Ethiopian Heritage Society in North America’s annual Ethiopian cultural festival will open Friday, July 26, 2012, at Georgetown University. Click here for more info.
Opening Ceremony: Friday, July 27, 2012 at 5:00 PM
Place: Georgetown University, 3700 O St NW, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20007
Welcome to the 2nd EHSNA Annual Celebration: by Dr. Shakespeare Fayissa, President, EHSNA
Welcome to Georgetown University: by Prof. Maurice Jackson, Department of History, Georgetown University
If you search for the name of Ethiopia’s prime minister, Meles Zenawi, on Twitter these days, you’ll see a flurry of incongruent postings: Meles is hospitalized in critical condition; he’s fine and returning to work; he died two weeks ago; he’s on holiday. Journalists for international news outlets have tried to sort out fact from rumor, but they’ve gotten no help from Ethiopian government officials who offered only vague assurances that the country’s longtime leader was ill but recovering. In Ethiopia, where the government has imposed increasingly repressive measures on the domestic press corps, news coverage has been minimal and contradictory. … [read more]
The trouble with tyranny and personalized power is that institutional mechanisms of power transfer do not work. In most cases, such mechanisms exist and are enshrined in written and exalted constitutions. Nonetheless, to the extent that tyranny and the exercise of arbitrary power irreparably tarnish them, institutions do not command any respect or legitimacy. Instead, the need to pass on power unleashes a bitter struggle among various contenders. The proliferation of contenders is a natural effect of the arbitrary exercise of power: when power is exercised without the aura of legitimacy, it sends the message that it is up for grab, thereby fostering contenders. Another effect of the demise of arbitrary power is the tendency to stimulate popular uprisings. People who so far had accepted tyranny without protest suddenly feel an impetus to rebel because they sense the weakening of the repressive power of the state: both power struggle among the ruling elite and the orphan condition of repressive forces (police and armed forces), which repressive forces were shaped by an exclusive loyalty to the now disabled or dead dictator, give the picture of a disintegrating power system.
The above description exactly defines Ethiopia’s present condition. Whether Meles is already dead, incapacitated by disease, or has no much time left, one thing is sure: there is now a power vacuum and a struggle among contenders for his position has already started. The bare fact that the government has so far refused to provide any reliable information about his condition is indication enough that Meles’s time is over. The assurance that he is now receiving treatment or resting and that he will soon resume his work is just a lie destined to prevent a popular uprising and conceal the on-going power struggle until the emergence of a winning faction. On top of economic disasters, the failure to establish any firm institution demonstrates that the two decades of TPLF rule have been nothing but a colossal waste for Ethiopia and Ethiopians.
What concerns Ethiopians most is neither the fate of Meles nor of his cronies, but what developments are likely in post-Meles Ethiopia. My intention here is not to predict the future. Personally, I do not believe that the future is simply unfolding from past conditions. The direction of history depends on unpredictable variables and, mostly, on decisions that people and individuals make. The future is the outcome of a creative process and as such bound to be unpredictable in its novelty. The best that analysis can do is to present possible scenarios, which are then possibilities, potentialities, not predictions.
As previously indicated, Meles’s death or incapacitation has created a situation of power struggle. This power struggle is essentially occurring within the EPRDF, but more importantly, within the TPLF, which is the decisive force. It is translated by the appearance of factions, often around individuals supposed to be influential. We already know the names of the individuals. However, there is no guarantee that said individuals are really or remain the main players. In a fluid situation of power vacuum, little known individuals often emerge, just as new factions can appear, while the old ones disappear or are integrated into the new factions. In other words, we must expect some form of restructuration within the TPLF, a different alignment of competing forces.
Most probably, the winning faction will be the one that secures the support of the armed forces. In this raw situation of power struggle, no individual or faction can impose its will without the support of repressive forces. Since the TPLF alone is able to claim (at least at this stage) the loyalty of the armed forces, it follows that it is likely to stay in control after an internal redistribution, which can even take a violent form. Even if the deputy Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, stays as head of the government, he would simply be a figurehead. My guess is that, given the complete impotence of Hailemariam, the winning faction may find it wise to promote him to prime minister, at least until things settle down.
What factors could possibly alter this scenario? One important factor could be that the army ends up by developing its own political ambition to the detriment of the civilian power of the TPLF. This possibility is not farfetched: experience shows that each time a faction appeals to the army to prevail over other factions, it incites the ambition of the army. Why would the army work for somebody else when it could have it all for itself? But this scenario depends on the unity of the army: conflicts among or between senior and junior officers or dissenting voices from the rank and file can incapacitate the army and force it to accept the civilian leadership.
Another important factor that can jeopardize the continuation of the rule of the TPLF is popular uprising. Given the bubbling general discontent, the rule of the TPLF cannot continue without the support of a strong and loyal repressive force. Any sign of weakening cannot but encourage uprisings. The occurrence of a generalized uprising will greatly complicate the situation. It will further divide the ruling party, including the army, as the start of a bloody confrontation is necessarily fraught with dangerous and uncontrollable developments. One uncontrollable development is, of course, the ethnic reaction. Two decades of misrule and ethnicization of Ethiopia direct animosity, not only to state power, but also to ethnic groups. Some such confrontation will break up the EPRDF and will force people to align around ethnic lines rather than class or national unity.
There are also other complicating factors. For instance, the Eritrean element: in the face of a serious unrest, Eritrea may again resort to military action both to recover the territories that it claims and punish the TPLF for its 2000 military victory. One other factor that is difficult to measure is the possible role of the opposition. If the opposition presents a united face, and this is a big if, it can have some role in avoiding the worst scenario, namely, ethnic confrontations. It can even present itself as an alternative course if a popular uprising occurs. At any rate, its ability to displace the TPLF is congenitally dependent on the occurrence of a popular uprising. Even then, it will not have much impact if it remains divided. I note that Medrek has finally upgraded itself to a front, which is good news. But this is not enough: to appear as a real alternative to the TPLF, the union must be credible and reach out to other opposition parties as well as to the bureaucracy and military apparatus.
Lastly, the direct intervention and real pressure of Western powers can have a serious impact in the direction of facilitating the creation of a government representative of all contending forces. Their pressure can thwart the scenario of military coup or of a refurbishing rule of the TPLF; it can even prevent the start of a popular uprising. The two basic conditions for Western pressure to be effective are: (1) Western powers themselves must show a united front and act as honest brokers; (2) the opposition must speak with one voice and credibly argue in favor of a transitional inclusive government. This last possibility is by far the best course, for it alone promises a peaceful transition.
Ahlam Mohsen (writer), Nicholas Linn (photographer) | Yemen Times
Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers demonstrated outside the Human Rights Ministry in Hadda on Monday morning, protesting excessive force used by Yemeni security forces to remove them from the country’s immigration prison the previous evening.
According to the former prisoners, security forces forcibly removed them from the prison.
Security forces used tear gas and rubber bullets, the former prisoners said, throwing tear gas canisters into cells to disorient them, before dragging them out and beating them with steel rods.
Ethiopian, Eritrean and Somali refugees who were in the prison now live on the streets.
Following last year’s 11-month demonstration, refugees set up tents outside UNHCR’s Sana’a office before being removed by Yemeni security forces. UNHCR said it offered the refugees a one-time payment to end demonstrations outside the office. Refugees said they were offered $400 per family, though those who accepted UNHCR’s offer said they only received $200 of the promised $400.
During the height of the political uprising, refugees—facing increased violence from Yemeni security forces—demanded a durable and permanent solution to their situations.
“Many of us have been here for 10, 15, 20 years,” said one Oromo-Ethiopian woman. “We asked for Yemeni citizenship or repatriation elsewhere. They rejected all of our demands, and after being removed, we agreed we would go to Al Kharaz refugee camp. They took three buses to Al Kharaz; the rest of us were taken to prison.”
UNHCR estimates 400 refugees were initially taken from outside the UNHCR building and placed in immigration prison. Prior to Sunday’s removal of refugees from the prison, UNHCR estimated there were 120 men, children and women inside. Prisoners said there were 114 refugees—102 Ethiopians, seven Eritreans and five Somalis, including 40 women and 54 children. The youngest of the imprisoned was 3 months old.
“They threw tear gas canisters into the men’s cells,” Makya Ahmed, 25, said. “The gas drifted over, women and children were crying and vomiting. After they removed us from our cell, they hit me in the back with a steel rod and then picked me up and threw me into a van.”
Refugees at Monday’s protest, now living on the streets with no food or water, sounded increasingly desperate.
“We aren’t allowed any dignity,” Ahmed said. “We can’t live like this; take back your IDs. They’re of no use to us,” she said about her Refugee Status identification card.
Desperate for justice
Some refugees threatened to harm themselves if their situations didn’t improve. Several mentioned self-immolation as an option.
“We have no work, no one treats us well, we’ve contacted all the human rights groups,” Yousef Aman, an Oromo-Ethiopian, said. “At this point, we are just tired. I don’t know if there are human beings anywhere else on the planet who live like this. It’s been 10 years for me. I can’t go on; I’d rather destroy myself.”
Ramadan difficulties
The majority of the refugees are Muslim and spend the month of Ramadan fasting, praying and thinking of God. Refugees reported that immigration prison authorities did not provide food or water during their last three weeks in prison. They instead relied on friends or community members to bring food and water once a week from outside.
Today, the refugees, who have no blankets, mattresses or clothes other than what they are wearing, sleep on cement pavements, unprotected from the elements. It is Ramadan, but they have no Suhoor or Iftar—one woman wondered aloud if God will accept her fast.
Yemen’s obligations
According to the U.N.’s 1951 Refugee Convention, to which Yemen is a signatory, the state has obligations to refugees. These include protecting a refugee’s right to non-refoulement—protection against forcible return. While the Yemeni government grants prima-facie refugee status to Somalis fleeing two decades of war, it does not recognize the refugee status of Ethiopians and Eritreans. Yemeni policy is to arrest and deport them, behavior that is contradictory to international law, according to Human Rights Watch.
Except for very few individuals in the ruling TPLF junta, no body knows exactly where Ethiopia’s khat-addicted dictator currently is. Today is the 35th day since he disappeared from the public view. Rumor is surfacing again this morning that he — or his dead body — is hiding or placed in a refrigerator at Berhane GebreKristos’ house in Brussels, Belgium.
Western diplomats — who can easily get such information from the intelligence services of their countries — are keeping mum or they just don’t care. The international media is not asking questions. If Al Bashir, Mugabe or another dictator disappears for this long, every major international news media would have assigned several reporters to investigate. This shows how inconsequential Ethiopia under the Woyanne junta has become to the international community.
In the mean time, it is not clear who is in charge of the “government,” in Ethiopia currently. The TPLF Central Committee is holding another secret meeting today, and the security apparatus Meles has put in place seems to be running the show for now.
(Philadelphia) — An Ethiopian man who had become separated from family members Monday during a visit to Center City was found safe by police wandering along the northbound lanes of Rte. I-95.
A Pennsylvania State Trooper on routine patrol found KifleYohanesse Tessema, 62, walking along the highway at 7 a.m. Tuesday and took him to Episcopal Hospital. From there, he was transferred to a shelter for the homeless.
Towamencin Township police had circulated a news release Tuesday describing Tessema as missing. They were notified Tuesday night that he had been located. Tessema’s family lives in the township.
Once Tessema was positively identified as the missing person, he was transported by State Police to SEPTA police headquarters and turned over to a family member.
When he vanished Monday, Tessema had no money and no identification on him. He does not speak English. Tessema disappeared near the Market Street East Station after he and his family rode the regional rail line into Center City.
A Pennsylvania State Trooper on routine patrol found KifleYohanesse Tessema, 62, walking along the highway at 7 a.m. Tuesday and took him to Episcopal Hospital. From there, he was transferred to a shelter for the homeless.