Skip to content

Author: Negash

የህወሃት ማበስበሱ ቁማርና የደኅንነቱ ሚና

Posted on

የቀዩ መስመር ሰላባዎች?

By Goolgule.com

May 20, 2013

Woyyane

 

መለስ ህይወታቸው እንዳለፈ ከተሰጡት አስተያየቶችና ትንቢቶች መካከል ቀዳሚው የመለስ ሞት ለህወሃት ጊዜውን ጠብቆ የሚፈነዳ ፈንጂ መሆኑ ነበር። በዚሁ በጎልጉል የድረገጽ ጋዜጣ በስልጣን ላይ ያሉ የኢህአዴግ ዲፕሎማት “መለስ የቆፈሩት ጉድጓድ” በሚል ርዕስ በሰጡት ቃለ ምልልስ ይህ እንደሚከሰት ቁልጭ አድርገው ተናግረው ነበር።

መለስ አፍነው የያዟቸው የፖለቲካ ችግሮች ጊዜያቸውን እየጠበቁ የሚፈነዱና በመጨረሻም ፓርቲውን እንደሚፈረካክሰው የተገለጸው በየደረጃ የሚፈነዱት ችግሮች እየበረከቱ በመሄዳቸው ነበር። መለስ አፍነው የያዟቸው ችግሮች የእርስ በርስ መበላላት ደረጃ እንደሚያደርሱ በርካታ ወገኖችና መገናኛዎች ጎልጉልን ጨምሮ አመላክተዋል። አሁን አሁን ትንቢቱ የፍጻሜው ጅማሬ ላይ እንደሚገኝ የሚናገሩም አሉ።

የፖለቲካ አቋም ልዩነት ሳይኖር የአስተሳሰብ ልዩነት ማራመድ በህወሃት ዘንድ አይቻልም። ከተሞከረም ክህደት ነው፤ መፈንቅለ መንግስት የማካሄድ ያህል ነው። የርዕዮተ ዓለም ለውጥ የማቀጣጠል ያህል ያስፈርጃል። ሽብርተኛ ያስብላል። ከቶውንም ተቀባይነት ስለሌለው ድንበር ተበጅቶለታል። ድንበሩም “ቀይ መስመር” በመባል ይታወቃል። የ”ቀይ መስመር” ሃሳብ አመንጪና ደራሲ አቶ መለስ ናቸው። “በጠቅላይ ሚኒስትርነት ማዕረግ የቀድሞው ፕሬዚዳንት ዶ/ር ነጋሶ ጊዳዳ” በሚል የምጸት ስም የሚጠሩት አቶ ሃይለማርያም ደሳለኝም ይህንን የቀይ መስመር ጽንሰ ሃሳብ ለንግግር ያህል ይጠቀሙበታል።haile and girma

ቀይ መስመር የሚሰመርበት በውል ተለይቶ የተቀመጠ ውስን ጊዜ የለውም። መስመሩ ሁሌም አለ። ሁሉም ቆመውበታል። ከልምድ እንደሚታየው በህወሃት ህመም ኢህአዴግ ሲያተኩሰው በድንገት መስመሩ በደማቁ እንዲቀባ ይደረጋል። መስመሩ የሚቀባበት ደማቅ ቀለም የሚቀዳው አቶ መለስ አፈር ሳይልሱ “በስብሰናል” ሲሉ ከሰየሙት የኢህአዴግ የ”ማበስበሻ” ባህር ውስጥ ነው።

በኢህአዴግ የ”ማበስበሻ” ባህር ውስጥ ያልተነከረ የለም። በዚህ ባህር ውስጥ ሆነው የሚንቦጫረቁት ተቆጥረው አይሰፈሩም። አዲስ አበባ በአራቱም ማዕዘን፣ በክልልና በክልል ዋና ዋና ከተሞች፣ እንዲሁም በተለያዩ አገራት የሚሰነፍጠው የባህሩ “ግልማት” የዜጎችን የመኖር ህልውና ከተፈታተነ ቆይቷል።

በባህሩ ውስጥ በመርከብ ሆነው በጀልባ የሚቀዝፉትን የሚመለከቱ አሉ። ጀልባ የሚቀዝፉት ጌቶቻቸውንና “ልዕልቷን” እያዩ ሽታውን በለመዱት ባህር ውስጥ ይምነሸነሻሉ። በዛው ባህር ውስጥ በደረታቸው እየዋኙና እየተንቦጫረቁ ግብር የሚያስገቡ አሉ። “ዲጂታል” የሚባሉትና “ምስለኔዎቹ” ደሞ የማበስበሻውን “መረቅ የማቅለሚያ ማዕድን” ይዘው አራት ኪሎ የባህሩ አናትና ማማ ላይ ሆነው ሁሉንም ይመራሉ። የባህሩን የመጫወቻ ህግ የሚበላቸውና ከበሰበሰው ባህር ወደ እቶን የሚወረወሩት “የቀይ መስመር ሰለባዎች ” ይለያሉ። ለይተው ሲጨርሱ ለባህሩ ካፒቴን የፌዴራል የስነ ምግባርና ጸረ ሙስና ኮሚሽን ያቀብሉታል። በዚሁ ሂደት ይቀጥላል። አዲስ ነገር የለም። ሊኖርም አይችልም። ይህ መነሻ ነው። ወደ ጉዳዩ እናምራ።

የሰሞኑ ወግ – ኢህአዴግ አመረረ ወይስ ቀለደ?

ሰሞኑን ኢህአዴግ “ሙስና ላይ ዘመትኩ። በህዝብ ጥቆማና ትብበር ሙስና የተንሰራፋበትን ተቋም አበራየሁት። የህዝብ ትብብር አይለየኝ …” በማለት የፍርድ ቤት አሰራርና ህጋዊ የፍርድ አካሄድ እያስኮመኮመ የሚያውጀው አዋጅ ያስገረማቸው ክፍሎች “እንዴት እንመን? እንዴት እንቀበል? ማን ያልተነካካ አለ?” እያሉ ነው። ከተለያዩ አቅጣጫ “ኢህአዴግ አመረረ ወይስ ቀለደ” በሚል ክርክርም እያስነሳ ነው።

የፌዴራል ስነ ምግባርና ጸረ ሙስና ኮሚሽን ኮሚሽነር አሊ ሱሌማን ፓርላማ ቀርበው “ጥናቱ የተጀመረው በአቶ መለስ ትዕዛዝ ከዓመት ከአስር ወር በፊት ነበር” በማለት ምስክርነታቸውን የሰጡበት ዘመቻ አቶ መለስ በህይወት እያሉ ያልተጠናቀቀው በድንገት በመታመማቸው፣ ከዛም በመሞታቸው፣ ከዛም በላይ የሽግግር ወቅት በመሆኑ እንደሆነ አስረድተዋል። መለስ ሲሞቱ ሃይለማርያም ሙስና ላይ ዘመቱ በሚል ስባሪ ታሪክ እንዳያተርፉ፣ ከዚያም አልፎ ዘመቻው የፖለቲካ ልዩነቱ የፈጠረው “የአራግፍ፣ የመንጥር ዘመቻ” እንዳይመስል አቶ አሊ መለስን የዘመቻው “አባትና ባለታሪክ” አድርገው እንዲያቀርቡ መታዘዛቸው ዘመቻው የተለመደው የኢህአዴግ ቀልድ እንደሆነ አመላካች ስለመሆኑ በስፋት አስተያየት የሚሰነዘርበት ጉዳይ ነው።

ምንም ሆነ ምንም ኢህአዴግ ለጀመረው የሙስና ዘመቻ ሊመሰገን ይገባዋል የሚሉ ወገኖች ዘመቻው እንደ ሰደድ እሳት ተያይዞ የሚነድ ስለመሆኑ ሲናገሩ ይሰማል። የኢህአዴግ ደቀ መዝሙር በመሆን የሚታወቁ ድርጅታቸው “የመለስ ቦናፓርቲ” የተሃድሶ ዘመን ተመልሶ እንደመጣ፣ የዚህ ተሃድሶ ፊት አውራሪ ደግሞ እጩ ጠ/ሚኒስትሩ ዶ/ር ደብረጽዮን ገ/ሚካኤል እንደሆኑ በኩራት እየተናገሩ ነው።

ከደህንነቱ ራዳር የተሰወረ አለ?

በብሔራዊ መረጃና ደህንነት አገልግሎት የማናቸውም ባለሃብቶችና ባለስልጣናት እለታዊና አጠቃላይ የክትትል መረጃ ተመዝግቦ የተቀመጠ ነው። ዋናው ደህንነት የማበስበሻው ባህር ቁልፍ እጁ ላይ ነው። ሲፈለግ ከዋናው ባህር መዝገብ የሚፈልጋቸው ነቅሶ በስሩ ላላው የኢኮኖሚ ደህንነት ዘርፍ ያቀብላል። ለስራው ቅርብ የነበሩና በቅርቡ አገር ለቀው ናይሮቢ የሚገኙ እንዳሉት በዚሁ አሰራር መሰረት አሁን የታሰሩት ሰዎች ሪፖርት ተጠናቆ የቀረበው የዛሬ አምስት ወር ግድም ነው።

ደህንነቱ ማን ከማን ጋር እንደሚሰራ፣ የትኞቹ ባለስልጣናት ከየትኛው “ባለሃብት” ጋር አብረው እንደሚሰሩ፣ በየትኛው ወገኖቻቸውና ዘመዶቻቸው ስም እንደሚነግዱ፣ የኤክስፖርትና ኢምፖርት ስራ እንደሚሰሩ፣ ያለ ማስያዣ ብድር እንደሚፈቅዱና እንዲፈቀድ መመሪያ የሚሰጡ፣ ወዘተ ሙሉ መረጃ እንዳለው የሚጠቁሙት እኚሁ ሰው “ሙስና ከግል፣ ከድርጅትና ከተቋማት አልፎ በመንግስት ደረጃ የተዘረጋ ነውና ማን ማንን ይወነጅላል?” የሚል ጥያቄ ያነሳሉ። አያይዘውም “አገራችን ውስጥ ሙስና በግለሰብ ደረጃ ሳይሆን በመንግስት ደረጃ የተቋቋመ ነው” ብለዋል።

ሌሎችም እንደሚሉት ሙስናው ሊደበቅ በማይችል ደረጃ አገሪቱን እንደ ወባ ወረርሽኝ ሲያጥለቀልቃት፣ በየአቅጣጫው ሙስናና የመልካም አስተዳደር ችግር ህዝብን ሲያንገሸግሸው ለምን ዝምታ ተመረጠ? የሚለው አንኳር ጉዳይ ብዙ ከመላምትነት የዘለሉ ምክንያቶች እየቀረቡበት ነው። በተለያዩ ደረጃ የኢህአዴግን የመበስበስና የእድገት ደረጃ የማሟጠጥ ጉዳይ አንተርሰው አስተያየት የሚሰጡ ቅድሚያ አጀንዳ የሚያደርጓቸው አቶ መለስን ነው።

መለስ ዝምታን ለምን መረጡ?

እርሳቸው ምን ያህል ተዋናይ እንደሆኑ አሃዝ ጠቅሶ መናገር ባይቻልም አቶ መለስ አገሪቱ በሙስና መንቀዟን እያወቁ ዝም ማለታቸው ከተባባሪነት እንደማያሸሻቸው ስምምነት አለ። በፓርላማ፤ ከነጋዴዎችና ከኢንቨስትመንት ማህበረሰብ ጋርና ከተለያዩ አካላት ጋር ሲነጋገሩ ሙስናን አስመልክቶ አስገራሚ ዲስኩር ሲያሰሙ ኖረው ያለፉት አቶ መለስ፣ ሙስናን ተሸክመው የኖሩት በፍርሃቻ እንደሆነ የአብዛኞች ማጠቃለያ ነው። አቶ መለስ ሙስናን እንደ ስልት በመጠቀም በዙሪያቸው ያሉትን “በማበስበስ” እንዳሻቸው ይነዱዋቸዋል።

በሙስና የተጨማለቁና በሙስናው ባህር ውስጥ የሚዋኙትን ባለስልጣናት፣ ካድሬዎች፣ ባለሃብቶች፣ የጊዜው ሰዎችና ዘመዶቻቸው ቢታወቁም አቶ መለስ በመፈክር አብረዋቸው ለመኖር የወሰኑትና በዚያው ይህችን ዓለም ባላሰቡበት መንገድ የተለዩት በጡረታና “ያለህን ብላ” በሚል አካባቢያቸውን ለማጽዳት የሞከሩት ሙስናው ውስን አድራሻና መንደር ስለሌለው ነው። ዛሬ ምን አዲስ ነገር ተገኘና መለስ የፈሩት ሙስና እንዴት ተደፈረ?

መለስ በህይወት እያሉ ሙስናውን ዝም አሉ የሚሉትን ክፍሎች አጥብቀው የሚቃወሙ ቡድኖች ደግሞ “አቶ መለስ የሙስናው አውራ ናቸው። በመንግስት ደረጃ ለተገነባው የሙስና መንደር ፊታውራሪና ይለፍ ሰጪ ናቸው” ሲሉ ይከራከራሉ። የሙስናውን አዝመራ የዘሩ፣ ኮትኩተው ያለመለሙት፣ መጨረሻ ላይም ባህር አዘጋጅተው የማበስበሻ አረንቋ የተከሉት አቶ መለስ በመሆናቸው ርምጃ ለመውሰድ እንደማይቻላቸው፣ ርምጃ ልውሰድ ቢሉም ሁሉም ስለተበከሉ “በአገሪቱ የጦር አዛዥ፣ የፖሊስ አለቃ፣ የደህንነት ሹም፣ የሚኒስትሮች ምክር ቤት፣ ፓርላማ፣ ቀበሌ፣ ክፍለ ከተማ፣ ከንቲባ፣ መሃንዲስ፣ ሆስፒታል … የሚቀር ስለማይኖር በቅድሚያ በአገሪቱ የአስቸኳይ ጊዜ አዋጅ ሊታወጅ ይገባል” ሲሉ የሙስናውን አደገኛነትና መንግስታዊ መዋቅር ያለው ስለመሆኑ ይከራከራሉ።

ለማስረጃ ከሚያነሱት መከራከሪያ መካከል “ዋናው የሙስና ሻርክ” በሚል ስያሜ የሚጠሩት ባለሃብትና በሳቸው መዋቅር ውስጥ ሆነው ከተራ ወንጀል እስከ አገር አቀፍና ድንበር ዘለል ዝርፊያ የሚፈጽሙ “ማፍያዎች”፣ በፌስታል ብር የሚያቀባብሉ ምስለኔዎች፣ የባለስልጣናትን ሚስቶችና ዘመዶች በንግድ ተቋሞቻቸው በመሰግሰግ የአገሪቱን ህግና ህገመንግስት እንዳሻቸው የሚጋልቡ  ማጅራት መቺዎች፣ የአገሪቱን ባንኮችና የንግድ ስርዓት በማዛባት ሰርተው የሚበሉ ዜጎችን አሟምተው የጨረሱ፣ የራሳቸው ፖሊስና የደኅንነት ሃይል በመገንባት እንደ መንግስት ያቆጠቆጡ ወዘተ በህዝብ ይታወቃሉ። እኒህ ክፍሎች የአቶ መለስን ኮሪዶርና ማረፊያ ቤት ሲመላለሱበት መለስ ዝም ማለታቸው ከምን የመነጨ ሊሆን ይችላል? የሚል ጥያቄ ለሚያነሱ መልሱ አንድ ነው። እሳቸውም፣ ባለቤታቸውም፣ ዘመዶቻቸውም፣ ወገኖቻቸውም፣ የትልቁ “የማበስበሻው ባህር” አባል በመሆናቸው ነው። ከዚያም በላይ ደግሞ ልንካው ካሉ የመገንደስ አደጋ ስለሚከተል ነው። በሌላ አነጋገር ከስር እስከ አናት በተለያየ ደረጃ በህገወጥ የበለጸጉና የትንንሽ መንግስታት መሪዎች የሆኑ ስለበዙ አቶ መለስም ሆኑ እሳቸው የሚመሩት ህወሃት መራሹ አስተዳደር የመከልበስ አደጋ እንዳያጋጥመው በመፍራት እንደሆነ ከውስጥም ከውጪም በስፋት የሚታመንበት እውነታ ነው።

ደብረጽዮን “የጎበዝ አለቃ”!!

መለስ ሲያልፉ ሃላፊነቱን ጠቅልለው የተረከቡት መለስ በመተካካት ሰበብ ያዘጋጇቸው ሰዎች ናቸው። ከነዚህ አዲስ አመራሮች መካከል ዶ/ር ደብረጽዮን ዋናው መሃንዲስ ናቸው። መለስ የፈሩትን ጉድ እሳቸው እንዴት ደፈሩት ለሚለው የሰሞኑ ጥያቄ ምላሽ የሚሰጡ ለጉዳዩ ቅርበት ያላቸው ክፍሎች ዶ/ር ደብረጽዮንን ከፊት ለፊት ያስቀምጣሉ።

debretsionከደህንነት መዋቅር ቁንጮ ላይ እንዳሉና መለስ ከሞቱ በኋላ ህወሃት ፊትለፊት ያወጣቸው ደብረጽዮን ከዋናው ስራቸው በተጨማሪ በምክትል ጠ/ሚኒስትር ማዕረግ የኢኮኖሚና የፋይናንስ ክላስተር የሚመሩ ናቸው። ጉዳዩን የሚከታተሉ እንደሚሉት እንደ እሳቸው ፍላጎት ቢሆን አሁን የተወሰደው ርምጃ ከአምስት ወር በፊት መከናወን የነበረበት ጉዳይ ነበር።

አሁን በቁጥጥር ስር የነበሩት ሰዎች ከአምስት ወር በፊት በቁጥጥር ስር እንደሚውሉ ይታወቅ እንደነበር የሚናገሩት የደህንነት ሰዎች “ከመለስ ህልፈት በኋላ በተፈጠረው የሃይል ክፍፍል  አሸናፊ ሆነው የወጡት ክፍሎች ቅርንጫፍ መቆራረጥ ጀመሩ እንጂ ርምጃው የጸረ ሙስና ዘመቻ አይደለም” ባይ ናቸው። የእነ በረከት ስምዓንና የወ/ሮ አዜብን ቡድን በመጻረር በመለስ ሞት ማግስት ዘመቻ የጀመሩት ቡድኖች ከሙስናው ባህር ውስጥ ተጨልፈው ወደ እቶን ውስጥ እንዲጣሉ ሲወሰን ደረጃ ተዘጋጅቶ እንደሆነ አንዳንድ መረጃዎች ያመለክታሉ።

መለስ አፍነው የያዙት የህወሃት “የመበስበስ” ችግር ገሃድ ከሆነ በኋላ አቶ ስብሃት ነጋ ግንባር ሆነው የወጡ ቢሆንም ለምን ታለፉ? የሚል ጥያቄ ስለመነሳቱ አስተያየታቸውን የሚሰጡት እኒሁ የደህንነት ሰዎች እንደሚሉት “አሁን የተጀመረው ኦፕሬሽን አሸናፊዎቹ ሃይሎች ጉልበታቸውን የሚያሳዩበትና የተጻራሪውን ቅርንጫፍ በመቆራረጥ ዋናውን ግንዶች ማድረቅና ለማገዶ የማዘጋጀት የታሰበ ነው” ዘመቻው በቀጣይነት በጡረታ ስም የሚያስወግዳቸው አውራ ሃይሎች እንዳሉት የሚናገሩት ክፍሎች አቶ አርከበ እቁባይና አምባሳደር ብርሃነ ገ/ ክርስቶስ  በዚህ የማጥራት ቀመር ውስጥ እንዳሉበት ይጠቁማሉ።

ወ/ሮ አዜብ መስፍንና አቶ በረከት ስምዖን ላይ ያነጣጠረ ዘመቻ ጀምረው የነበሩት አቶ ስብሃት  ነጋ ምንም ዓይነት ርምጃ እንደማይወሰድባቸው ያመለከቱት ውስጥ አዋቂዎች “ስብሃት ግን ቅርንጫፎቻቸው በሙሉ ተመልምለው ብቻቸውን ይቀራሉ። በመጨረሻም እንዲደርቁ ይደረጋል” ሲሉ ስለ ስሌቱ የሚያውቁትን ይናገራሉ።

“አቶ ስብሃት ላይ ርምጃ ከተወሰደ የባህሩ ዋና ተዋናዮች በሙሉ ርቃናቸውን ይቀራሉ። ሁሉም መረጃዎች ከወጡ ህወሃት ራሱ ባሰመረው የሞት መስመር ላይ ግንባር ቀደም ተሰላፊ እንዲሆን ያደርገዋል” የሚሉት የመረጃው ሰዎች፣ ለጊዜው አሸናፊ የሆኑት ክፍሎች የተነፈሱ ቢመስላቸውም ውስጥ ውስጡን የጋመ ጉዳይ ስለመኖሩም አመልክተዋል።

የሙስና ፋይል!! የህወሃት ፓናዶል!!

የፌዴራል የስነ ምግባርና የጸረ ሙስና ኮሚሽን ከበቂ በላይ ጥቆማ እንደሚደርሰው፣ በሚደርሰው ጥቆማ መሰረት የማጣራት ስራ ባከናወነባቸው ተቋማት ላይ ርምጃ ለመውሰድ ሲጠይቅ ማዕቀብ እንደሚደረግበት ሰራተኞቹ ውስጥ ውስጡን የሚነጋገሩበት ጉዳይ ነው። ከደህንነት ጋር በቁርኝት የሚሰራው ይህ ተቋም ሳንጃ የሚሰጠው ህወሃት ሲታመም ነው። ኢህአዴግ ውስጥ ግለት ሲጨምር ሳንጃው ድንበር ተበጅቶ ይታዘዛል። ሰሞኑን የሆነውና ከዚህ ቀደም የተደረጉት ሁሉ የዚሁ አሰራር ነጻብራቆች ናቸው።

“ቴሌ በሙስና ገልምቷል” ከተባለና ዋናው ተፈላጊዎች እንዲሸሹ ከተደረገ ከአራት ዓመት በኋላ  ኮሚሽኑ “ሳንጃህን ካፎቱ አውጣው ተባለ” መባሉን የሚያስታውሱ ክፍሎች፣ በህወሃት ክፍፍል ወቅት በአንድ ጀንበር የተሰራውን የማራገፍ ድራማ ያጣቅሳሉ። አሁን በቅርቡ ኦህዴድ ውስጥ የህወሃትን የበላይነት ለመሸርሸር በተነሱ ወጣት አመራሮች ላይ ሙስናን ተንተርሶ የተወሰደውን የማጥራት ዘመቻ ያክላሉ። አሁንም በተመሳሳይ ሰሞኑን የተወሰደውን ርምጃ ከዚሁ ከኖረው የህወሃት “የመበላላት” ታሪክ ጋር የሚያገናኙት ክፍሎች፣ በግልጽ አሁን አሸናፊ ሆኖ ከወጣው ቡድን ቁንጮና “ልዕልት” ጋር አብረው የሚሰሩ ግለሰብና፣ ባለስልጣን መታሰራቸው ቢድበሰበስም የክስ ሂደቱ እየጠና ሲሄድ ምን ሊፈጠር እንደሚችል አሁን ለመገመት የሚችግር እንደሚሆን ይናገራሉ።

ህወሃት በተለይም ተሹለክልከው መሪ የሆኑት አቶ መለስ ከበረሃ ጀምሮ ተቀናቃኞችን እንዴት ይበሉዋቸው እንደነበር ያጋለጡት የቀድሞው የህወሃት የገንዘብ ቤት ኃላፊ አቶ ገ/መድህን አርአያ የሃሳብ ልዩነት አስመልክቶ ውይይት ተደርጎ መስማማት ባለመቻሉ በጣም ሲመሽ  “አሁን እንረፍ፣ እንተኛ” ከተባለ በኋላ በተኙበት በዛው እንዲቀሩ የተደረጉ ስለመኖራቸው ተናገረው እንደነበር በማስታወስ “የአሁኑ ህወሃት ውሳኔውን ተቋማዊ ለማስመሰል። ተቋሙም በህግ፣ በፍርድ ቤት ችሎት፣ በዳኞችና ራሱ መርማሪ፣ ራሱ ከሳሽ በሆነው የፌዴራል የጸረ ሙስና ኮሚሽን የሚመራ በማስመሰል መበላላቱን “ዲጂታል” አድርጎ እየሰራበት ይገኛል።

ለማጠቃለል

የድሃ ልጆች ቦዘኔ ተብለው ሲታሰሩ አገሪቱ ውስጥ የተዛባ ነገር አልነበረም። በፖለቲካ አመለካከታቸው ዜጎች እስር ቤት ሲጣሉ ህግ የተከበረ ነበር። ንጹሃኖች በፈጠራ ወንጀል ሲገረፉና በስቃይ ሲዘለዘሉ ፍትህ አልጎደለም ነበር። እናት በችግር ልጇን ለገበያ ዝሙት ስትልክ ሃፍረት አልነበረም። በዝርፊያ ገንዘብ አዲስ አበባ በህንጻ ስታብድ አግባብነት አይታይም ነበር። ህዝብ በኑሮ ግለት ሌማቱ ሲደርቅና ገንዳ ላይ ምግብ ፍለጋ ህጻናት ሲባትቱ ችግር ሆኖ አይቆጠርም ነበር። አለፍርድ ቤት ትዕዛዝ ሰዎች እንደ ከብት በየአቅጣጫው ሲታጎሩ የፍትህ ስርዓቱ አልተዛባም ነበር … ሰሞኑን እስር ቤት የተወረወሩት አቶ ገብረዋህድ ፍርድ ቤት ቀርበው ስለ ባለቤታቸውና ልጃቸው ሲናገሩ “አገሪቱ ምን እየሆነች ነው” አሉ። ከኮብራ ወርደው ወህኒ ቤት ሲገቡ የአገሪቱ የፍትህ ስርዓትና የህግ የበላይነት እንደ ደቀቀ ታያቸው። የባለቤታቸው ከስርዓት ውጪ መታሰር አንገበገባቸው። የልጃቸው መታሰር አቃጠላቸው። ሌሎች ምን ይበሉ? የፕሮፌሰር አስራት ቤተሰቦችና ወዳጆች ምን ይበሉ? የእስክንድር ነጋ ልጅና ባለቤት ምን ይናገሩ? የነበቀለ ገርባ፣ የነ ኦልባና ለሊሳ፣ የነ ሌሊሴ ወዳጆ በኦሮሞነታቸው ብቻ ለስቃይ የተዳረጉና የመከራው ተካፋይ የሆኑት ቤተሰቦቻቸው ይህን ያህል ዓመት ችግሩን እንዴት ተሸከሙት?

የአቶ መለስ ባለቤት ወ/ሮ አዜብ መስፍን የቅርብ ባልደረባና የስራ አጋር የሆኑት የአቶ ገ/ዋህድ ባለቤትና ልጃቸው መታሰር ጥፋት ከሌለባቸው የሚደገፍ ባይሆንም ለሌሎች ባለስልጣናትና የህወሃት አለቅላቂዎች ታላቅ ትምህርት የሚሰጥ እንደሆነ በተለያዩ የማህበራዊ ድረአውዶች መነጋገሪያ ሆኗል።


በኢንቨስትመንት ስም የሚፈጸም የመሬት ነጠቃ በኢትዮጵያ

የኦክላንድ ተቋምና ለአዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ ንቅናቄ

 

Screen Shot 2013-05-15 at 6.49.34 AM

smneለአዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ ንቅናቄ

May 14, 2013

በኢንቨስትመንት ስም የአገር ሃብትና ትውልድን እየበላ ስላለው የመሬት ነጠቃ አስመልክቶ የኦክላንድ ተቋምና ድርጅታችን ለአዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ ንቅናቄ በጋራ ያዘጋጁት ጥናታዊ ዘገባ ይፋ ሆነ። የጋራ ንቅናቄያችን ዋና ዳይሬክተር ጥናቱ በትክክለኛ ጭብጥ ላይ ተመስርቶ እንዲዘጋጅ ለህይወታቸው ሳይሳሱ መረጃ በመስጠት ለተባበሩ ዜጎች “ታላቅ ክብር ይሁንላችሁ። አሁን አትታወቁም። ግን ከቶውንም አትረሱም። ክብር ለማትታወቁት ግን ለማትረሱት የአገር ጀግኖች” በማለት ምስጋና አቅርበዋል።

ኢህአዴግን በደፈናው መቃወምን ዓላማው ያላደረገው ይህ ጥናታዊ ዘገባ ዜጎችን ካደጉበት፣ ከኖሩበት፣ ከቀያቸው፣ ከህልውናቸው፣ ከርስታቸው፣ ወዘተ ያለ አንዳች ውይይት፣ ምክክርና ንግግር በማፈናቀል ለውጪ ኩባንያዎችና ለራሱ ለባለጠመንጃው አገዛዝ ሰዎችና ባለሟሎች መሬት ማከፋፈሉን በማስረጃ ያሳያል። የራሱ የኢህአዴግ አካላትም በሪፖርቱ ውስጥ በአግባቡ ድምጻቸው ተካትቷል። የሚጠቀሙባቸው አዋጆችና ህጎችም አልተዘለሉም።

cover 6

 

“የውጪ ባለሃብቶችና ኩባንያዎች ወደ አገር ውስጥ መግባታቸው ለቴክኖሎጂ ዝውውር፣ በአገሪቱ ያለውን የምግብ እጥረት ለማስወገድ ይረዳል” የሚሉ ምክንያቶች እያቀረበ ያለው ኢህአዴግ በተግባር ሲፈተሽ ተግባሩና ዓላማው ምን እንደሆነ የሚያመለክተው ጥናቱ የስርዓቱ ሰለባዎች፣ የኢህአዴግ ባለስልጣናት፣ ኢንቨስተሮች፣ ጉዳዩ የሚመለከታቸው ክፍሎች፣ የቅርብ ምስክሮች፣ የተለያዩ ከዓለምአቀፍ ተቋማት የተገኙ መረጃዎች፣ አገዛዙ ራሱ ይፋ ያደረጋቸው መረጃዎችና ለጥናቱ አስፈላጊ የተባሉ አኻዞች የተካተቱበት በመሆኑ እውነታውን ህዝብና ማናቸውም ወገኖች እውነቱን ለመረዳት ያስችላቸዋል ተብሎ በጉልህ ታምኖበታል።

በምሳሌ ለማሳያነት የተጠቀሰው የሳዑዲ ስታር ኩባንያ የሚያመርተውን ሩዝ ደብረዘይት በገነባው ተቋሙ አማካይነት ሩዙን የመለየትና ለኤክስፖርት የማዘጋጀት ስራ ይሰራል። የተመረጠውና መለኪያውን የሚያሟላው ሩዝ ኤክስፖርት የሚደረግ ሲሆን፣ ደቃቃውና በሚሊሜትር ተለክቶ ለኤክስፖርት ደረጃ የማይበቃው አገር ቤት እንዲቀር ይደረጋል። ከዚህ አንጻር እንኳ ቢታይ የመሬት ኢንቨስትመንት የተባለው ዓለም ጠንቅቆ ለሚያውቀው የአገራችን የምግብ እጥረት ችግር መፍትሄ ሊሆን አይችልም። በጥናቱ ዝርዝር ጉዳዩ አለ።

ኢህአዴግ በፖለቲካው ውድማ ላይ ቆሞ የሚያወራውና በተግባር የሚሆነውን እውነት ከሰለባዎቹ አንደበት በመቅዳት ሊስተባበል በማይችልበት ደረጃ ያቀረበው ጥናት፣ ዜጎች ከቀያቸው  ከመፈናቀላቸው በፊት ምክክርና የስነልቦና ዘግጅት እንዲደረግ ጊዜ እንደሚሰጥ በህግ የተደነገገ ስለመሆኑ፣ ነግር ግን እውነታው የተገላቢጦሽ መሆኑንን ጥናቱ በማስረጃ ያትታል። ዜጎች ነገ ስለሚሆነው እንኳ ሊያውቁ በማይችሉበት ደረጃ ማለዳ ካረፉበት ሲነቁ ዶዘር ማሳቸውን፣ የጓሮ አትክልታቸውን፣ የኑሯቸው መሰረት የሆነውን ደናቸውን፣ ቤታቸውን ሲጠርግ እንደሚያዩ እነዚሁ መከረኞች ለህይወታቸው ሳይሳሱ መናገራቸውን ጥናቱ ትኩረት ሰጥቶ አቅርቦታል።

የመሬት ካሳ እንኳ ባግባቡ የማያገኙት ወገኖች በራሳቸው አንደበት፣ በግብር የደረሰባቸውንና ከፊት ለፊታቸው ያለውን አደጋ አስመልክቶ በዝርዝር ሚዛናዊ በማድረግ ያቀረበው ጥናት ኢህአዴግ ለማስተባበል ከፈለገ በዜናና በተራ ጩኸት ሳይሆን በመረጃ የተደገፈ፣ ሁሉንም ወገኖች ያካተተ  ሚዛናዊ ሪፖርት ካቀረበ ብቻ ለአዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ ንቅናቄ (አኢጋን) በማስተባበያነት እንደሚቀበለው አስቀድሞ ለመግለጽ ይወዳል።

በአገርና በግለሰብ ደረጃ መረጃ ለማዳረስ፣ በተመሳሳይ ኢህአዴግ የሚያሰራጨውን የሃሰት ፕሮፓጋንዳ ማጋለጥ፣ የሰብአዊ መብት ጥሰቱን ማሳየት፣ የተሳሳተውን ፖሊሲ ማስቀየር ዋናው የጥናቱ ዓላማ ነው። በጥናቱ በቀረበው ጭብጥ መሰረት የዓለም ባንክ፣ ወዳጅ አገሮች፣ አበዳሪ አገሮች ፖሊሲ አውጪዎች ወዘተ አካሄዳቸውን እንዲመረምሩ ለማስቻል ሰፊ ስራ የተሰራ መሆኑንን በዚህ አጋጣሚ እንጠቁማለን። በተለያዩ አጋጣሚዎች የተለያዩ የውጪና የአገር ውስጥ ሚዲያዎች እንደዘገቡት ሰፊ ስራ የተሰራ ቢሆንም፣ በዋናነት የጉዳዩ ባለቤት የሆነው የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ምን እየተሰራ እንደሆነ ሲረዳ ትግሉን ማቅለል፤ ውጤቱንም ማቅረብ ይቻላል የሚል እምነት አለን።

በዚህና በሌሎችም ተዛማጅ ምክንያቶች በከፍተኛ የሃላፊነት ስሜት፣ ረዥም ጊዜ ተወስዶ የተሰራው የትርጉም ሰራ ሰውን የሚያክል ክቡር ፍጥረት ከማደሪያው እንዲወጣ ተደርጎ እንዴት ወደ ጉድጓድ እንደሚወረወር ለመጪው ትውልድ በታሪክነት፣ አሁን ላለነው በመረጃነት፣ ከሁሉም በላይ ከጩኸትና ከመረጃ አልባ ክስ የምናገኘው ጥቅም አለመኖሩን በመረዳት አቋቋምን ለማስተካከል ይረዳል፣ ታላቅ ምሳሌም ይሆናል ብለን እናምናለን።

ጥናቱን በማሰራጨትና ዜጎች እጅ እንዲደርስ በማድረጉ በኩል የሁሉም ወገኖች ያልተቆጠበ ጥረት እጅግ አስፈላጊ እንደሆነ ለመግለጽ እንወዳለን። በዚህ አጋጣሚ እናወጣዋለን ብለን ካሰብንበት ጊዜ በማለፍ ተጨማሪ ሳምንታት በማዘግየታችን ታላቅ ይቅርታ እንጠይቃለን፡፡ በአገራችን ካለው የመረጃ አፈና አኳያ የጥናቱ መጠን ሰብሰብና አጠር ባለ መጠን በኢሜይል እንደሚሰራጭ ሆኖ በአዲስ መልክ ሲቀናበር ተጨማሪ ሳምንታትን መውሰዱ የግድ ሆኗል፡፡

የጋራ ንቅናቄያችን ጽሁፉን የማሰራጨቱ ስራ በጨዋነት፣ ለጽሁፉ ባለቤቶች (ለእንግሊዝኛው የኦክላንድ ተቋም ለአማርኛው ደግሞ አኢጋን) አስፈላጊውን እውቅና በመስጠት እንዲሆን በዚህ አጋጣሚ አበክረን እንሳስባለን። ከመሬት ነጠቃ በላይ የከፋ ወንጀል የለም። ዜጎችን በምድራቸው ወደ ባርነት የሚያሸጋግረው የመሬት ነጠቃ የአገሪቱን ሃብትና ንብረት እየበላ ነው። ይህንን ወደር የሌለው ወንጀል ለማጋለጥ፣ ለመታገል፣ ለመቃወምም ሆነ ተዛማጅነት ያላቸው ተግባራት ለማከናወን ለሚፈልጉ ተቋማት፣ ግለሰቦችና ሚዲያዎች ይረዳ ዘንድ (Land Grabhttp://landgrabsmne.wordpress.com) የሚባል ብሎግ እንዲሁም በፌስቡክ Land Grab/መሬት ነጠቃ መከፈቱን ለማሳወቅ እንወዳለን። በቅርቡ የሚሻሻለው ይህ ብሎግና የፌስቡክ ገጽ ከመሬት ወረራ ጋር በተያያዘ ሁሉም ዓይነት ማስረጃዎች የሚታተሙበት ስለሚሆን መረጃ ለሚፈልጉ ወገኖች ሁሉ መልካም አጋጣሚ ይሆናል። ጥናታዊ ዘገባውን ከድረገጻችን ላይ ለማግኘት እዚህ ላይ ይጫኑ፡፡ በኢሜይል ለማግኘት የሚፈልጉ በሙሉ በሚከተለው አድራሻ ([email protected]) ቢጠይቁን በቀጥታ የምንልክ መሆናችንን እናሳውቃለን፡፡

በመጨረሻም የጋራ ንቅናቄያችን ዋና ዳይሬክተር ለተርጓሚው ከሁሉም በላይ ግን የስርዓቱ ላንቃ ስር ሆነው የህይወት ዋጋ በመክፈል መረጃ ለሰጡት ወገኖች የአክብሮት ምስጋና አቅርበዋል። አቶ ኦባንግ በመልዕክታቸው “በቦታው ላይ ሆናችሁ ለህይወታችሁ ሳትፈሩ ይህንን መረጃ የሰጣችሁ ሁሉ የአገር ጀግኖች ናችሁ፤ አሁን አትታወቁም። አሁን ልንገልጻችሁ አንችልም። ጊዜና ወቅት ጀግንነታችሁን እስኪገልጹት ግን አትረሱም። ልትረሱም አትችሉም። ብዙ ባይነገርላችሁና ባይዘመርላችሁም ታላቅ ስራ ሰርታችሁዋልና ክብር ይሁንላችሁ” ብለዋል፡፡

ለአዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ ንቅናቄ

የሚዲያና ሕዝብ ግንኙነት ግብረኃይል

የ ሙሉውን ጥናት ትርጉም በአማርኛ ለማንበብ እዚህ ይጫኑ Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa (Ethiopia)

*********************************************************************************************************

ለዚህ ደብዳቤ ምላሽም ሆነ ለተጨማሪ መረጃ ዋና ዳይሬክተሩን ለሚዲያ ክፍሉ ([email protected]) በመጻፍ ወይም ድረገጻችንን (www.solidaritymovement.org) በመጎብኘት ለመረዳት ይችላሉ፡፡

Arbitrary arrests, torture and killings common in Ethiopia – US State Department

U.S. State Department 2012 Report

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ethiopia is a federal republic. On August 20, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi died. The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) elected then deputy prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn to take Meles’s place as chairman of the party. The EPRDF subsequently nominated him for the post of prime minister. On September 21, parliament elected Hailemariam as prime minister. In national parliamentary elections in 2010, the EPRDF and affiliated parties won 545 of 547 seats to remain in power for a fourth consecutive five-year term. Although the relatively few international officials allowed to observe the elections concluded technical aspects of the vote were handled competently, some also noted that an environment conducive to free and fair elections was not in place prior to the election.

Security forces generally reported to civilian authorities; however, there were instances in which special police and local militias acted independently of civilian control.

The most significant human rights problems included restrictions on freedom of expression and association through politically motivated trials and convictions of opposition political figures, activists, journalists, and bloggers, as well as increased restrictions on print media. In July security forces used force against and arrested Muslims who protested against alleged government interference in religious affairs. The government continued restrictions on civil society and nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities imposed by the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSO).

Other human rights problems included arbitrary killings; allegations of torture, beating, abuse, and mistreatment of detainees by security forces; reports of harsh and at times life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; detention without charge and lengthy pretrial detention; a weak, overburdened judiciary subject to political influence; infringement on citizens’ privacy rights, including illegal searches; allegations of abuses in the implementation of the government’s “villagization” program; restrictions on academic freedom; restrictions on freedom of assembly, association, and movement; alleged interference in religious affairs; limits on citizens’ ability to change their government; police, administrative, and judicial corruption; violence and societal discrimination against women and abuse of children; female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C); exploitation of children for economic and sexual purposes; trafficking in persons; societal discrimination against persons with disabilities; clashes between ethnic minorities; discrimination against persons based on their sexual orientation and against persons with HIV/AIDS; limits on worker rights; forced labor; and child labor, including forced child labor.

Impunity was a problem. The government, with some reported exceptions, generally did not take steps to prosecute or otherwise punish officials who committed abuses other than corruption.

Factions of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), an ethnically based, violent, and fragmented separatist group operating in the Somali Region, were responsible for abuses. Members of the separatist Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union Front (ARDUF) claimed responsibility for a January attack on a group of foreign tourists in the Afar Region.

 

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

Members of the security forces committed killings and used lethal force to quell protests (see section 2.b.). During the year, scattered fighting continued between government forces, primarily regional government-backed militia, and residual elements of the ONLF. Also, clashes between ethnic groups during the year resulted in 100 to 150 deaths (see section 6).

Ethiopian security forces reportedly killed as many as six persons in retaliation for an April 28 attack by armed gunmen that killed at least five persons and injured numerous others at the Saudi Star compound in the Gambella Region.

On February 12, members of the Somali Region Special Police allegedly opened fire on a local assembly in the Ogaden area of the Somali Region, killing 20 persons. The villagers reportedly were gathered to discuss the murder of a village elder the previous day. Many others were detained during the same incident.

Members of the ARDUF claimed responsibility for a January 18 attack on a group of foreign tourists in the Afar Region. The attack resulted in the deaths of five Europeans and the kidnapping of two Europeans and two Ethiopians. The kidnapped Europeans later were released; the whereabouts and well-being of the Ethiopian hostages remained unknown at year’s end.

b. Disappearance

There was a reported case of a politically motivated disappearance of two persons in which security officials detained opposition activists and held them temporarily incommunicado.

On June 15, in the North Gondar area of the Amhara Region, federal police reportedly arrested Meles Ashire, deputy chairman of the opposition All Ethiopia Unity Party (AEUP) for the Chilga District, and Tadlo Tefera, an AEUP executive member for the North Gondar zone. Following their arrest, Meles and Tadlo’s whereabouts were reportedly unknown; however, authorities released them in August.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution and law prohibit such practices; however, there were numerous reports security officials tortured and otherwise abused detainees.

Authorities reportedly tortured Ahmedin Jebel, an editor and a columnist with Muslim Affairs magazine (see section 2.a.).

In 2010 the UN Committee Against Torture reported it was “deeply concerned” about “numerous, ongoing, and consistent allegations” concerning “the routine use of torture” by police, prison officers, and other members of the security forces–including the military–against political dissidents and opposition party members, students, alleged terrorists, and alleged supporters of violent separatist groups like the ONLF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The committee reported that such acts frequently occurred with the participation of, at the instigation of, or with the consent of commanding officers in police stations, detention centers, federal prisons, military bases, and unofficial or secret places of detention. Some reports of such abuses continued during the year.

Sources widely believed police investigators often used physical abuse to extract confessions in Maekelawi, the central police investigation headquarters in Addis Ababa. Authorities continued to restrict access by diplomats and NGOs to Maekelawi.

According to a Human Rights Watch report, soldiers arbitrarily arrested and raped persons following the April 28 attack by armed gunmen at the Saudi Star compound in the Gambella Region (see section 1.a). There was no additional reporting to corroborate the report of rape.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison and pretrial detention center conditions remained harsh and in some cases life threatening. There were numerous reports of authorities beating prisoners. Medical attention following beatings reportedly was insufficient in some cases.

Physical Conditions: As of September there were 70,000-80,000 persons in prison, of whom approximately 2,500 were women and nearly 600 were children incarcerated with their mothers. Juveniles sometimes were incarcerated with adults, and small children were sometimes incarcerated with their mothers. Male and female prisoners generally were separated.

Severe overcrowding was common, especially in sleeping quarters. The government provided approximately eight birr ($0.44) per prisoner per day for food, water, and health care. Many prisoners supplemented this amount with daily food deliveries from family members or by purchasing food from local vendors, although there were reports of some prisoners being prevented from receiving supplemental food from their families. Medical care was unreliable in federal prisons and almost nonexistent in regional prisons. Prisoners had limited access to potable water, as did many in the country. Also, water shortages caused unhygienic conditions, and most prisons lacked appropriate sanitary facilities. Many prisoners had serious health problems in detention but received little treatment. Information released by the Ministry of Health during the year reportedly stated nearly 62 percent of inmates in various jails across the country suffered from mental health problems as a result of solitary confinement, overcrowding, and lack of adequate health care facilities and services.

The country has six federal and 120 regional prisons. There also are many unofficial detention centers throughout the country, including in Dedessa, Bir Sheleko, Tolay, Hormat, Blate, Tatek, Jijiga, Holeta, and Senkele. Most are located at military camps.

Pretrial detention often takes place in police station detention facilities, where the conditions varied widely. Reports regarding pretrial detention in police stations indicated poor hygiene, lack of access to visitors (including family members and legal counsel), and police abuse of detainees.

Administration: It was difficult to determine if recordkeeping was adequate due to the lack of transparency regarding incarceration. Authorities did not employ alternative sentencing for nonviolent offenders. Prisons did not have ombudspersons to respond to complaints. Legal aid clinics existed in some prisons for the benefit of prisoners. Authorities generally permitted visitors. In some cases family visits to prisoners were restricted to a few per year. Family members of prisoners charged with terrorist activity alleged instances of blocked access to the prisoners; there were also reports those charged with terrorist activity were denied visits with their lawyers or representatives of the political parties to which they belonged. Prisoners generally were permitted religious observance, but this varied by prison, and even by section within a prison, at the discretion of prison management. There were some allegations that while in custody, detainees were denied adequate locations in which to pray. Prisoners were permitted to voice complaints about prison conditions or treatment to the presiding judge during the trial.

Monitoring: During the year the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited regional prisons throughout the country. The visits occurred after a general assessment by the government reopened the path to regular ICRC access; the government had limited such access since 2004.

Regional authorities allowed government and NGO representatives to meet regularly with prisoners without third parties present. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) monitored federal and regional detention centers and interviewed prison officials and prisoners in response to allegations of widespread human rights abuses. The domestic NGO Justice For All-Prison Fellowship Ethiopia (JFA-PFE) was granted access to various prison and detention facilities.

Improvements: The government and prison authorities generally cooperated with efforts of the JFA-PFE to improve prison conditions. The JFA-PFE ran model prisons in Adama and Mekele, with significantly better conditions than those found in other prisons. The government undertook renovations to prisons in the Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia regions and in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region (SNNPR) during the year.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

Although the constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, the government often ignored these provisions in practice. There were multiple reports of arbitrary arrest and detention by police and security forces.

Civilians, international NGOs, and other aid organizations operating in the Somali Region reported government security forces, local militias, and the ONLF committed abuses such as arbitrary arrest.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The Federal Police reports to the Ministry of Federal Affairs, which is subject to parliamentary oversight. The oversight was loose in practice. Each of the country’s nine regions has a state or special police force that reports to the regional civilian authorities. Local militias operated across the country in loose coordination with regional and federal police and the military, with the degree of coordination varying by region. In many cases these militias functioned as extensions of local EPRDF political bosses.

Security forces were effective, but impunity remained a serious problem. The mechanisms used to investigate abuses by the federal police were not known. Numerous complaints of human rights abuses were lodged against the Somali Region Special Police. Several of its members reportedly were arrested for acts of indiscipline. The government rarely publicly disclosed the results of investigations into abuses by local security forces, such as arbitrary detention and beatings of civilians.

The government continued its efforts to provide human rights training for police and army recruits. During the year the government continued to accept assistance from the JFA-PFE and the EHRC to improve and professionalize its human rights training and curriculum by including more material on the constitution and international human rights treaties and conventions. The JFA-PFE and the EHRC conducted human rights training for police commissioners, prosecutors, judges, prison administrators, and militia in Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, Afar, SNNPR, Gambella, and Addis Ababa.

Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention

Although the constitution and law require detainees be brought to court and charged within 48 hours of arrest, sometimes this requirement was not respected in practice. With court approval, persons suspected of serious offenses can be detained for 14 days without being charged and for additional 14-day periods if an investigation continues. Under the antiterrorism proclamation, police may request to hold persons without charge for 28-day periods, up to a maximum of four months, while an investigation is conducted. The law prohibits detention in any facility other than an official detention center; however, local militias and other formal and informal law enforcement entities used dozens of unofficial local detention centers.

A functioning bail system was in place. Bail was not available for murder, treason, and corruption. In one high-profile case, a judge denied bail for Feteh editor in chief Temesgen Dessalegn due to concerns the defendant might continue to write articles offending the government if he was released. The judge also based the denial on concerns he posed a flight risk, although he had been free for more than a month during the pretrial phase. Authorities dropped the charges against him on August 28 (see section 2.a.); they reopened the case in December, and it continued at year’s end. In most cases authorities set bail between 500 and 10,000 birr ($28 and $550), which was not affordable for most citizens. Police officials did not always respect court orders to release suspects on bail. The government provided public defenders for detainees unable to afford private legal counsel, but only when their cases went to court. While detainees were in pretrial detention, authorities sometimes allowed them little or no contact with legal counsel, did not provide full information on their health status, and did not provide for family visits.

Arbitrary Arrest: Authorities regularly detained persons without warrants and denied access to counsel and in some cases to family members, particularly in outlying regions.

Pretrial Detention: Some detainees reported being held for several years without being charged and without trial. Trial delays were most often caused by lengthy legal procedures, the large numbers of detainees, judicial inefficiency, and staffing shortages.

Amnesty: On September 11, in keeping with a long-standing tradition of issuing pardons at the Ethiopian New Year, the federal government pardoned 1,993 prisoners. Regional governments also pardoned persons during the year. For example, the SNNPR regional government pardoned 5,395 prisoners, the Oromia regional government pardoned 4,700 prisoners, and the Amhara regional government pardoned 2,607 prisoners.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The law provides for an independent judiciary. Although the civil courts operated with a large degree of independence, the criminal courts remained weak, overburdened, and subject to political influence. The constitution recognizes both religious and traditional or customary courts.

Trial Procedures

By law accused persons have the right to a fair public trial by a court of law within a “reasonable time,” a presumption of innocence, the right to be represented by legal counsel of their choice, and the right to appeal. The law gives defendants the right to present witnesses and evidence in their defense, cross-examine prosecution witnesses, and access government-held evidence. In practice the government did not always allow defendants the right of access to evidence it held. The court system does not use jury trials. Judicial inefficiency and lack of qualified staff often resulted in serious delays in trial proceedings and made the application of the law unpredictable. The government continued to train lower court judges and prosecutors and made effective judicial administration the primary focus of this training. Defendants were often unaware of the specific charges against them until the commencement of the trial; this also caused defense attorneys to be unprepared to provide adequate defense.

The Public Defender’s Office provided legal counsel to indigent defendants, although its scope and quality of service remained limited due to the shortage of attorneys. Numerous free legal aid clinics around the country, based primarily at universities, provided advice to clients. In certain areas of the country regional legislative bodies passed laws allowing volunteers, such as law students and professors, to represent clients in court on a pro bono basis.

During the year the government concluded trials against 31 persons who had been charged with terrorist activities under the antiterrorism proclamation. These trials included cases against12 journalists, opposition political figures, and activists based in the country, as well as an Ethiopian employee of the UN. All were found guilty. Eighteen persons living abroad were convicted in absentia. The government also invoked the antiterrorism proclamation in charging 28 Muslims identified with protests and one Muslim accused of accepting funds illegally from a foreign embassy. Several international human rights organizations and foreign diplomatic missions raised concerns over the conduct of the trials. Observers found the evidence presented at trials to be either open to interpretation or indicative of acts of a political nature rather than linked to terrorism. Human rights groups also noted the law’s broad definition of terrorism, as well as its severe penalties, its broad rules of evidence, and the discretionary powers afforded police and security forces.

In some sensitive cases deemed to involve matters of national security, notably the high-profile trials of activists in the Muslim community, detainees stated authorities initially denied them the right to see attorneys. The trial of the 28 Muslims identified with protests and one Muslim accused of accepting funds illegally from a foreign embassy was not fully open to family and supporters, although it was initially open to the press and diplomats. The trial of 11 persons (including six persons in absentia) charged on May 19 with being members of the terrorist organizations al-Qa’ida and al-Shabaab was not open to the public.

Many citizens residing in rural areas generally had little access to formal judicial systems and relied on traditional mechanisms of resolving conflict. By law all parties to a dispute must agree to use a traditional or religious court before such a court may hear a case, and either party can appeal to a regular court at any time. Sharia (Islamic law) courts may hear religious and family cases involving Muslims. Sharia courts received some funding from the government and adjudicated the majority of cases in the Somali and Afar regions, which are predominantly Muslim. In addition other traditional systems of justice, such as councils of elders, continued to function. Some women stated they lacked access to free and fair hearings in the traditional justice system because they were excluded by custom from participation in councils of elders and because there was strong gender discrimination in rural areas.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

Estimates by human rights groups and diplomatic missions regarding the number of political prisoners varied. Domestic and international NGOs estimated there were up to 400 political prisoners and detainees at year’s end. The government did not permit access by international human rights organizations.

Twelve of the journalists, opposition members, and activists convicted under the antiterrorism proclamation during the year remained in prison. Several international human rights organizations and foreign diplomatic missions raised concerns about the conduct of the trials.

On January 19, a court convicted journalists Woubishet Taye and Reyot Alemu and opposition figure Zerihun Gebre-Egziabher Tadesse on terrorism charges. It also convicted Hirut Kifle Woldeyesus, who denied the prosecution’s claim she was an opposition political figure. Journalist and blogger Elias Kifle was tried and convicted in absentia in the same case. On January 26, Woubishet and Reyot were each sentenced to 14 years in prison, while the other two defendants present received sentences of 17 and 19 years. Reyot appealed her case to the Supreme Court, which later overturned two of the three charges and reduced her sentence to five years. She subsequently appealed the Supreme Court’s decision to the Court of Cassation, arguing a fundamental error of law had been made in her trial. The other defendants chose not to appeal.

On June 27, the Federal High Court found journalist and blogger Eskinder Nega, vice chairman of the opposition front Medrek Andualem Arage, and Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ) official Natnael Mekonnen guilty on all counts of terrorism and treason. On July 13, Eskinder and Natnael were each sentenced to 18 years in prison, while Andualem received a life sentence. Eskinder and Andualem appealed their conviction to the Supreme Court; the case remained ongoing at year’s end. In September the government announced it had asked the Federal High Court to freeze the assets of Eskinder and Andualem while investigating whether their assets had been used in conjunction with the commission of the crimes for which they were convicted. Court proceedings regarding the assets also remained ongoing at year’s end.

Bekele Gerba and Olbana Lelisa, two well-known political opposition figures from the Oromo ethnic group, as well as seven other individuals, were convicted under the criminal code of conspiracy to overthrow the government and incite unrest. Bekele was sentenced to eight years in prison; Olbana was sentenced to 13 years. A separate trial of 69 members of Oromo political opposition parties, charged in 2011 under the criminal code with “attacking the political or territorial integrity of the state,” remained ongoing at year’s end.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

The law provides citizens the right to appeal human rights violations in civil court; No such cases were filed during the year.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The law requires authorities to obtain judicial warrants to search private property; in practice police often ignored the law, and there were no records of courts excluding evidence found without warrants. Opposition political party leaders reported suspicions of telephone tapping and other electronic eavesdropping.

The government reportedly used a widespread system of paid informants to report on the activities of particular individuals. During the year opposition members reported ruling party operatives and militia members made intimidating and unwelcome visits to their homes.

Security forces continued to detain family members of persons sought for questioning by the government. There were reports unemployed youths who were not affiliated with the ruling coalition sometimes had trouble receiving the “support letters” from their kebeles (neighborhoods or wards) necessary to get jobs.

The government interfered with citizens’ family rights. Medical abuses to facilitate international adoption were documented. This included the diagnosis of new mothers as mentally unfit by unqualified medical professionals and the subsequent forced relinquishment of children.

The national government and regional governments continued to put in place “villagization” plans in the Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, SNNPR, and Somali regions. These plans involved the relocation of scattered rural populations from arid or semiarid lands vulnerable to recurring droughts into designated clusters by regional governments. The stated purposes of villagization are to improve the provision of government services (i.e., health care, education, and clean water), protect vulnerable communities from natural disasters and attacks, and change environmentally destructive patterns of shifting cultivation. Some observers stated the purpose was to enable the large-scale leasing of land for commercial agriculture, a claim the government denied. The government described the villagization program as strictly voluntary.

Assessments by international donors continued to find no systematic evidence of human rights violations in this program. They did find problems such as delays in establishing promised infrastructure from rushed program implementation. Communities and individual families appeared to have agreed to move based on assurances from authorities of food aid, services, and land, although in some instances communities moved before adequate basic services and shelter were in place in the new locations. For example, an early August visit to a site in South Omo in the SNNPR suggested the process was voluntary but found that promised infrastructure, such as access to water, education, and healthcare, were not in place by the time persons moved. A subsequent October visit to the same site revealed improved conditions, including installation of a water pump, a newly built school, and a health services tent stocked by UNICEF. A January Human Rights Watch report that drew upon information gathered in 2011 characterized the process as “far from voluntary.” The report described a process in which security forces and local militia attended meetings with those communities that initially had indicated they did not want to move and later went with villagers to the new locations, where they oversaw the construction of tukuls (traditional huts) by the villagers. According to the report, security forces beat (sometimes to death), threatened, arrested without charge, and detained persons who were critical of the planned villagization of their communities. Additional Human Rights Watch reporting stated the government harassed, mistreated, and arbitrarily arrested persons in South Omo in order to clear or prepare land for commercial agriculture; development partners did not find evidence to support this claim during visits.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Status of Freedom of Speech and Press

The constitution and law provide for freedom of speech and press; however, authorities arrested, detained, and convicted journalists and other persons whom they perceived as critical of the government.

Freedom of Speech: Authorities arrested and harassed persons for criticizing the government. The government attempted to impede criticism through various forms of intimidation, including detention of journalists and opposition activists and monitoring and interference in the activities of political opposition groups. Some villagers continued to report local authorities threatened retaliation against anyone who reported abuses by security forces.

In July authorities charged Jemal Kedir with “fomenting dissent, arousing hatred, and stirring up acts of political, racial, or religious disturbances” for sending text messages on his cell phone stating “Allahu Akbar, seventeen times our voice should be heard and prisoners who are in jail should be released.” He was also charged with sending messages claiming police had prevented Muslims from entering the Grand Anwar Mosque in Addis Ababa, calling for additional protests, and calling for a boycott of the elections to the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (EIASC) until detainees were released. On September 13, a court found him guilty. The judge referred to the crime as “rumor mongering with his cell phone,” and sentenced him to one year in prison.

In October police arrested seven individuals after they gave radio interviews regarding reported land grabs in Lega Tofo in the Oromia Region. The individuals stated they were forced off their land without adequate compensation. The police later released them.

Freedom of Press: Ethio-Channel, Negadras, Feteh, and two Muslim newspapers closed due to government pressure. The remaining 15 newspapers had a combined weekly circulation in Addis Ababa of more than 100,000, down from 150,000 in 2011. Most newspapers were printed on a weekly or biweekly basis, with the exception of the state-owned Amharic and English dailies.

The government controlled the only television station that broadcast nationally, which, along with radio, was the primary source of news for much of the population. Three private FM radio stations broadcast in the capital city, and at least 13 community radio stations broadcast in the regions. State-run Ethiopian Radio has the largest reach in the country, followed by Fana Radio, which is affiliated with the ruling party.

Government-controlled media closely reflected the views of the government and the ruling EPRDF. The government periodically jammed foreign broadcasts, including after the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. The broadcasting law prohibits political and religious organizations and foreigners from owning broadcast stations. The investment law also prohibits foreigners from owning broadcast stations.

Violence and Harassment: The government continued to arrest, harass, and prosecute journalists. Several UN special rapporteurs and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern about the government’s use of the antiterrorism proclamation against journalists and opposition members.

On August 9, the Ministry of Justice filed three charges against Feteh editor in chief Temesgen Dessalegn. These charges included inciting and agitating the country’s youth to engage in violence, defamation of government, and destabilizing the public by spreading false reports, based on articles published between December 2011 and August. Temesgen was detained on August 23, but the charges were dropped on August 28 and he was released the same day. The government reopened its case against Temesgen on December 11, and the case remained ongoing at year’s end.

On July 20, authorities arrested Muslim Affairs editor Yusuf Getachew and Muslim Affairs columnist Ahmedin Jebel. Ahmedin Jebel reportedly was tortured. At year’s end, they remained imprisoned along with 27 other Muslim activists accused of terrorist activity.

Also in July two editors from Muslim Affairs, Akmel Negash and Yishak Eshetu, left the country, citing fear of arrest. After these arrests and departures, the publication ceased operation.

Courts found journalists Woubishet Taye, Reyot Alemu, and Eskinder Nega, who were arrested in 2011, as well as six journalists/bloggers tried in absentia, guilty of charges under the antiterrorism proclamation in separate cases (see section 1.e.).

Censorship or Content Restrictions: Government harassment of journalists caused them to avoid reporting on sensitive topics. Many private newspapers reported informal editorial control by the government through article placement requests and calls from government officials concerning articles perceived as critical of the government. Private sector and government journalists routinely practiced self-censorship.

In April the state-run Berhanena Selam Printing Press, which accounted for approximately 90 percent of newspaper printing in the country, instituted a new standard printing contract with its private publisher clients. The contract stipulated the printing press had the right to refuse to print newspapers containing material deemed “illegal.” Editors of privately owned newspapers refused to sign the contract, deeming it censorship and in violation of the constitutional protection of press freedom. Berhanena Selam stopped printing publications that did not sign the updated contract.

On July 20, the Ministry of Justice banned the distribution of that week’s issue of the Feteh newspaper via court order. Reports indicated the ban was based on the issue’s contents–which authorities deemed objectionable and sensitive–which dealt with the late prime minister’s health and the ongoing protests by some members of the Muslim community. Although the Ministry of Justice issued no further injunctions, Berhanena Selam refused to print subsequent issues of Feteh.

Berhanena Selam refused to print the August 31 edition of Finote Netsanet, the newspaper of the Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) party, one of the largest opposition political parties, citing complaints filed against the newspaper by the public related to coverage of the death of the prime minister in the previous issue. In September Berhanena Selam refused to print the UDJ newspaper, claiming the printer was too busy to do the work. The newspaper resumed publication in October after reaching an agreement with a private publisher, but ceased publication by November.

Libel Laws/National Security: The government used the antiterrorism proclamation to suppress criticism. Journalists feared covering five groups designated by parliament in June 2011 as terrorist organizations (Ginbot 7, the ONLF, the OLF, al-Qaida, and al-Shabaab), citing ambiguity on whether reporting on these groups might be punishable under the law. Several journalists, both local and foreign correspondents, reported an increase in self-censorship.

In September the government pardoned Swedish freelancers Johan Persson and Martin Schibbye. In December 2011 a court convicted them of rendering support to a terrorist organization and illegally entering the country.

The government used libel laws during the year to suppress criticism.

Internet Freedom

The government restricted access to the Internet and blocked several Web sites, including blogs, opposition Web sites, and Web sites of Ginbot 7, the OLF, and the ONLF. The government also temporarily blocked news sites such as the Washington Post, the Economist, and Al Jazeera, and temporarily blocked links to foreign government reporting on human rights conditions in the country. Several news blogs and Web sites run by opposition diaspora groups were not accessible. These included Addis Neger, Nazret, Ethiopian Review, CyberEthiopia, Quatero Amharic Magazine, Tensae Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian Media Forum. A foreign government news Web site was only available periodically, although users could generally access it via proxy sites. Authorities took steps to block access to Virtual Private Network (VPN) providers that let users circumvent government screening of Internet browsing and email. According to the government, 4 percent of individuals subscribed to Internet access.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

The government restricted academic freedom, including through decisions on student enrollment, teachers’ appointments, and the curriculum. Speech, expression, and assembly frequently were restricted on university and high school campuses.

According to sources, the ruling party, via the Ministry of Education, continued to give preference to students loyal to the party in assignments to postgraduate programs. While party membership was not as common at the undergraduate level, some university staff members commented priority for employment after graduation in all fields was given to students who joined the party.

The government also restricted academic freedom in other ways. Authorities limited teachers’ ability to deviate from official lesson plans. Numerous anecdotal reports suggested non-EPRDF members were more likely to be transferred to undesirable posts and bypassed for promotions. There were some reports of teachers not affiliated with the EPRDF being summarily dismissed for failure to attend nonscheduled meetings. There continued to be a lack of transparency in academic staffing decisions, with numerous complaints from individuals in the academic community alleging bias based on party membership, ethnicity, or religion.

According to multiple credible sources, teachers and high school students in grade 10 and above were required to attend training on the concepts of revolutionary democracy and EPRDF party ideology.

There were no changes to the 2010 Ministry of Education directive prohibiting private universities from offering degree programs in law and teacher education. The directive also requires public universities to align their curriculum offerings with the previously announced policy of a 70-to-30 ratio between science and social science academic programs. As a result the number of students studying social sciences and the humanities continued to decrease and private universities focused heavily on the social sciences. Ministry officials originally cited a need to maintain quality standards as the reason for the directive.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Freedom of Assembly

The constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly; however, the government restricted this right. On several occasions during the year, authorities injured and arrested protesters who reportedly were demonstrating without a permit. Security forces used lethal force against civilians (see section 1.a.).

Organizers of large public meetings or demonstrations must notify the government 48 hours in advance and obtain a permit. Local government officials, almost all of whom were affiliated with the EPRDF, controlled access to municipal halls, and there were many complaints from opposition parties local officials denied or otherwise obstructed the scheduling of opposition parties’ use of halls for lawful political rallies. There were numerous credible reports of owners of hotels and other large facilities citing unspecified internal rules forbidding political parties from utilizing their space for gatherings, for example, claiming that hotel meeting space could only be used for weddings.

Regional governments, including the Addis Ababa regional administration, were reluctant to grant permits or provide security for large meetings.

Beginning in late 2011 and continuing throughout much of the year, some members of the Muslim community, alleging government interference in religious affairs, held peaceful protests following Friday prayers at several of Addis Ababa’s largest mosques, the Aweliya Islamic Center in Addis Ababa, and at other locations throughout the country. Most demonstrations occurred without incident, although some were met with arrests and alleged use of unnecessary force by police.

In late July authorities arrested as many as 1,000 Muslim demonstrators, including members of a self-appointed committee claiming to represent the interests of the Muslim community, for protesting alleged government interference in religious affairs. The majority of the protesters subsequently were released without charge. On October 29, authorities charged 29 individuals under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation; 28 of the individuals were identified with the protest movement, while one was accused of accepting funds illegally from a foreign embassy.

On October 21, in the South Wollo Zone of the Amhara Region, police and protesters clashed during a gathering during elections for the local Islamic council. Accounts of the event differed. One report indicated protesters threw stones at the houses of Muslims who participated in the election. In response to the stone throwing, police arrested the protest organizer. A crowd then marched on the police station, demanding his release. Protesters reportedly entered the police station by force, killing one police officer and seriously injuring another. Police reportedly killed two protesters, including the detained protest organizer.

Freedom of Association

Although the law provides for freedom of association and the right to engage in unrestricted peaceful political activity, the government limited this right in practice.

In accordance with the CSO law, anonymous donations to NGOs are not permitted. All potential donors were therefore aware their names would be public knowledge. The same was true concerning all donations made to political parties.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs screens registration applications from international NGOs and submits a recommendation on whether to approve or deny registration.

c. Freedom of Religion

See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt.

d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons

Although the law provides for freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, the government restricted some of these rights in practice.

The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern.

In-country Movement: The government continued to relax but did not completely remove restrictions on the movement of persons into and within the Ogaden area of the Somali Region, continuing to argue the ONLF posed a security threat (see section 2.d., Internally Displaced Persons). Deliveries of food and medicine were halted temporarily in the limited areas affected by fighting due to security concerns.

The government expanded an out-of-camp policy allowing Eritrean refugees to live outside of a camp to all refugees. According to the Administration for Returnees and Refugee Affairs (ARRA), which managed the out-of-camp program, 3,412 refugees lived outside of the camps during the year, compared with 1,294 in 2011 and 723 in 2010. Prior to this policy, such permission was given primarily to attend higher education institutions, undergo medical treatment, or avoid security threats at the camps.

Exile: Several citizens sought political asylum in other countries or remained abroad in self-imposed exile (see section 2.a.).

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

The total number of IDPs in the country during the year was not known. Many persons who had been displaced due to conflict in the Gambella, Oromia, SNNPR, and Somali regions remained displaced. Drought also caused displacements during the year.

A land rights dispute in the Bench Maji Zone of the SNNPR spurred ethnic conflict, causing the displacement of 463 ethnic Amharas in March. These IDPs were sent to Addis Ababa, where the government provided them with food and essential items. Shortly after their arrival, the regional government informed the IDPs they should return to their areas of origin–referring not to where they had been living before being displaced, but to the Amhara Region, which their families had left during the time of the Derg (1974-91). The regional government later decided to relocate most of the IDPs to Tsegede in North Gondar Zone of the Amhara Region.

Temporary displacements due to flooding were reported from parts of Amhara, Oromia, and SNNPR between mid-July and August. Most of those displaced later returned to their homes.

In July communal conflict in the Moyale area in the south of the country displaced tens of thousands of persons. Following an initial response by the Federal Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS), Moyale town was put under federal control while the conflict was mediated, leading to deployment of a team from the Ministry of Federal Affairs to help coordinate the humanitarian response. According to the results of a joint assessment conducted by the DRMFSS and development partners, most of those displaced returned home by early September, although some 1,000 households remained without shelter. Some 58,000 persons required food assistance due to the impact of the conflict, and more than 78,000 required provision of potable water.

During the year, drought caused displacements in the Somali Region, a situation exacerbated in some cases by the continuing conflict.

The government at the federal level did not recognize IDPs as a distinct group, and there was no specialized office charged with managing matters such as IDP protection, return, resettlement, or durable solutions. The government did not maintain data on IDPs. The DRMFSS, under the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, is the main government agency responsible for emergencies, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Water and Energy, and has responsibility for coordinating the provision of humanitarian assistance to displaced persons.

Restrictions limiting the access of human rights organizations, the media, humanitarian agencies, and diplomatic missions to conflict-affected areas continued, particularly with regard to the Somali Region conflict zones of Fik, Degahbur, Korahe, and parts of Warder. The partial relaxation of those restrictions that began the previous year continued, with humanitarian access in the Somali Region improving in particular. Journalists were required to register before entering conflict regions. The government lacked a clear policy on NGO access to sensitive areas, leading regional government officials and military officials frequently to refer requests for access to the federal government. There were isolated reports of regional police or local militias blocking NGOs’ access to particular locations on particular days, citing security concerns.

Protection of Refugees

Access to Asylum: The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government has established a system for providing protection to refugees.

According to the UNHCR, the country hosted 376,410 refugees at year’s end. The majority of refugees were from Somalia (223,243), with others coming from Sudan and South Sudan (66,177, in addition to an estimated 20,000 unregistered refugees residing along the South Sudan-Ethiopia border), Eritrea (62,996), and other nations (3,994), particularly Kenya. New arrivals from Somalia numbered approximately 50,000 for the year, a significant decrease from 100,000 in 2011.

The UNHCR, the government, and humanitarian agencies continued to care for Sudanese arrivals fleeing from conflict in Sudan’s Blue Nile State.

Eritrean asylum seekers continued to arrive at the rate of approximately 700 new arrivals per month, according to the UNHCR. Hundreds of Eritrean refugees reportedly departed monthly on secondary migration through Egypt and Sudan to go to Israel, Europe, and other final destinations. The UNHCR and ARRA assisted in the reception and transportation back to My Ayni or Adi Harush camps of approximately 700 Eritrean refugees in 2011 and 952 during the year who had been detained in Egypt and deported by the Egyptian authorities. The UNHCR reported the population of unaccompanied minors who fled Eritrea into the country was 1,200 at year’s end. Unaccompanied minors in the 15- to17-year-old age group represented more than 75 percent of the total population of such minors.

Employment: The government does not grant refugees work permits.

Access to Basic Services: Refugees in camps were provided with schooling and health services. For those outside of camps, there were no reports of discrimination in access to public services.

Durable Solutions: The government granted refugee status to asylum seekers from Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. The government welcomed refugees to settle permanently in the country, but did not offer a path to citizenship. During the year approximately 5,543 refugees departed the country for resettlement.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The constitution and law provide citizens the right to change their government peacefully. In practice the ruling party’s electoral advantages limited this right.

Elections and Political Participation

Recent Elections: On August 20, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi died. The ruling EPRDF elected Hailemariam Desalegn, the deputy prime minister, to take Meles’s place as chairman of the party and subsequently nominated him for the post of prime minister. On September 21, parliament elected Hailemariam as prime minister.

In the 2010 national parliamentary elections, the EPRDF and affiliated parties won 545 of 547 seats to remain in power for a fourth consecutive five-year term. Independent observation of the vote was severely limited due to government restrictions. Although the relatively few international officials allowed to observe the elections concluded technical aspects of the vote were handled competently, some also noted an environment conducive to free and fair elections was not in place prior to election day. Several laws, regulations, and procedures implemented since the 2005 national elections created a clear advantage for the EPRDF throughout the electoral process. There was ample evidence unfair government tactics, including intimidation of opposition candidates and supporters, influenced the extent of the EPRDF victory. In addition, voter education was limited to information about technical voting procedures and was done only by the National Electoral Board just days before voting began.

The African Union, whose observers arrived one week before the vote, deemed the elections to be free and fair. The European Union, some of whose observers arrived a few months before the vote, concluded the elections fell short of international standards for transparency and failed to provide a level playing field for opposition parties. The EU observed a “climate of apprehension and insecurity,” noting the volume and consistency of complaints of harassment and intimidation by opposition parties was “a matter of concern” and had to be taken into consideration “in the overall assessment of the electoral process.”

Political Parties: Political parties were predominantly ethnically based. EPRDF constituent parties conferred advantages upon their members; the parties directly owned many businesses and were broadly perceived to award jobs and business contracts to loyal supporters. Several opposition political parties reported difficulty in renting homes or buildings in which to open offices, citing visits by EPRDF members to the landlords to persuade or threaten them not to rent property to these parties.

During the year, there were credible reports teachers and other government workers had their employment terminated if they belonged to opposition political parties. According to Oromo opposition groups, the Oromia regional government continued to threaten to dismiss opposition party members, particularly teachers, from their jobs. Government officials made allegations many members of legitimate Oromo opposition political parties were secretly OLF members and more broadly that members of many opposition parties had ties to Ginbot 7. At the university level members of Medrek and its constituent parties were able to teach.

Registered political parties must receive permission from regional governments to open and occupy local offices.

In early 2010 a system of public campaign finance was announced. Under this system parties are to receive public funds from the National Electoral Board based in part on the number of parliamentary seats they hold. In 2011 the EPRDF decided to redistribute its share of the funds, which accounted for approximately 75 percent based on its dominance of the parliament and regional councils, to other political parties that were members of the Joint Council of Political Parties, whether or not they had seats in parliament. Because of an ongoing dispute with the EPRDF, Medrek, the largest opposition front, remained outside the Joint Council. Despite this Medrek was offered a small amount of funds, which it refused to accept.

Participation of Women and Minorities: No laws or cultural or traditional practices prevented women or minorities from voting or participating in political life on the same basis as men or nonminority citizens. The Tigray Regional Council held the highest proportion of women nationwide, at 48.5 percent.

The government policy of ethnic federalism led to the creation of individual constituencies to provide for representation of all major ethnic groups in the House of People’s Representatives. There were more than 80 ethnic groups, and small groups lacked representation in the legislature. There were 24 nationality groups in six regional states (Tigray, Amhara, Beneshangul-Gumuz, SNNPR, Gambella, and Harar) that did not have a sufficient population to qualify for constituency seats based on the 2007 census result; however, in the 2010 elections, individuals from these nationality groups competed for 24 special seats in the House of People’s Representatives. Additionally, these 24 nationality groups have one seat each in the House of Federation.

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; despite the government’s prosecution of numerous officials for corruption, some officials continued to engage in corrupt practices. Corruption, especially the solicitation of bribes, remained a problem among low-level bureaucrats. Police and judicial corruption also continued to be problems. Some government officials appeared to manipulate the privatization process, and state- and party-owned businesses received preferential access to land leases and credit.

The Ministry of Justice has primary responsibility for combating corruption, largely through the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC).

On September 5, five members of the Dire Dawa City Administration Council were sentenced in connection with corruption charges filed by the FEACC. The council members, found guilty of crimes including illegally giving away government land, manipulating tender processes, and accepting bribes, received prison sentences ranging from one to seven years.

The law requires that all government officials and employees officially register their wealth and personal property. The president, prime minister, and all cabinet-level ministers had registered their assets. By year’s end a total of 32,297 federal government officials had registered their assets, according to the FEACC.

The law provides for public access to government information, but access was largely restricted in practice. The law includes freedom of information provisions.

The government publishes its laws and regulations in the national gazette prior to their taking effect. The Government Communications Affairs Office managed contacts between the government, the press, and the public; the private press reported the government rarely responded to its queries.

Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A few domestic human rights groups operated, but with significant government restrictions. The government was generally distrustful and wary of domestic human rights groups and international observers. State controlled media were critical of international human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch. The government strongly criticized Human Rights Watch on several occasions during the year for what it described as biased and inaccurate reporting. The government also criticized an International Crisis Group (ICG) report that analyzed the impact of the death of Prime Minister Meles, claiming the ICG applied “very questionable standards” and did not reflect the reality on the ground.

The CSO law prohibits charities, societies, and associations (NGOs or CSOs) that receive more than 10 percent of their funding from foreign sources from engaging in activities that advance human and democratic rights or promote equality of nations, nationalities, peoples, genders, and religions; the rights of children and persons with disabilities; conflict resolution or reconciliation; or the efficiency of justice and law enforcement services. There were 3,522 organizations registered before the CSO law was adopted, although not all were active. Upon enactment of the CSO law, all charities were required to reregister with the government’s Charities and Societies Agency (ChSA). The implementation of the law continued to result in the severe curtailment of NGO activities related to human rights. In July the UN high commissioner for human rights expressed concern that civil society space “has rapidly shrunk” since the CSO law came into existence.

As of October 2,852 CSOs, both old and new, had been registered under the law. Of these, 389 were foreign charities, 491 were “resident” charities, 1,865 were “local” charities, 60 were adoption agencies, and 47 were consortia. The government maintained that the majority of organizations that did not reregister were not functional organizations prior to the passage of the law. Some human rights defender organizations adjusted to the law by registering either as local charities, meaning they could not raise more than 10 percent of their funds from foreign donors but could act in the specified areas, or as resident charities, which allowed foreign donations above 10 percent but prohibited activities in those areas.

One of several sets of implementing regulations under the law, the so-called 70/30 rule, caps administrative spending at 30 percent of an organization’s operating budget. The regulations define training of teachers, agricultural and health extension workers, and other government officials as an “administrative” cost, contending the training does not directly affect beneficiaries, thus limiting the number of training programs that can be provided by development assistance partners who prefer to employ train-the-trainer models to reach more persons. After discussions with development assistance partners, the government agreed to address application of this regulation on a case-by-case basis. A Civil Society Sector Working Group cochaired by the Ministry of Federal Affairs and a representative of the donor community convenes periodically to monitor and discuss challenges that arise as the law is implemented.

In October the ChSA announced it had closed 10 CSOs over the past two years because of improper payment of taxes and lack of adherence to the CSO law and related regulations. The agency also reportedly issued warnings to an additional 476 CSOs.

On October 19, the Supreme Court upheld the ChSA’s 2010 freezing of funds received by the Human Rights Council (HRCO) and the Ethiopian Women Lawyers’ Association (EWLA) from foreign sources.

The government denied NGOs access to federal prisons, police stations, and political prisoners, with the exception of JFA-PFE, one of only three organizations granted an exemption enabling them to raise unlimited funds from foreign sources and engage in human rights advocacy. JFA-PFE was permitted to visit prisoners and played a positive role in improving prisoners’ chances for clemency.

Restrictions that limited the access of human rights organizations, the media, humanitarian agencies, and diplomatic missions to conflict-affected areas continued, particularly with regard to the Somali Region conflict zones of Fik, Degahbur, Korahe, and parts of Warder. The partial relaxation of those restrictions that began in the previous year continued, with humanitarian access in the Somali Region improving in particular. Journalists were required to register before entering conflict regions. The government lacked a clear policy on NGO access to sensitive areas, leading regional government officials and military officials frequently to refer requests for access to the federal government. There were isolated reports of regional police or local militias blocking NGOs’ access to particular locations on particular days, citing security concerns.

There were credible reports security officials intimidated or detained local individuals to prevent them from meeting with NGOs and foreign government officials who were investigating allegations of abuse.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The government-established EHRC, which is funded by the parliament and subject to parliamentary review, is a semiautonomous body that investigates human rights complaints and produces annual and thematic reports. The commission operated 112 legal aid centers in collaboration with 17 universities and two civil society organizations, the EWLA and the Ethiopian Christian Lawyers Fellowship. The commission also completed the preparatory measures to sign collaborative agreements with two additional universities. The EHRC reported its Addis Ababa headquarters resolved 90 percent of the 952 complaints submitted to it during the year.

The Office of the Ombudsman has authority to receive and investigate complaints with respect to administrative mismanagement by executive branch offices. The office received 2,094 complaints in Addis Ababa from September 2011 to September 2012. Of these, the ombudsman opened investigations into 784, and the office reported it resolved the remaining cases through alternative means. The majority of complaints dealt with social security, labor, housing, and property disputes. The Office of the Ombudsman did not compile nationwide statistics. The Ombudsman’s Office opened five new offices around the country during the year.

In May the government completed drafting of a National Human Rights Action Plan, with an implementation coordinating office to be housed at the Ministry of Justice.

Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

The constitution provides all persons equal protection without discrimination based on race, nation, nationality or other social origin, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth, or status. However, in practice the government did not fully promote and protect these rights.

Women

Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalizes rape and provides for penalties of five to 20 years’ imprisonment, depending on the severity of the case; however, the law does not expressly address spousal rape. The government did not fully enforce the law, partially due to widespread underreporting. Recent statistics on the number of abusers prosecuted, convicted, or punished were not available. Anecdotal evidence suggested reporting of rapes had increased since the 2004 revision of the criminal code but the justice system was unable to keep up with the number of cases.

Domestic violence, including spousal abuse, was a pervasive social problem. The government’s 2011 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) found that 68.4 percent of women believe wife beating was justified. The previous survey, conducted in 2005, found 81 percent approval, showing a downward trend. The 2011 DHS revealed 45 percent of men felt that wife beating was justified, down from 52 percent found in the 2005 DHS data.

Although women had recourse to the police and the courts, societal norms and limited infrastructure prevented many women from seeking legal redress, particularly in rural areas. The government prosecuted offenders on a limited scale. Domestic violence is illegal, but government enforcement of laws against rape and domestic violence was inconsistent. Depending on the severity of damage inflicted, legal penalties range from small fines to imprisonment for up to 10 to 15 years.

Domestic violence and rape cases often were delayed significantly and given low priority. In the context of gender-based violence, significant gender gaps in the justice system remained, due to poor documentation and inadequate investigation. During the year, “child friendly” benches were established specifically to hear cases involving violence against children and women. Police officers were required to receive domestic violence training from domestic NGOs and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. There was a commissioner for women’s and children’s affairs in the EHRC.

Women and girls experienced gender-based violence, but it was underreported due to cultural acceptance, shame, fear, or a victim’s ignorance of legal protections.

The government established a National Commission for Children’s and Women’s Affairs in 2005, as part of the EHRC, to investigate alleged human rights violations against women and children.

Harmful Traditional Practices: The most prevalent harmful traditional practices, besides FGM/C, were uvulectomy (cutting or removal the uvula, the piece of flesh that hangs down at the rear of the mouth), tonsillectomy (cutting or removal of the tonsils), and marriage by abduction.

Marriage by abduction is illegal, although it continued in some regions, including Amhara, Oromia, and SNNPR, despite the government’s attempts to combat the practice. Forced sexual relationships accompanied most marriages by abduction, and women often experienced physical abuse during the abduction. Abductions led to conflicts among families, communities, and ethnic groups. In cases of marriage by abduction, the perpetrator did not face punishment if the victim agreed to marry the perpetrator.

Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): One of the most prevalent harmful traditional practices, FGM/C, is illegal, but the government did not actively enforce this prohibition or punish those who practiced it. The practice was still widespread; however, according to a 2010 Population Council survey the rates continued to fall. Eighty percent of women ages 40 to 49 reported they were subjected to FGM/C, while 58 percent of girls and women ages 15 to 19 reported the same. The prevalence of FGM/C was highest in the Afar, SNNPR, and Oromia regions.

Sexual Harassment: Sexual harassment was widespread. The penal code prescribes penalties of 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment; however, authorities generally did not enforce harassment laws.

Reproductive Rights: Individuals have the right to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing, and timing of children and to have the information and means to do so free from discrimination, coercion, and violence. The 2011 DHS indicated a contraceptive prevalence of 29 percent nationwide among married women, a twofold increase from the survey done six years earlier. The 2011 DHS indicated the maternal mortality rate was 676 per 100,000 live births as compared with 673 per 100,000 reported in the 2005 DHS. Principle causes of maternal mortality included excessive bleeding, infection, hypertensive complications, and obstructed labor, with the underlying cause being the prevalence of home births. Only 9 percent of women reported delivering in a health facility or with a skilled birth attendant. According to the Federal Minister of Health, a government program known as the Health Development Army resulted in this figure reaching approximately 50 percent in the Tigray Region.

Discrimination: Discrimination against women was most acute in rural areas, where an estimated 85 percent of the population lives. The law contains discriminatory regulations, such as the recognition of the husband as the legal head of the family and the sole guardian of children more than five years old. Courts generally did not consider domestic violence by itself a justification for granting a divorce. Irrespective of the number of years the marriage existed, the number of children raised, and joint property, the law entitled women to only three months’ financial support if a relationship ended. There was limited legal recognition of common-law marriage. A common-law husband had no obligation to provide financial assistance to his family, and as a result, women and children sometimes faced abandonment. Notwithstanding progressive provisions in the formal law, traditional courts continued to apply customary law in economic and social relationships.

According to the constitution all land belongs to the government. Both men and women have land-use rights, which they can pass on as an inheritance. Land law varies among regions. All federal and regional land laws empower women to access government land. Inheritance laws also enable widowed women to inherit joint property they acquired during marriage.

In urban areas women had fewer employment opportunities than men, and the jobs available did not provide equal pay for equal work. Women’s access to gainful employment, credit, and the opportunity to own or manage a business was further limited by their generally lower level of education and training and by traditional attitudes.

The Ministry of Education reported female participation in undergraduate and postgraduate programs increased to 144,286 during the 2011-12 academic year, compared with 123,706 in 2010-11, continuing the trend of increasing female participation in higher education.

Children

Birth registration: Citizenship is derived from one’s parents. The law requires that all children be registered at birth. In practice children born in hospitals were registered while most children born outside of hospitals were not. The overwhelming majority of children, particularly in rural areas, were born at home.

Education: As a policy, primary education was universal and tuition-free; however, there were not enough schools to accommodate the country’s youth, particularly in rural areas. The cost of school supplies was prohibitive for many families, and there was no legislation to enforce compulsory primary education. The number of students enrolled in schools expanded faster than trained teachers could be deployed.

Child Abuse: Child abuse was widespread. In March a YouTube video of a young girl being repeatedly abused by a female caretaker went viral, spurring the establishment of a Facebook group called Ethiopians Against Child Abuse. A 2009 study conducted by the African Child Policy Forum revealed prosecuting offenders for sexual violence against children was difficult due to inconsistent interpretation of laws among legal bodies and the offender’s right to bail, which often resulted in the offender fleeing or coercing the victim or the victim’s family to drop the charges. During the year, “child friendly” benches were established specifically to hear cases involving violence against children and women.

Child Marriage: The law sets the legal marriage age for girls and boys at 18; however, this law was not enforced uniformly, and rural families were sometimes unaware of this provision. In several regions it was customary for older men to marry young girls, although this traditional practice continued to face greater scrutiny and criticism.

According to the 2011 DHS the median age of first marriage among women surveyed between the ages of 20 and 49 was 17.1 years. The age of first marriage appeared to be rising. In 2005 the median age of marriage for women surveyed between 20 and 24 was 16.5 years, and while 39 percent of women between 45 and 49 reported being married by age 15, only 8 percent of young women between 15 and 19 reported being or having been married.

In the Amhara and Tigray regions, girls were married routinely as early as age seven. Child marriage was the most prevalent in the Amhara Region, where the median first marriage age was 15.1 years per the 2011 DHS, compared with 14.7 years in 2005. Regional governments in Amhara and, to a lesser extent, Tigray offered programs to educate young women on issues associated with early marriage.

Harmful Traditional Practices: Societal abuse of young girls continued to be a problem. Harmful practices included FGM/C, early marriage, marriage by abduction, and food and work prohibitions. A 2006 African Child Policy Forum retrospective survey indicated 68.5 percent of girls surveyed in the country had been abused sexually and 84 percent had been abused physically.

The majority of girls in the country had undergone some form of FGM/C. FGM/C was much less common in urban areas, where only 15 percent of the population lived. Girls typically experienced clitoridectomies seven days after birth (consisting of an excision of the clitoris, often with partial labial excision) and faced infibulation (the most extreme and dangerous form of FGM/C) at the onset of puberty. A 2008 study funded by Save the Children Norway reported a 24 percent national reduction in FGM/C cases over the previous 10 years, due in part to a strong anti-FGM/C campaign. The campaign continued to have an effect in the SNNPR and Afar regions during the year, although reliable sources in SNNPR reported infibulation still was administered on most girls. The penal code criminalizes practitioners of clitoridectomy, with imprisonment of at least three months or a fine of at least 500 birr ($28). Infibulation of the genitals is punishable with imprisonment of five to 10 years. However, no criminal charges have ever been brought for FGM/C. The government discouraged the practice of FGM/C through education in public schools, the Health Extension Program, and broader mass media campaigns.

Sexual Exploitation of Children: The minimum age for consensual sex is 18 years, but this law was not enforced. The law provides for three to 15 years in prison for sexual intercourse with a minor. The law provides for one year in prison and a fine of 10,000 birr ($550) for trafficking in indecent material displaying sexual intercourse by minors. The law prohibits profiting from the prostitution of minors and inducing minors to engage in prostitution; however, commercial sexual exploitation of children continued, particularly in urban areas. Girls as young as age 11 reportedly were recruited to work in brothels. Customers often sought these girls because they believed them to be free of sexually transmitted diseases. Young girls were trafficked from rural to urban areas. They also were exploited as prostitutes in hotels, bars, resort towns, and rural truck stops. Reports indicated family members forced some young girls into prostitution.

Infanticide: Ritual and superstition-based infanticide continued in remote tribal areas, particularly the South Omo Valley. Local governments worked to educate communities against the practice.

Displaced Children: According to a 2010 report by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, approximately 150,000 children lived on the streets, of whom 60,000 were in the capital. The ministry’s report stated families’ inability to support children due to parental illness or insufficient household income exacerbated the problem. These children begged, sometimes as part of a gang, or worked in the informal sector.

A 2010 Population Council Young Adult Survey found that 82.3 percent of boys who lived or worked on the streets had been to or had enrolled in school, 26.4 percent had lost one parent, and 47.2 percent had lost both parents. Among these boys, 72 percent had worked for pay at some point in their lives. Government and privately run orphanages were unable to handle the number of street children.

Institutionalized Children: There were an estimated 5.4 million orphans in the country, according to a 2010 report by the Central Statistics Authority. The vast majority lived with extended family members. Government orphanages were overcrowded, and conditions were often unsanitary. Due to severe resource constraints, hospitals and orphanages often overlooked or neglected abandoned infants. Institutionalized children did not receive adequate health care, and several infants in SNNPR died due to lack of adequate medical attention.

International Child Abductions: The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

Anti-Semitism

The Jewish community numbered approximately 2,000; there were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.

Trafficking in Persons

See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip.

Persons with Disabilities

The constitution does not mandate equal rights for persons with disabilities. However, two laws prohibit discrimination against persons with physical and mental disabilities in employment and mandate access to buildings. It is illegal for deaf persons to drive.

The Right to Employment of Persons with Disabilities Proclamation prohibits employment discrimination based on disability. It also makes employers responsible for providing appropriate working or training conditions and materials to persons with disabilities. The law specifically recognizes the additional burden on women with disabilities. The government took limited measures to enforce the law, for example, by assigning interpreters for hearing-impaired civil service employees.

The Building Proclamation mandates building accessibility and accessible toilet facilities for persons with physical disabilities, although specific regulations that define the accessibility standards have not been adopted. Buildings and toilet facilities were usually not accessible. Landlords are required to give persons with disabilities preference for ground-floor apartments, and this was respected in practice.

Women with disabilities were more disadvantaged than men with disabilities in education and employment. An Addis Ababa University study from 2008 showed that female students with disabilities were subjected to a heavier burden of domestic work than their male peers. The 2010 Population Council Young Adult Survey found young persons with disabilities were less likely to have ever attended school than young persons without disabilities. The survey indicated girls with disabilities were less likely than boys with disabilities to be in school; 23 percent of girls with disabilities were in school, compared to 48 percent of girls without disabilities and 55 percent of boys without disabilities. Overall, 47.8 percent of young persons with disabilities surveyed reported not going to school due to their disability. Girls with disabilities also were much more likely to suffer physical and sexual abuse than girls without disabilities. Thirty-three percent of sexually experienced disabled girls reported having experienced forced sex. According to the same survey, some 6 percent of boys with disabilities had been beaten in the three months prior to the survey, compared to 2 percent of boys without disabilities.

There were several schools for hearing and visually impaired persons and several training centers for children and young persons with intellectual disabilities. There was a network of prosthetic and orthopedic centers in five of the nine regional states.

Several domestic associations, such as the Ethiopian National Association of the Blind, Ethiopian National Association of the Deaf, and Ethiopian National Association of the Physically Handicapped, like other civil society organizations, continued to be affected negatively by the CSO law.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

The country has more than 80 ethnic groups, of which the Oromo, at approximately 35 percent of the population, is the largest. The federal system drew boundaries roughly along major ethnic group lines. Most political parties remained primarily ethnically based.

Clashes between ethnic groups during the year resulted in 100 to 150 deaths and the displacement of persons. Water shortages contributed to interethnic conflict.

On March 12, armed gunmen ambushed a passenger bus in Bonga, near the capital of the Gambella Region. After stopping the vehicle, the gunmen forced passengers off the bus and divided “highlanders” from locals (the term “highlanders” generally referred to persons from the Tigray or Amhara regions, although in Gambella the term also was applied more broadly to refer to those from outside the region). The gunmen opened fire on the highlanders, killing 21 persons and wounding nine.

Early in the year, around Moyale town, on the country’s border with Kenya, long-standing ethnic tensions erupted into large-scale violence as rival groups vied for resources. A series of retaliatory attacks on the Kenyan side of the border forced thousands of ethnic Borena (Borana) and Gebre (Gabbra) to flee into Ethiopia. In July rival Borena, Gebre, and Garre groups clashed on the Ethiopian side of the border, leading to as many as 85 deaths and displacing tens of thousands before federal forces contained the fighting.

Other Societal Violence or Discrimination

Societal stigma and discrimination against persons living with or affected by HIV/AIDS continued in the areas of education, employment, and community integration. Despite the abundance of anecdotal information, there were no statistics on the scale of the problem.

Section 7. Worker Rights

a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining

The constitution and the law provide workers, except for certain categories of workers, with the right to form and join unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively; however, such rights are severely restricted or excessively regulated by other laws. The 2003 Labor Proclamation specifically excludes managerial employees, teachers, and civil servants (including judges, prosecutors, and security service workers) from organizing unions. The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations noted that the CSO law gives the government power to interfere in workers’ right to organize, including through the registration, internal administration, and dissolution of organizations.

A minimum of 10 workers is required to form a union. While the law provides all unions with the right to register, the government may refuse to register trade unions that do not meet its registration requirements. The law stipulates a trade union organization may not act in an overtly political manner. The law allows administrative authorities to appeal to the courts to cancel union registration for engaging in prohibited activities, such as political action. Seasonal and part-time agricultural workers cannot organize into labor unions. While the law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers and provides for reinstatement for workers fired for union activity, it does not prevent an employer from creating or supporting a workers’ organization for the purpose of controlling it.

While the law recognizes the right of collective bargaining, this right is severely restricted. Negotiations aimed at amending or replacing a collective agreement must be completed within three months of its expiration, or the provisions on wages and other benefits cease to apply. Civil servants, including public school teachers, have the right to establish and join professional associations, but are not allowed to negotiate for better wages or working conditions. Furthermore, the arbitration procedures in the public sector are more restrictive than those in the private sector.

Although the constitution and law provide workers with the right to strike to protect their interests, it contains detailed provisions prescribing excessively complex and time-consuming formalities that make legal strike actions difficult to carry out. A minimum of 30 days’ advance notice must be given before striking when the case is referred to a court or a labor relations board. The law requires aggrieved workers to attempt reconciliation with employers before striking and includes a lengthy dispute settlement process. These provisions applied equally to an employer’s right to lock workers out. Two-thirds of the workers involved must support a strike for it to occur. If a case has not already been referred to a court or labor relations board, workers retain the right to strike without resorting to either of these options, provided they give at least 10 days’ notice to the other party and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and make efforts at reconciliation.

The law also prohibits strikes by workers who provide essential services, including air transport and urban bus service workers, electric power suppliers, gas station personnel, hospital and pharmacy personnel, firefighters, telecommunications personnel, and urban sanitary workers. Such a discretionary list of essential services exceeds the ILO definition of essential services. The law prohibits retribution against strikers, but also provides for excessive civil or penal sanctions for unions and workers involved in nonauthorized strike actions. Unions can be dissolved for carrying out strikes in “essential services.”

The informal labor sector, including domestic workers, is not unionized and is not protected by labor laws. Lack of adequate staffing prevented the government from effectively enforcing applicable laws during the year. Court procedures were subject to lengthy delays and appeals.

Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining were not respected in practice. Although the government permits unions, the major trade unions were government-established and -controlled entities. The government continued to use its authority to refuse to register the National Teachers’ Association (NTA) during the year on the grounds a national teacher association already existed. According to the Education International report to the ILO in 2011, members of the NTA were subjected to surveillance and harassment by government security agents, with the goal of intimidating teachers to abandon the NTA and forcing them to give up their long-standing demand for the formation of an independent union. In November the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association expressed its concern with regard to serious violations of the NTA’s trade union rights, including continuous interference in its internal organization that prevented it from functioning normally and interference by way of threats, dismissals, arrest, detention, and mistreatment of NTA members. The committee urged the government to register the NTA without delay; to ensure the CSO law was not applicable to workers’ and employers’ organizations; and to undertake civil service reform to fully ensure the right of civil servants to establish and join organizations of their own choosing.

While the government allowed citizens to exercise the right of collective bargaining freely, representatives negotiated wages only at the plant level. It was common for employers to refuse to bargain. Unions in the formal industrial sector made some efforts to enforce labor regulations.

Despite the law prohibiting antiunion discrimination, unions reported that employers frequently fired union activists. For example local government backed management at Balcha Hospital, Addis Ababa, that reportedly made efforts to establish a “yellow union” or employer-controlled union and to force workers to join it with the purpose of weakening the existing union. The chairperson of the factory workers’ union at a sugar factory in East Wellega in the Oromia Region was reportedly dismissed due to his union activities. There were reports most Chinese employers generally did not allow workers to form unions and often transferred or fired union leaders, as well as intimidated and pressured members to leave unions. Lawsuits alleging unlawful dismissal often take years to resolve because of case backlogs in the courts. Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination were required to reinstate workers fired for union activities and generally did so in practice. While the law prohibits retribution against strikers, most workers were not convinced the government would enforce this protection. Labor officials reported that, due to high unemployment and long delays in the hearing of labor cases, some workers were afraid to participate in strikes or other labor actions.

b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits most forms of forced or compulsory labor, including by children; however, the law also permits courts to order forced labor as a punitive measure. The government did not effectively enforce the forced labor prohibition, and forced labor occurred in practice. Both adults and children were forced to engage in street vending, begging, traditional weaving, or agricultural work. Children also worked in forced domestic labor. Situations of debt bondage also occurred in traditional weaving, pottery, cattle herding, and other agricultural activities, mostly in rural areas.

Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip.

c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

By law the minimum age for wage or salary employment is 14 years. The minimum age provisions, however, only apply to contractual labor and do not apply to self-employed children or children who perform unpaid work. Special provisions cover children between the ages of 14 and 18, including the prohibition of hazardous or night work. The law defines hazardous work as work in factories or involving machinery with moving parts or any work that could jeopardize a child’s health. Prohibited work sectors include passenger transport, electric generation plants, underground work, street cleaning, and many other sectors. The lack of labor inspectors and controls prevented the government from enforcing the law, leading to increasing numbers of children working in these sectors, particularly construction. The law expressly excludes children under age 16 attending vocational schools from legal protection with regard to the prohibition of young workers from performing hazardous work. The law does not permit children between the ages of 14 and 18 to work more than seven hours per day or between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., on public holidays or rest days, or overtime.

The government did not effectively enforce these laws in practice. The resources for inspections and the implementation of penalties were extremely limited. Despite the introduction of labor inspector training at Gondar University in 2011, insufficient numbers of labor inspectors and inspections resulted in lax enforcement of occupational safety and health measures and prohibitions against child labor.

The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) covers child labor issues, with support from the Ministry of Women, Children, and Youth Affairs. Cooperation, information sharing, and coordination between the ministries improved during the year. The National Action Plan (NAP) to Eliminate the Worst Forms of Child Labor was signed at the end of the year. The government conducted activities to raise awareness regarding child labor and piloted a child labor-free zone.

To underscore the importance of attending school, joint NGO and government-led community-based awareness raising activities targeted communities where children were heavily engaged in agricultural work. During the year the government invested in modernizing agricultural practices and constructing schools to combat the problem of children in agricultural sectors.

Child labor remained a serious problem, in both urban and rural areas. In both rural and urban areas, children often began working at young ages. Child labor was particularly pervasive in subsistence agricultural production, traditional weaving, fishing, and domestic work. A growing number of children worked in construction. Children in rural areas, especially boys, engaged in activities such as cattle herding, petty trading, plowing, harvesting, and weeding, while other children, mostly girls, collected firewood and fetched water. Children in urban areas, including orphans, worked in domestic service, often working long hours, which prevented many from attending school regularly. They also worked in manufacturing, shining shoes, making clothes, portering, directing customers to taxis, parking, public transport, petty trading, and occasionally herding animals. Some children worked long hours in dangerous environments for little or no wages and without occupational safety protection. Child laborers often faced physical, sexual, and emotional abuse at the hands of their employers.

Also see the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/tda.htm.

d. Acceptable Conditions of Work

There is no national minimum wage. Some government institutions and public enterprises set their own minimum wages. Public sector employees, the largest group of wage earners, earned a monthly minimum wage of approximately 420 birr ($23); employees in the banking and insurance sector had a minimum monthly wage of 336 birr ($18). The official estimate for the poverty income level is approximately 315 birr ($17) per month.

Only a small percentage of the population, concentrated in urban areas, was involved in wage-labor employment. Wages in the informal sector generally were below subsistence levels.

The law provides for a 48-hour maximum legal workweek with a 24-hour rest period, premium pay for overtime, and prohibition of excessive compulsory overtime. The country has 13 paid public holidays per year. The law entitles employees in public enterprise and government financial institutions to overtime pay; civil servants receive compensatory time for overtime work. The government, industries, and unions negotiated occupational safety and health standards. Workers specifically excluded by law from unionizing, including domestic workers and seasonal and part-time agricultural workers, generally did not benefit from health and safety regulations in the workplace.

The MOLSA’s inspection department was responsible for enforcement of these standards. The country had 380 labor inspectors. However, due to lack of resources, these standards were not enforced effectively. The MOLSA’s severely limited administrative capacity; lack of an effective mechanism for receiving, investigating, and tracking allegations of violations; and lack of detailed, sector-specific health and safety guidelines hampered effective enforcement of these standards. In addition penalties were not sufficient to deter violations.

Compensation, benefits, and working conditions of seasonal agricultural workers were far below those of unionized permanent agricultural employees. Although the government did little to enforce the law, in practice most employees in the formal sector worked a 39-hour workweek. However, many foreign, migrant, and informal sector workers worked more than 48 hours per week.

Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardizing their employment. Despite this law most workers feared losing their jobs if they were to do so. Hazardous working conditions existed in the agricultural sector, which was the primary base of the country’s economy. There were also reports of hazardous and exploitative working conditions in the construction and fledgling industrial sectors.

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204120#wrapper

State Criminality in Ethiopia’s Ogaden — Graham Peebles

Posted on

Under Darkness in the Somali Region of Ethiopia

By Graham Peebles | Counterpunch.org
April 19, 2013

No matter how tightly truth is tied down, confined and suffocated, she slowly escapes. Seeping out through cracks and openings large and small, illuminating all, revealing the grime and shame, that cowers in the shadows.

The arid Somali (or Ogaden) region of Ethiopia, home to some 5 million ethnic Somalis has been isolated from the world since 2005, when the government imposed a ban on all international media and most humanitarian groups from operating in the area. Human Rights Watch (HRW), report that the government, “has tried to stem the flow of information from the region. Some foreign journalists who have attempted to conduct independent investigations have been arrested and residents and witnesses have been threatened and detained in order to prevent them from speaking out“. Aid workers with the United Nations (UN), Medecines Sans Frontiers (MSF) and the International Committee of The Red Cross, plus journalists from a range of western papers, including The New York Times have all had staff expelled and/or detained, by the Ethiopian regime, which speaks of democracy yet does act not in accordance with its own liberal constitution and consistently violates international law, with total impunity.

Under the cover of media darkness together with donor country indifference, the Ethiopian government according to a host of human rights organisations, is committing wide-ranging human rights abuses that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Serious accusations based on accounts relayed by refugees and interviews with Ogaden Somalis on the ground, thatgive, one fears, a hint only of the level of state criminality taking place in the troubled, largely ignored region. HRW, make clear the seriousness of the situation, stating that, “tens of thousands of ethnic Somali civilians living in eastern Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State are experiencing serious abuses… Ethiopian troops have forcibly displaced entire rural communities, ordering villagers to leave their homes within a few days or witness their houses being burnt down and possessions destroyed—and risk death.”

The African Rights Monitor (ARM) in their detailed study, conservatively titled ‘Concerns Over the Ogaden Territory’, found, “that the Ethiopian government has systematically and repeatedly arbitrarily detained, tortured and inhumanly degraded the Ogaden people.” Women and children they report, “are raped, sexually assaulted, and killed”. The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) they found, “systematically attacks the women and children as they are the weakest in a civil society” and are unable to defend themselves. Documenting a series of specific cases of violence, HRW (28/05/2012) report, “an Ethiopian government-backed paramilitary force [the Liyuu Police] summarily executed 10 men during a March 2012 operation”, HRW “interviewed witnesses and relatives of the victims who described witnessing at least 10 summary executions…. The actual number may be higher.” Such accounts as these clearly warrant investigation by independent agencies, and yet they are resolutely ignored. Supporters of the regime know well what is occurring throughout the Ogaden, and yet they remain silent. America – the single biggest donor to the country, with military bases inside Ethiopia from where their deadly drones are launched into Somalia and Yemen – and Britain are close allies – of the Ethiopian government it seems, but not of the Ethiopian people it seems.

A Regime of Abuse

Page after page could be filled with detailed accounts of abuse from refugees who have fled the region, human rights groups and members of the Ogaden diaspora. Atrocities meted out to innocent civilians suspected of supporting the ONLF, which Genocide Watch (GW) find, amount to “war crimes and crimes against humanity”. Beaten to death, hanged from a tree, tied with wire and held over burning chilies, raped, repeatedly and falsely imprisoned; brutal, unjustifiable acts, justified by the government as part of a ‘counter insurgency operation’, against the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), predictably branded terrorists.

Documented reports of human rights violations amounting to state terrorism are dismissed by the EPRDF government, a regime with a notoriously dismal human rights record – who suggest that such accounts are reports of military personnel simply carrying out their duty to safeguard the Ethiopian people by routing out terrorist gangs. A scripted rhetoric of righteousness drafted in Washington after 9/11, translated worldwide distorted and espoused by totalitarian governments East and West, North and South to legitimise methods of control and acts of aggression.

Given the media restrictions, we cannot vouchsafe the governments view, but “if the Ethiopian government doesn’t have anything to hide, why don’t they allow independent investigators and journalists into the region”, Leslie Lefkow, HRW deputy director of Africa, poses the question on the tip of our tongues that cannot be asked too often. There is, she says with understatement, “ a lot of concern about the human rights situation on the Ogaden”. GW are more blunt, claiming unequivocally that Ethiopia is committing genocide in the Somali region, as well as to the “Anuak, Oromo and Omo” ethnic groups (or tribes). And they call on the EPRDF regime to “cease all attacks on the Ogaden Somali” people and “immediately release all prisoners”, urging them to “adhere to it’s own constitution and allow its provinces the legal autonomy they are guaranteed.”

A Captains Story

In 2005, delivery of the Ethiopian government’s violent policy of suppression in the Ogaden shifted from the Military to the newly-formed paramilitary group, the Liyuu Police. Not a recognisable police force at all, as Faysal Mohamoud Abdi Wali a defected 38-year-old former Captain in the Intelligence unit of the Liyuu makes clear, but “an extension of the military”, which operates under a cloak of impunity, lacking all accountability. Faysal Mohammoud served in the Liyuu from its inception eight years ago, when it was called the ‘Liyuu Xayi’ until he defected in 2012. His testimony is of particular interest, especially given the media ban.

The former Liyuu officer from regiment nine “stationed in the Duhun districy”, was interviewd by Swedish journalists, Amnesty International and myself. He related how young men are forced to join the force and arrested should they refuse. Confirming findings by HRW that forced recruitment takes place amongst tribal groups, who are ordered Faysal says tribal elders are ordered “to bring at least 80 fighters for every single tribe. If any of these [recruited fighters] escaped from the Militia they seek and capture [them, the truant is] then forced to kill one of his relatives or kinship”.

He recounts mass killing, in “Hamaro, Sagag, and Dhuhun of Fiq provinces”, where he says “large number of civilians accused of being ONLF sympathizers” where massacred. “These people are mostly killed by hanging from trees and girls are gang-raped and then murdered.” He goes on to say “the youth in Dhuhun, the young men and the young women in Hamaro, the young men slaughtered in Degeh-bur and teens summarily executed [in] Denan and Dakhato”. Extra judicial executions, intimidation and “forceful methods; strangling and rape of females aged 15 – 25,” are used as weapons of terror, “based on the advice we received from the regional president Abdi Mohamud Omar who said ‘indoctrinate the women with the male phallus and the men with guns’. Omar was largely responsible for the creation of the Liyuu, which evolved out of the Ethiopian army, and was embraced by the former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.

The Captain states he was an “eye-witness for unaccountable massacres” by Liyuu Police who, after killing villagers “burned the entire village to the ground”. They forcefully remove them [villagers] from the land and slaughter their livestock. In remote villages, they sometimes massacre them all. For example, they forcefully removed many villagers from Gudhis, massacring 125 members from that village and burned the village, in 2007.”

Soldiers are rewarded he says, for killing civilians, for the “good job they have done”. Nomads who have the misfortune to see the Liyuu on operations, are killed, “in order to make sure that their information is not received by the ONLF rebels“. Summary executions, he reports are commonplace, as “in Dakhato in June 2010… {Where] 43 nomads were killed”. Faysal Mohammedd estimates the number of civilians murdered by the Liyuu since 2005 “to be in excess of 30, 000 people”.

Urgent Action Required

The Somali region, poor and desolate, is potentially the richest part of Ethiopia. Natural Gas and oil have been discovered to be lying under the harsh surface and various contracts for exploration have been granted to international companies, (without consultation with local, indigenous people, needless to say). The current round of violence is to many people linked to the discovery of these natural treasures: GW relay how, “immediately after oil and gas were discovered in the Ogaden, Ethiopian government forces evicted large numbers of Ogaden Somalis from their ancestral grazing lands”. According to Faysal Mohamoud the federal government “has strategic economic and land acquisition aim in the Ogaden region, intended to exploit the natural resources of the region.” These are strategic aims that they are seeking to realise through the silencing of the indigenous local people.

Whilst some numbers, dates and locations from these and other accounts may be debated, the weight of claims of human rights violations and state criminality, is, it would appear beyond dispute – to the extent that GW have, “called upon the United Nations Security Council to refer the situation in Ethiopia to the International Criminal Court”. This required measure together with a range of others (including; the immediate release of all so called political prisoners, the correct distribution of all humanitarian aid to the needy, journalists granted open and unrestricted access, and a thorough investigation by independent observers) would be the right and proper course of action in the region. Action that should be undertaken, at the insistence of Ethiopia’s main donors – America, Britain and the European Union and with all due urgency.

Graham Peebles is director of the Create Trust. He can be reached at: [email protected]

Land grab destroys lives: Obang Metho at congressional briefing

                                          African Land and Natural Resource Grabs Destroy Lives and Futures of Africans

Mr. Obang Metho, Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia (SMNE), warns of the impact on people at the U.S. Congressional Briefing on Land Grabs in Africa

April 15, 2013

Press

I would like to thank Congressman Christopher Smith, Chairman of the U.S. House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations and members of the subcommittees for making this briefing on land grabs in Africa possible.

I am honored to be among those invited to talk about the impact of these land and resource grabs on the people of Africa. It is a vitally important issue that needs to be confronted. To me, this is not just about land grabs, but it is inherently about life grabs. In Africa, as well as in many other places, when you take someone’s land, you take away the means to an entire family’s livelihood, wellbeing and future. I am thrilled that the World Bank is also addressing this issue and hope it will soon lead to concrete action that saves lives.  

To me and the organization I lead, the Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia (SMNE), the problem of land grabs is not new. We have been actively working to expose and find solutions to these land grabs since they began in 2008 and partnered with the Oakland Institute in 2011 in a comprehensive in-country study on: Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Ethiopia.[1] What is going on today is an immoral and predatory practice by African strongmen and their powerful partners that is targeting the most vulnerable people on the continent. 

When I speak today, my testimony will not be as an outsider, but as a witness. When I talk about the people being displaced from the land grabs, in many cases I am speaking about people whose names I know. They include my uncle, my cousins, my nephews, my extended family, my community and my people—the people of Gambella, the people of Ethiopia, the people of Africa and the people of the world. We the people of Africa must be able to feed ourselves, but when the powerful take the food and land we have to sustain ourselves, leaving little behind for the indigenous, it is unconscionable and should be challenged. I welcome the opportunity we have to talk about this today. I request that my statement be submitted into the record in its entirety.

Introduction:

When the global food crisis of 2008 struck, with its food shortages, sky-rocketing food prices and widespread riots, it sounded an alarm that began the global race for fertile agricultural land, particularly land with access to water. Asian countries in the global south, like India, China, and South Korea, simply did not have enough unused, suitable land to meet the increasing need for food for their people. Some European countries were in the same position. Arid countries in the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, may have wealth from oil, but they were large importers of food and have little or diminishing arable land. Underground water aquifers were already being depleted in efforts to irrigate existing food crops.

Soaring populations, decreasing available land, environmental degradation and lessening confidence in access to adequate imports caused many governments to search beyond their borders for new ways to ensure a supply of food for the future. At the same time, speculators, investors and multinational agri-businesses began to see food as a high-profit commodity which could be profitable like oil, minerals and other natural resources.

So began the second scramble for African land that has led to massive land grabs of land already occupied by the people of Africa. For most of those affected, it has led to widespread displacement and to greater, rather than less, food insecurity. This abuse of land rights has happened most easily in nations where authoritarian regimes maintain their control over the people through suppression of basic freedoms, human rights abuses, fraudulent elections, corruption and military power. Unfortunately, many of these foreign investors become complicit as they partner with Africa’s strongmen.

World Bank President Dr. Jim Yong Kim said at their annual meeting last week, “Usable land is in short supply, and there are too many instances of speculators and unscrupulous investors exploiting smallholder farmers, herders, and others who lack the power to stand up for their rights. This is particularly true in countries with weak land governance systems.”[2]

In many countries in Africa freedom does not exist. Freedom House in their Freedom in the World Study for 2012 ranked Sub-Saharan Africa as 82% un-free or only partially free. People who dare to demand their rights or who expose the dark side of those in power, do so at risk to their lives and futures. Those in power do not represent the best interests of their people, but instead represent their own interests. With the search for agricultural land, authoritarian governments with weak adherence to laws and few protections for the people are making secretive deals to lease both small and large swathes of some of the prime agricultural land to foreign and crony investors for negligible amounts (e.g. $1.19 per hectare in parts of Ethiopia) for up to 99 years. Equivalent land reportedly brings $350 per hectare in places like Indonesia and Malaysia and thousands in the farm belt of the US.

Much of the food is destined for export or wherever it can bring the highest price. Most Africans are small farmers; though poor, they have been able to sustain themselves because of their land; however, the displaced will no longer be able to be self-reliant and may easily end up hungry or in need of food aid. Although some of the food produced will end up locally, food prices may well be beyond their ability to pay. The displaced are mostly in the rural regions where education and training have been lacking, leaving most ill-equipped to find other jobs. Institutions, meant to strengthen civil society, often do not exist or are under government control. Because there is little accountability or transparency, it has opened the doors to high-level corruption, crony favoritism and illicit transactions as secretive deals, with vague contracts, are negotiated by regime power-holders. 

A Focus on the Gambella region of Ethiopia, my birthplace and the epicenter of land grabs in Africa:

Ethiopia is one of the leading examples on the continent where large scale land grabs are going on. Gambella region, considered to have the potential for becoming the breadbasket of Ethiopia or the Horn of Africa, may now fail to feed its own. The region has some of the richest, most fertile land and abundant water in the country. My own ethnic group, the Anuak—as well as other indigenous groups like the Nuer, the Mazengir, the Komo and the Opo—consider Gambella their ancestral home, but little investment has been directed towards this marginalized and undeveloped region. Now, Gambella is the region most significantly targeted for land grabs.

In 2003, related to natural resources, the current government of Ethiopia massacred 424 Anuak leaders within three days and went on to commit many more crimes against humanity directed towards this one ethnic group in the following three years. It was related to natural resources at the time and now, their land is being grabbed.

It is happening in other regions as well. Already, an estimated 200,000 small farmers and pastoralists in the rural areas have been displaced from their land in order to free it up for investors. Recently, thousands of people of Amhara ethnicity were forcibly evicted from the region of Benishangul. A year ago, 70,000 other Amhara were evicted from land in the Southern Nation’s region. In 2011-2012, 70,000 small farmers from the Gambella region were forced off their land. Many more will be moved to resettlement areas in the next year. In Gambella, a region with a total population of about 300,000, this means nearly three-quarters of the people will be affected. 

In the vague contracts, previously made available on the government’s website, investors are promised land “free of impediments.” Impediments, a description which refers to the people now living on the land, are citizens of Ethiopia, but instead of their own government protecting their rights, they are seen as obstacles to be “cleared from their land” as if they were squatters or intruders in their own homes. Even though the government claims the local people are choosing to leave voluntarily in order to access better services, resistance is met with human rights abuses.

This is most often occurring in rural areas among indigenous people who have no established land rights even though they and their families or communities have lived on the land for generations. Neither do they have the power to resist the regime’s security forces as many are forcibly evicted from their land and moved to resettlement areas where they are promised improved access to services; however, most often, those services do not exist and the land is inferior with less access to water sources. Some end up homeless, in refugee camps in neighboring countries or working for slave wages on land they used to own. In most cases those affected have neither been consulted nor compensated for their losses, in contradiction to national and international laws.

The government claims there is no relationship between the resettlements and land leases; however, as soon as they are pushed off their land, the investors or agricultural companies move in to clear the land. For example, land grabs from small farmers have opened up 100,000 hectares—nearly 250,000 acres—for large agricultural farms like Karuturi Global Limited of India. Karuturi has been promised a total of 300,000 hectares—nearly 750,000 acres, which will require the expropriation of the vast majority of the best agricultural land in Gambella. Water for irrigation from this Upper Nile region is not being regulated and could greatly impact water availability elsewhere, including down river in other parts of Gambella, as well as in South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt.

Another agricultural company, Saudi Star, owned by the second richest man in Africa, multi-billionaire Sheikh Mohammed Al Amoudi has been given 10,000 hectares to lease in Gambella. As part of his Derba Group, he plans to lease another 290,000 hectares in the same region. He also allegedly has intentions to lease 300,000 hectares in Benishangul, another marginalized region, north of Gambella, and recently purchased three other farms in the country. There has been violent conflict related to Saudi Star. Within Gambella, smaller sized sections of land have been leased to regime cronies. In fact, it is estimated that nearly 70% of the domestic lessees of land in Gambella are either regime supporters or members of the ruling party’s own ethnic group.

Some real life stories from the ground:

Case Study #1: Mr. Okok Ojulu: Okok is an Anuak smallholder farmer who was educated in the UK in sustainable development.  In 2002, he led the World Bank’s project in the Gambella region. His work was very effective in utilizing the bank’s development funds to build schools, clinics and to dig water wells for the region. The funds were given to all other regions in Ethiopia as well. After the World Bank assessed the outcomes, Okok was given an award of excellence for how the funds were used and how the services were implemented. One of the rewards received from the bank was a car for his work. Shortly thereafter he was imprisoned for several years in Addis Ababa by the federal government because he had become a threat to the government, having become so popular and influential in the community. In 2007 he was released and returned to his family and region.

Shortly after his release and prior to the land rush in the Gambella, Okok, a man of considerable vision and ability, began plans to form an agricultural cooperative that would benefit the community. He began to grow food himself and when he had grown enough food to make a profit, he began hiring local people. He also began negotiating for the purchase of a tractor that could be leased out during planting and harvesting. Those using it would help pay for the cost of the tractor with their crops when they were successfully harvested. The cooperative would then market the produce to the local people.

The initial success of the venture inspired the young people to see farming as a viable opportunity for their future livelihoods. It was also seen as a way to eradicate poverty and to become more self-reliant; however, the TPLF/EPRDF saw it as a threat, in direct opposition to the foreign investment model they were selling to the people. They intimidated him and after finding out he was again going to be arrested, he had to flee the country. He had been supporting his own children’s school fees as well as fees of other relatives, which he could no longer do. His vision was killed and the people he had hired no longer had jobs. In doing this, the regime further disempowered the small holder farmers, the backbone of solving food insecurity.

The farmland he had used in this project was instead given to Saudi Star. When we talk about local small farmers being pushed off their land and impoverished by it, we have names for you of many more examples. Mr. Okok is now in Kenya as a refugee because it is no longer safe for him to live in Ethiopia.

Case Study #2: WorOwar: A second case example is a local business man, WorOwar, who invested all the money he had from his business to lease agricultural land when he noted how foreigners were coming to take the land. However, because he was not a government supporter, a regime crony nor a TPLF/ERPDF party member, the government authorities ended up harassing, threatening, and torturing him. He lost the land to the government who made it so difficult for him and his family that they were forced to flee the country for safety in 2010. Some regime crony now has possession of his land.

Case Study #3: Gambellans in the Diaspora: There are Anuak, now living in the Diaspora, who took the initiative to attempt to lease land in the Abobo District of Gambella. They had heard that the area where they had grown up and where family members still lived was on the list to be leased. This was an effort to ensure that these family members would not be displaced and that the land would continue to be theirs; however, the regime authorities refused to lease it to them. Instead, an Indian company took over the land.

Case Study #4: Mazenger community leaders: In 2011, community leaders of the Mazenger people took the initiative to go to Ethiopian President Girma Woldegiorgis to seek help to stop the clearing of their virgin forests for an Indian company to grow spices.

The president agreed with the local people and advocated on their behalf by writing a letter to the Ethiopian Minister of Agriculture, the former Prime Minister, and the Minister of Environment, saying it would hurt rather than help the country in the long run; but his efforts were ignored. Instead, those community leaders who initiated this ended up losing their jobs and some were even put in jail. This is impact of the land grab investment on the people even while the government denies it all. This is why I call it not only a land grab, but a life and future grab from these innocent people. There are too many other examples to tell; not only in Gambella, Ethiopia or Africa but throughout the world

What Undergirds Land Grabbing?

  • Lack of freedom:

Out of five countries in the world showing the greatest aggregate declines in freedom from 2007-2011, Ethiopia was fifth according to the previously mentioned 2012 study by Freedom House. In the case of Ethiopia, it is well known within the country that the ethnic-based Tigrayan Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) not only controls the ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), but it also controls every sector of society and every facet of life from the federal level to the kebele (neighborhood levels). This includes the parliament, civil service, the judiciary, the military, security forces, civic institutions, religious institutions, the economic system, the educational system and the administration of developmental aid; including the dispensation of food aid, fertilizers, seed and other developmental aid. 

  • Lack of justice and equality

Most benefits are directed to the TPLF’s own region or supporters. For example, in their own region of Tigray, there are five hospitals and four universities whereas in a region like Gambella, there are no universities and only one hospital without running water. Party membership is necessary to get into schools, to get jobs and to access most any opportunities. If you are not part of the inner circle, you stand no chance of moving ahead. Conversely, if you challenge the system, you could face harassment, higher taxes, loss of property, intimidation or rights violations. The judiciary and the land appeal process are not independent but are controlled by the top regime power-holders. The number one interest of the regime is the resources but not the people whose freedom they must restrict in order to have free reign of benefiting from the nation’s resources.

  • Lack of political space: 

Opposition groups are threatened and undermined and opposition leaders and activists are imprisoned on charges of terrorism. There is only one opposition member in Parliament out of 547 members. He is only given 3 minutes to speak at any session.

  • Lack of freedom of religion:

The TPLF/ERPDF interferes in the religious affairs of both Christians and Muslims, for example, forcing regime-selected, pro-government religious leaders into top positions to undermine their influence on society. It has caused church divisions among Christians and caused thousands of Muslims to peacefully protest against religious control. Muslim leaders have been arrested and are in prison despite committing no crimes.

  • Lack of independent institutions:

Civic institutions, which are crucial in healthy societies, are under the control of the regime. Even the laws undermine civil society by prohibiting significant parts of their work, with criminal penalties for infractions, if they receive more than 10% of their funding from foreign sources. For example, human rights organizations have had to close and instead, the government has created their own.

  • Lack of Communication and technology

Communication and technology, on every level, is controlled. Here are some examples:

  • Telecommunication: the government is the only provider and most Ethiopians have limited access; for example, the rate of mobile phone usage in Ethiopia (5%) is one of the lowest in Africa; the rate of fixed land phones is only 1%; again, among the lowest. Ethiopia has invested in sophisticated spyware equipment to monitor users.
  • Internet: the government is the only provider; they actively control opposition websites and closely monitor use[3] through various techniques, including spyware. Access to the Internet is one of the lowest rates in the world at 0.5%, seven times behind the African average.
  • There is only one government-run television station and radio station. Voice of America (VOA) and Deustche Welle (DW) have both been jammed in the past. Newspapers are self-censoring or government –controlled. Journalists and editors have been imprisoned as terrorists or have fled the country. Printing shops have been threatened not to print any material that reflects poorly on the TPLF/ERPDF.
  • The government disseminates propaganda internally and internationally; for example, claiming that resettlement is voluntary, by denying human rights abuses, by denying personal gain by regime power-holders, and by using democratic, developmental and war on terror rhetoric to dupe outsiders and to gain political, financial and military support.
  • Lack of land tenure undergirds poverty and land grabs:

In Ethiopia, all land is owned by the state; essentially banning private ownership. This has made it impossible for farmers, who use their land as collateral, to buy and sell land. It also gives them uncertain rights to that land since the government has reserved the their own right to redistribute the land if they see fit to do so.

In regards to how this creates or mitigates food insecurity, the SMNE worked with the Humphrey Institute at the University of Minnesota on the completion of a study, Land Reform in Ethiopia: Recommendations for Reform, focusing on the role of land tenure policy and poverty in Ethiopia. That report will be released this week and will be available on our website. http://www.solidaritymovement.org/

The team of researchers found evidence that a lack of land tenure contributes to the vulnerability of the people; particularly in regions where they have no certificates giving the people individual or customary/community rights to utilize the land. Small and marginalized tribes have the fewest rights. The TPLF/ERPDF uses the lack of certification to redistribute land on whim.

Only four regions now have partial certification: Amhara, Oromia, Tigray and parts of Southern Nations. No one is safe, but those with certification are safer. Lack of mapping boundaries of properties also exacerbates the problem.

City dwellers also are at risk. Even though many hold certificates; urban certificates are inviolable only as long as no one wants the land underneath your home, condominium or business. If it is strategically located or sought after by an investor or someone from the inner circle of regime, the land can be expropriated. New laws are on the books that can demand eviction from urban land sites if the lessees fail to build a two or three story structure on the site. Many find it financially impossible to do so and end up on the streets, homeless.

The study found that land appeals are oftentimes heard by the same people and authorities who made the decisions on the expropriation of the land involved. There is obviously an inherent conflict of interest. [More information on Ethiopia’s certification program can also be found from the World Bank’s document: the Land Governance Assessment Framework: Identifying and Monitoring Good Practice in the Land Sector.][4]

Some observations:

  • High rates of rural landlessness and land poverty already exist; challenging the government’s argument that there is abundant excess land. Much of that land is less arable than what is being forcibly vacated. Forty three percent of rural Ethiopians have no access to land and fully 60% lack sufficient land to grow enough food for a family of five. (Please see Humphrey Institute’s Executive Summary).
  • Land grabs can be linked to increasing corruption, but not to decreasing hunger.
  • Land grabs, which are resulting in increased food insecurity and dispossessing the small farmers of their livelihoods, are exactly contrary to goals expressed by the World Bank, the IMF, USAID, development groups like the Gates foundation and others who say they want to support smallholder farmers.
  • Most every voluntary guideline of the FAO is not being followed in Ethiopia.[5] [Please see: Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security for further information].

Some conclusions regarding the TPLF/EPRDF’s Control of Ethiopia:

  • Government ownership of land is equivalent to TPLF ownership of land, to be used as they choose. The TPLF strategic plan for hegemony of all of Ethiopia, including exploiting its resources for its own interests, will actively war against reversing poverty and conflict in the country. [Please see the link here http://www.enufforethiopia.net/pdf/Revolutionary_Democracy_EthRev_96.pdf to: TPLF/ERFDF’s Strategies for Establishing its Hegemony & Perpetuating its Rule.[6]]

This is a disturbing plan for one, ethnic-based party, the TPLF, to gain permanent control of Ethiopia and its resources that few insiders and even fewer outsiders have seen. A government that in and of itself has a policy that views any outside its party as enemies or people to be exploited, has egregiously failed to perform its duty to protect the rights of the people and must be reformed.

  • A regime that actively promotes division, controls religious expression, criminalizes dissent and perpetrates robbery and violence against its own people has egregiously failed to perform its basic duties and should not be supported by international groups.
  • A regime that lacks accountability and transparency and where corruption is rampant should not be supported by the international donors, the World Bank, the IMF, USAID, development groups like the Gates foundation. Ethiopia lost US11.7 billion in illegal capital flight from 2000-2009 and in the year following the beginning of the land leasing program in Ethiopia, the Task Force for Financial Integrity and Economic Development [7] (FTFP) reported that the amount doubled to $3.26 million (USD)—with the majority of that increase coming from corruption, kickbacks and bribery. 
  • International Developmental organizations, like World Bank, the IMF, USAID, development groups like the Gates foundation, report success in helping small farmers in Ethiopia, but the majority of that aid is directed by the TPLF/ERPDF to one region—the TPLF’s own region of Tigray. Financial support to institutions, economic enhancement programs and democracy-building are directed to pseudo-institutions run by the TPFL/ERPDF.
  • Military support received from donor countries is believed to have been used to perpetrate human rights crimes. This autocratic regime, with a documented history of human rights crimes, should not be the recipient of such support until a full and independent investigation is conducted.

Solutions:

The solution to this burgeoning problems of land and natural resource grabs is to have a government where the law can protect the people and where the law is not only limited to the elite, its cronies and partners. For positive change to come, citizens must be able to claim their rights—human, civil, land and religious. Until there is such a government to protect the rights of the people, which upholds democratic principles of free speech, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, freedom in the media, an independent judiciary and institutions, an independent appeal process, a non-politicalized military and similar aspects of free and open societies, the people will be seen as impediments to whatever the government wants for its own interests. No one is safe in such a political climate. This is where donor countries like the US can become involved in pressuring these governments to be accountable to the people; not supporting autocratic regimes that are creating poverty by pushing people off their land. Africans who used to feed themselves from farming their own land are now hungry and needing food aid. Some who have been hired to work on these agricultural farms, are often working for wages below the World Bank’s minimum wage standards.

Overall, the donor countries, like the US, should try to side with the people, supporting them in having the freedom to elect their own government. If land grabs, human rights abuses and increased resulting food insecurity continue, it could create conflict, displacement and instability. This is not just about a land grab but is a life-grab which will affect the lives of Africans for generations to come. The multi-dimensional impacts are broad, long-lasting and difficult to measure. Environmental impacts are frighteningly inadequate. Sometimes the environmental assessments have not been done or when done, are voluntary or simply not enforced. Few controls are put on users of water and few, if any, studies have been done on the impact of water use on the lives of people in the surrounding areas or downstream. This is about human rights and human freedom. The donors and investors should look into this and take it seriously. The donors should think beyond themselves and about the people to whom the land belongs.

The following recommendations are for the US and other donor countries:

  • Put pressure on the Ethiopian government to recognize human rights and provide social and environmental safeguards in land investment practices. Ethiopia is dependent on international aid and as such, donors are in a powerful position to demand that Ethiopia lives up to its international obligations and implements the above recommendations. Aid flows should be restricted if Ethiopia is not living up to international human rights, good governance, and indigenous rights standards.
  • Ensure that not aid monies are going into any project that will be involved in land investment in its present form. Aid monies should not be funnelled towards projects that will make it easier for land investment in its present form to continue to take place.
  • Aid flows be considered to aid and assist Ethiopian government in achieving the above goals. Many of the above recommendations will more easily be implemented if the financial support is available to support them.

In conclusion:

By 2025, nine billion people are expected to be in the world and these people will need food. The search for this food has fueled the land grabs in Africa. The exploration for suitable agricultural land and water sources has gone to where the most vulnerable people live and these are the people who are the victims. The weakest and most vulnerable populations of the world, already deprived of their rights and freedom are like these people in Africa. The focus has gone to the places where there is no rule of law, where people are not valued and where there is no participation in the decision-making by the people. 

Africans lack human freedom. They live on one of the poorest and most hungry continents, but not because they do not have arable land or water. What they lack are governments and strong institutions that protect the people. This is why unscrupulous investors are robbing the weak and the vulnerable. The need for food, water and shelter is not only critical to the more developed nations or the powerful, but the same needs exist for the weak and the vulnerable in Africa. 

You do not see it happening in the most agriculturally productive countries in the world, like in Saskatchewan, Canada, America’s Midwest or other free countries because there is a rule of law that is followed, but you can see it in a place like Ethiopia and in other parts of Africa.  This is what I call robbing the innocent. It is a daylight robbery and must stop. We are not against investment but it is immoral and wrong to rob the most vulnerable in our global society. It demands that free, conscience-minded people speak up. For some of the more powerful and wealthy to unjustly take the resources from these people will create conflict and instability in our global world.

As World Bank President Dr. Jim Yong Kim states, “Securing access to land is critical for millions of poor people. Modern, efficient, and transparent policies on land rights are vital to reducing poverty and promoting growth, agriculture production, better nutrition, and sustainable development.” But he also presents one of the most crucial challenges as he warns, “Additional efforts must be made to build capacity and safeguards related to land rights – and to empower civil society to hold governments accountable.”

The core principles of the SMNE are about sharing and caring about others. What this means to us is that humanity should be valued above our diverse identity factors—putting humanity before ethnicity.

The dehumanization of others precedes most every act of injustice and evil; meaning that lasting peace and the prosperity of others can only come to our world if we care about the freedom, justice and well being of others for “no one is free until all are free.” Our humanity has no ethnic, national, gender, political or religious boundaries.

Until Africans are free; the world will not be free. We can build a better, more humane, more just and more harmonious world than this by simply recognizing the face of our Creator in every one of our global brothers and sisters! Will you not be a bystander and help create a better world for all of us?
Thank you!

______________________________________________________________

Please do not hesitate to e-mail your comments to Mr. Obang Metho, Executive Director of the SMNE at: [email protected]

አማራንና አማርኛን ማጥፋት የህወሃት ፕሮግራም ነው

Posted on

By Goolgule.com

April 15, 20013amhara

 

 

አማርኛ ተናጋሪዎችን የማመናመን፣ የማደህየት፣ የማራቆትና ክልላቸውን እያሳነሱ የማጥፋት እቅድ በህወሃት መርሃግብር ውስጥ የተካተተ ዋና ተግባር እንደሆነ ተገለጸ። አማርኛ ቋንቋንም ማሽመድመድ የዚሁ እቅድ አካል መሆኑ ተዘግቧል።

አቶ ገ/መድህን አርአያ ከኢሳት ሬዲዮ ጋር ባካሄዱት ቃለ ምልልስ በህወሃት ፕሮግራም ገጽ 18 አካባቢ “አማራ የትግራይና የኤርትራ ህዝብ ጠላት እንደሆነ ተመልክቷል” ብለዋል፡፡ አያይዘውም አማራ ማጥፋት የቅስቀሳው ዋና መሳሪያ ቢሆንም የትግራይ ህዝብ አልተቀበለም ብለዋል። ቅስቀሳውን አንቀበልም ያሉ “የትግራይ ሸዋ” ተብለው መገደላቸውን ይፋ አድርገዋል።

በተለይ የድርጊቱ ዋና አስተባባሪ በማለት የጠቀሷቸው አቶ መለስ ዜናዊ፣ አቶ ስብሃት፣ አቶ ስዩም መስፍን፣ አቶ አባይ ጸሐዬን የጠቀሱት አቶ ገ/መድህን፣ በ1972 በሰሜን ጎንደር የዘር ማጥፋት ወንጀል መፈጸሙን አጋልጠዋል። በወቅቱ የተካሄደው ጭፍጨፋ ከፍተኛ የዘር ማጥፋት ወንጀል እንደሆነም አመልክተዋል። “በሰላም እጃቸውን የሚሰጡ ወታደሮች እንኳ አማርኛ የሚናገሩ ከሆነ ይረሸኑ ነበር” ሲሉ እነ መለስ ያለቸውን በዘር ላይ የተመሰረተ ቆሻሻ አመለካከት አጋልጠዋል።

“ኢትዮጵያ የምትበተነው አማራ ሲጠፋ ነው” በሚለው የነመለስ ሃሳብ መተግበር የጀመረው ህወሃት አዲስ አበባ ከገባበት ጊዜ ጀምሮ መሆኑንን ያወሱት አቶ ገ/መድህን፣ ህወሃት ያሰማራቸው ከ350ሺህ በላይ ካድሬዎች ቁጥራቸው በውል የማይታወቅ አማራዎች በተለያዩ ምክንያቶች እንዲጨፈጨፉ ማድረጋቸውን አመልክተዋል።

ብአዴንን “አማራን ለማጥፋት የተፈጠረ፣ ጸረ አማራ ድርጀት” ሲሉ የሰየሙት አቶ ገ/መድህን፣ አመራሮቹ የኤርትራና የትግራይ ተወላጆች መሆናቸውን በርግጠኛነት ተናግረዋል። የትግራይ ህዝብ የተወከለው “በባንዳ ልጆችና የኤርትራ ተወላጆች ነው” ሲሉም ህዝቡ አደጋ ላይ እንደሚገኝ ጠቁመዋል። የክልሉ ፕሬዚዳንት አቶ አባይ ወልዱን “የባሻ ወልዱ ልጅ ነው” በማለት የትግራይ ህዝብ በባንዳ ኤርትራዊ ልጅ እንደሚመራ ያመለከቱት አቶ ገ/መድህን፤ ብርሀነ ገብረክርስቶስ፣ ቴድሮስ ሃጎስ፣ ቴድሮስ አድሃኖም፣ በማለት በመዘርዘር የባንዳ ልጆች መሆናቸውን ይፋ አድርገዋል።

“አማራው የሚኖርበትን መሬት በመውሰድ መሬቱን ያጠቡበታል፣ ከሌላው ክልል በማባረር የሚኖርበትን ክልል ያጠቡታል” ያሉት አቶ ገ/መድህን፣ ይህ የሚደረገው ከመጀመሪያው እንዲጠፋ የተወሰነበትን ህዝብ አጥብቦ በማፈን በችግር ለመግረፍና ለመቆጣጠር ተብሎ እንደሆነ ገልጸዋል።

ዘር የማጥራት የህወሃት የቀደመ ድርጅታዊ መዋቅር እንደሆነ በማመልከት መለስን የጠቀሱት አቶ ገ/መድህን፣ “አማራውን ዝም ካልነው አያስቀምጠንም” የሚለው የመለስ መፈክር አካል የሆነው የቤኒሻንጉል ክልል ርምጃ የህወሃት ቤት ስራ እንደሆነ አረጋግጠዋል። አማራውን ፋታ ማሳጣት፣ ማንገላታት፣ ስነልቦናውን መግፈፍ ህወሃት በፕሮግራም ደረጃ የያዘው እቅድ ስለሆነ ወደፊትም እንደሚቀጥል አቶ ገ/መድህን ተናግረዋል።

“ሞት መፍራት አያስፈልግም። የተቀደሰ ሞት መሞት ክብር ነው” ሲሉ በቃለ ምልልሳቸው መጨረሻ የተናገሩት የቀድሞው የህወሃት የፋይናንስ ሃላፊ ህዝቡ ተባብሮ ህወሃትን ማስወገድ ካልቻለ ማፈናቀሉና መሰደዱ ተጠናክሮ እንደሚቀጥል አስጠንቅቀዋል።