur.
