Tsegaye_Tegenu_Interpretation_of_the_Past

“Interpretation of
the
Past”

Editor’s Reflection
– Tsegaye
Tegenu

Before I proceed to
preparing for questions raised by readers, I felt the need to explain
the sprit behind this column and thereby to make clear certain doubts
entertained by some of us. I have presented this concern by way of
discussing on themes of History and Knowledge.

The activity of mankind takes place in
time and space. History is the study of the activity of mankind in the
past. It is not as such a study of time. As one American philosopher
wrote, a Historian can ask what has happened at certain time in the
past, while a philosopher asks what is time?

The work of a Historian and
questioning of human past activity is analogous to an episode described
by one saxophonist: “when you hear music after its over, it’s gone in
the air, you can never capture it again”. A Historian tries to
reconstruct what has “gone in the air” with the help of tracts, just
like as you try to re-experience a by gone music concert by listening
gramophone records. Can a Historian “capture it again” using documents
left behind? Yes, but what he writes is not the recreation of the past,
rather creation of meaning, knowledge of the past.

The question is what kind of
Knowledge? How is it different from other knowledge? All knowledge in
the past is not History, and all History is not knowledge. History
should be a scientific knowledge, and what makes it scientific is the
use of a correct method. This method is controllable, free from
internal contradiction, and based on critical observation of documents.
For instance, fictional portray of a case history is different from the
one portrayed by a discipline of History. As one British Historian
wrote “Historian is tied and bound by respect for his archival data.
The novelist is free to create events”. Can we say that History written
with the ideal respect to evidence scientific? This brings us to
another level of argument often discussed in the academic circle. I
shall try to discuss this issue by looking at Ethiopian Historiography.

At the risk of generalization and
simplicity, it can be said that social History has come now to displace
political History, particularly since the 1974 Ethiopian revolution. In
the tradition of political History, we have literature on biography of
emperors, and its method was source critic aimed to decide whether each
assertion made was right or wrong. Chronicles, narrative account of
kings, have made their imposition on such type of Historical research,
besides to the contemporary environment that surrounded the Historian
himself. The Ethiopian student movement, the spread of left ideology,
and finally the revolution, among other things, brought about change
from political to social History. “One-man History” began to be
replaced by a construction of a bigger social History: the question of
class, study of social institutions, etc. (in an article Crummey, D.
has made a review of literature on state and society in Ethiopia,
unfortunately this material is not at my reach for identification).
Research on social History is compounded with different perspectives
such as a History from below (on peasant class), as opposed to History
of the ruling class, and History of an ethnic group. To come back to my
question, does social History written with such perspective as ethnic
and based on the Historical method mentioned earlier represent
scientific knowledge?

I think there are two rules that are
central and general to all sciences. First science should be
communicative, and secondly, science should be (new) creative.
Scientific presentation makes for any one possible to criticise and
take a reasonable stand. Its language and definitions are clear, its
observation are controlled and free from internal contradiction. A
Historical research carried in such productive, communicable way has
little problem to give us new knowledge. I have in mind social History
that is written on such factors as wishful thinking, that foster
emotional commitments say to an “imagined community” raises the problem
discussed above on scientific knowledge.

The column, Interpretation of
the Past
has an ambition to adopt system analysis perspective. By
system is meant a group of elements that are inter linked by certain
rules and principles. Accordingly, social system has two parts:
resource system and control system. The former deals on the
acquisition, distribution and use of social surplus, while the later
(control system) deals on set of ideological representation,
administrative relation and the like. The two parts are an articulated
set, and the logic of articulation is treated concretely through
identification of the principles, the causal links, that combined and
related the two set of elements. Well, I know this is abstract, the
argument behind is that the column, Interpretation of the Past is not a
tool designed to serve this or that political and/or ethnic group. It
is a discussion forum which looks after communicative and creative
knowledge that is needed to understand our current problem. An
illustrative case is our rooted problem of poverty. It is a question
that has to be addressed by three basic major fields, History of
Environment (use of natural resources), demography (population) and
institutions (such as state and law). It is such type of
interdisciplinary approach that enable us to understand problems of
“development or underdevelopment” in Ethiopia, in Africa as well.

Narrow perspectives which foster
feelings and ideology, even if they use a correct method, may not be
useful and interesting for our time. I think I have gone far to explain
the sprit behind the column: Interpretation of the Past. With
this understanding, we hope to continue our effort. At the personal
level, I have really enjoyed all the questions and I would like to
thank all who participated in formulating questions, sharing of
feelings and views.

Before departing, I have a message:
the column will not appear in the coming two weeks as I have planned to
participate at XIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies
to be held at Michigan State University from 5th to 10th of September
1994
. The general theme chosen for the conference is “Rethinking
Ethiopian Studies”. I will let you know if I have news on what lines we
are going to “rethink”. In the meantime, you can send questions and
messages if you have any.

My Best Greetings!

Tsegaye Tegenu

Q1. When did the word “Ethiopia” start to be
associated wit the 14 provinces? Who was the first king who ruled
all the 14 provinces of Ethiopia? How and When?


Area administration and defense are one of the features and
functions of any state. By definition the Ethiopian state has
always been associated with “province”. The problem is,
however, how one defines a “province”. To give
examples:

a) as a region which constituted natural communities based on
ancestral tradition such as a name of a tribe, or

b) as an administrative, judicial and military unit
(governorates), or

c) as a territorial tax unit.

The problem does not stop here; one is also required to
explain the time frame (at what point in time), for old Ethiopia
knew many other meanings of this word. As an illustration, we can
take the word “Medr”. If you see the Land Charters of
Northern Ethiopia (by Huntingford, pp. 22-23), the term Medr was
used to refer large geographical area such as Medr Sire, Medr
Serea, as in the case of Agaw Medr. By the time of King Fasilades
(1632-67), the term Medr was used to refer to a farm land (see,
articles written on land ownership by Donald Crummey). We have
also other terms such as Hagar, Beher, N{garit, Qemes, Gult,
Gizat, etc. which need investigation.

In Ethiopian historiography the study on the relationship
between local society and the state is very recent, and to my
knowledge, there is no publication on such theme. If I am
allowed, I recommend readers to refer the following relevant
literature to get an insight to the problem:

On the political boundaries of Aksum read Sergew Habte
Sellasie 1972. “Ancient and Medieval Ethiopian History,
Addis Ababa.”,

On the Medieval and Early Modern Period read

— Taddesse Tamrat 1972. Church and State in Ethiopia,
1270-1527. Oxford

— Merid W. Aregay 1974 “Political Geography of Ethiopia
at the Sixteenth Century” in IV Congresso Internazionale di
Studie Etiopici, 10-15 April, Tomo I, Roma.

— Huntingford, G.W.B. 1989. The Historical Geography of
Ethiopia. From the First Century AD to 1704. New York.

On the Modern period and for an illustrative view of earlier
period see

— Ethiopia: Cradle of Civilization or National Atlas of
Ethiopia, Ethiopian Mapping Authority. Addis Ababa. 1988. pp.
64-74.

— Asmelash Beyene 1987. “Some Notes on the Evolution of
Regional Administration in Ethiopia” in Development
Research, V.9. N.1.

This last article by Asmelash provides answer to the question
on “14 provinces” which was during the time of Haile
Selassie. Yohannes and Menelik followed a policy of Gizat (fiscal
military territorial unit–my definition), and during the reign
of Menelik one finds 11 areas governed by Rases, 17 N{garit areas
governed by Dejazmach, 8 areas under Wuchi D{jazmach, 12 under
Fitawrari, 22 under K!nazmach, 7 under Grazmach, and 8 under
Balambaras. Emperor Theodros had a different policy known as
Hag{r B{ge (literally, the country is in my hands). He
administered the country not through governors but through
Misl{n` (financial district official).

For instance he divided Begemder into 24 financial
administrative districts, Tigray was divided into 45 financial
districts (Mesl{n`), Gojjam was under royal Mesl{ne, while Shewa
was under a provincial committee elected by the king himself.
Thus, the question when “Ethiopia” is associated with
that number of “province”, depends on one’s definition
of the term province and the historical period in which it was
used. The kind of contractual relationship that existed between
the king and the governors (or what you have) depended on the
policy of the king, custom and laws of the kingdom. For earlier
periods see the document of Ser{ at{ M{ngest (Laws and Regulation
of the State) translated from Geez into German by Varenbergh,
Joseph, “Studien zur abessinischen Reichsordnung” in
Zeitschrift fur Assyriologie und Verwandte Gebiete. Strassburg.
1915/16. There is a translation in English by Bairu Tafla, but
you do not find the Geez text. On the early modern period see
Mahteme Selassie Zekre Neger, pp. 636-654 and passim.

I hope the above references provide answer to the question,
and points to the complexity and the problem in our understanding
of state and local society in Ethiopia.

Q2. Did the failure of the Coptic Church to support
Haile Selassie during WW-II helped Italians in their aggression
against Ethiopia?

To begin with, is the information you get correct? Can you
bring a concrete evidence? What is your source? At first this
fact has to be established. Let us assume the information is
correct, but why didn’t the church support Haile Selassie?
Admittedly, my knowledge on the background of the Italo-Ethiopian
war of 1935 is limited. But judging from the historical process
that preceded the war, it can be said that Haile Selassie’s
“progressive” policy had affected not only the church
but the whole class of the Masafint, Makwanent and Balabat. If
you compare the battle of Adwa (1896) and the Italo-Ethiopian War
(1935), Menelik had the whole ruling class united behind him. For
your information, the Emperor and the Emperess (Tayitu) had
kindly requested some of the governors to remain behind because
the army was so large that the battle place could not be enough
to accommodate all and feared that they could kill each other
than fighting against Italy. Seven years later in commemorating
the 7th anniversary of the battle of Adwa, Menelik held military
parade in which 390 000 armed troops participated. Of these, the
Emperor’s central army numbered 90 000. (see, Gabre Selassie 1959
E.C. Dagmawi Menelik, pp. 306-312).

When Haile Selassie marched to Mai Chew in March 1936 he had a
force of 31000 consisting the Imperial guard (ca. 11 000) and the
survivor troops of Ras Kassa and Ras Seyum. Why such a visible
decrease in the numerical strength of the imperial army. We need
a fresh study on the impact of Haile Selassie
“progressive” policy on the military organization of
the state. I raised this point to indicate that the defeat of
Haile Selaasie could be related to other factors (consequence of
his policy, for one) not only lack of support from the church
(again if we have evidence). One result of his
“progressive” policy which could be applied to the
church was the land and taxation policy of Haile Sellasie. (You
find the documents in Maheteme Selassie, Zekre Nager, chapter six
and passim). This policy had eroded the privileges of the
Masafint, Makuanent and Balabat, and during the war they said
“Bechawun Yebela Bechawen Yemotal”, and hesitated to
support him. (See Tsehai Brehane Selassie, 1980. The Political
and Military Tradition of the Ethiopian Peasantry 1800- 1941.
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oxford, Faculty of Anthropology and
Geography). I did not study how the “progressive”
policy of Haile Selassie affected the economic position and
ideology of the church. I am sure that varied and complex
internal and external factors had contributed to his defeat.

Q3. I would like to get your opinion of how the Fetha
Negest may be used to make up a constitution of Ethiopia. Of
course with synthesis of modern ideas into it but limited
monarchy, is this workable?

My spontaneous view is that I would first consider the time
in
which Fetha Negest was introduced into Ethiopia, and the purpose
for which it was used. The Fetha Negast (Law of the Kings ) was
introduced in the legal system of Ethiopia at the beginning of
the 17 th century. It is said that the Fetha Negast was a
translation of a well known Coptic “nomocanon”
originally written in Arabic. Some authors wrote that the
original text was changed and adopted to Ethiopian conditions
when translated into Ethiopic language Geez. According to the
Ethiopian church tradition, the Fetha Negast was introduced
around the middle of the 15th century. But this tradition was to
refer the existence of the ecclesiastical part of the nomocanon
in the Ethiopian church before the translation.

The Fetha Negast consists a part dealing with ecclesiastical
law (chapter 1!22) and another part on secular subjects. For the
benefit of the readers I have quoted the secular part as follows:

Chapter 23 — Food, clothing, habitation, and trades proper
for Christians.

Chapter 24 — Betrothal, dowry, Marriage and dissolution of
marriage.

Chapter 25 — Prohibition of concubinage.

Chapter 26 — Donation.

Chapter 27 — Loan, pledge and guaranty

Chapter 28 — Loan for use

Chapter 29 — Deposit

Chapter 30 — Mandate

Chapter 31 — Slavery and manumission of slaves

Chapter 32 — Guardianship

Chapter 33 — Sale, purchase and related matters.

Chapter 34 — Partnership

Chapter 35 — Coercion and duress

Chapter 36 — Lease and rent

Chapter 37 — Buildings, waters and streets

Chapter 38 — Commercial ventures

Chapter 39 — Acknowledgment of debt

Chapter 40 — Lost ownerless things

Chapter 41 — Will

Chapter 42 — Successions

Chapter 43 — Judges and judicial procedure

Chapter 44 — Rights and duties of the king

Chapter 45 — Miscellaneous provision from the Old and New
Testament

Chapter 46 — Penal, Provisions for blasphemy, apostasy and
sorcery

Chapter 47 — Penal provision for theft

Chapter 50 — Penal provision for drunkenness, usury, and
miscellaneous offenses

Chapter 51 — Regulations of the church regarding heir,
circumcision, confession and rule making powers of the clergy.

Appendix: — Succession.

(See, Tzadu, P.,ed. 1968. The Fetha Nagast. The Law of the
Kings. Addis Ababa).

As the title itself proclaims, and judging from the contents
mentioned above, the law was designed to regulate the
relationship of the Mekwanent, Masafint, Liqawunt class and their
subjects. Do you think that it is acceptable by the present
middle class that have diverse social background, ideology,
different economic base, and a class that demanded democracy for
the last thirty years. I am not a student of law and neither I
have studied constitutional history. My feeling is that, you have
to consider the difference in time and the subject to whom you
address.

Q.4. Who is Aste Theodros? What is his last name?

The real name of Ase Theodros was Kassa. He was born in 1820
in the province of Quara. His father name was Hailu Welde
Georgis, who was Dejazmach of Quara, and his mother was called
Attitegeb, from an area south-east of Gonder. (On the family
background and childhood of Kassa, see T!kl! Tsadik Mekuriya
(1981 E.C.), Ase Theodros ena Ye Etiyopiya Andenet, Addis Ababa,
pp. 51-59).

Theodros was his throne name. Traditionally the Ethiopian
kings carried at least three names: the one given to them at
birth, a baptismal name, and a throne name which they adopted
upon coronation. Throne names often connoted the extent of power
and/or self-perception of the king himself. The Gonder kings had,
for instance, the following throne names: Fasiledes (1632-167)
was called Alem Seged (literally, the world submitted); Yohannes
(167-1682) as Ailaf Seged (lit. thousand submitted); Iyassu I
(1682-1706) as Adyam Seged (lit. the confines of the earth
submitted); Tekle Haimanot (1706-1708) as Liul Seged (lit. even
the exalted submitted); Teweflos (1708-1711) as Atsirar Seged
(lit. the enemies submitted); Yostos (1711-1716) as Tsehai Seged
(the sun bowed); Dawit III (1716-1721) as Adbar Seged (lit., the
mountains bowed); Bekaffa (1721-1730) as Mesih Seged (lit., the
anointed submitted). See Berry, L.B. 1976. The Solomonic Monarchy
at Gonder, 1630-1755: An Institutional Analysis of Kingship in
the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia. Ph. D. Thesis, Boston
University Graduate School. p. 151ff).

The name Theodros was associated, however, with a prophecy
about the coming of a messiah king who was to come in the later
days and rule the world in righteousness, peace and prosperity.
This prophecy was found written in the Ethiopian apocalyptic work
called Fukare Iyesus. According to this book, Christ himself
would bring a king called Theodros to power after a long period
of corruption, war, famine, lawlessness and perversity. (See,
Fukare Iyasus, Addis Ababa. 1966 E.C., p.59). The time of Kassa
was the Zemene Mesafint (Era of Princes) associated with a
continues war, social, economic and political disorder. Kassa
viewed himself as the massiah, as he often said “chosen by
God from a dust”. It is difficult to state when Kassa began
to entertain this vission. His chronicler (king’s secretary)
wrote that, after he rebelled, one day as Kassa slept, the Holy
sprit made him speak prophecy, and since then Kassa spoke
prophecy. See, Zenebe (1902), The Chronicle of King Theorore.
Litmann, E. (ed.). Leipzig. pp. 8-9). In other words, Kassa had
his vission of Theodros sometime between 1840-45 when he was a
rebell noble (Shifta).

He took the name Theodros when he was annointed and crowned as
king of kings in Deresege Mariyam church in 1855. Before him many
rebels and kings had claimed to be Theodros, but they were not
successful. (See, Mered Wolde Aregay, 1990 “Ye Theodros
Alamawoch Kayet Endemenchu” in Kasa and Kasa, Taddese
Beyene, Pankhurst, R. and Shiferaw Bekele (eds.) I.E.S., Addis
Ababa University. pp. 69-115.). I think the score of Theodros’s
military success, battle after battle, and his determination,
upright personality, and concern for the poor had a lot to do
with his vision and success. Theodros was a military genius, by
the standard of the time: he attempted to create paid army under
his command, he established an officer system and a permanent
combat military hierarchy, he created a divisional command (Derek
Tor) which rendered tactical flexibility and increased mobility
to the tradition of mass frontal attacks, his Gafat manufacturing
industry produced 2 brass guns and nine brass mortars, he
attempted at boat building on Lake Tana. He called one of his
guns Sebastapol (which was pulled by 500 people), after the
famous battle (Crimean war) in which Russia defeated the Turks.
Probably, he had a good reason to give this name. When he was a
governor of Quara and Dambia, Kassa (the future Theodros) was
once defeated by Egyptian force in western Ethiopia, and Masawa
was under Turks. Theodros had a vision to disloge out
Turko-Egyptian forces. His military innovations were supported by
changes in the administration of taxes, thus creating an economic
base to his reforms.

A lot can be said about his reforms, and all of them
represented a radical departure from the past, breaking almost
hundred years of tradition. Was his a revolution from above?
Historians continue to debate without helping being involved
emotionally and intellectually as well. Theodros as much as he
represented an image of a soldier king, he symbolised also a man
with a vision. That is all for today. I have no more question to
prepare for, so please send me some, preferably on nineteenth
century history.

Q.5. How will history judge H/Selassie? Was he a
progressive and visionary monarch who did the best he could until
his nobility and bureaucrats and eventually old age got into his
way or was he a shrewd power-hungry king who thrived in the fear
and mistrust he created among his subjects and the status- quo?
What are his most important legacies to contemporary Ethiopia and
Ethiopians?

My apology for not responding to the question promptly, and I
believe you may understand that. The question is very challenging
and it requires a serious study of Ethiopia history that
stretches from 1916, when Dejazmach Tafari (the future Haile
Selassie) was elected as heir to the throne, up to the last days
of 1974. As I have not specialised on this period, I am not the
right person to sit in the judgement of Haile Selassie.
Relatively speaking, we have an abundant literature on Haile
Selassie than on any other kings; and I have made below some list
for your reading and balanced judgement.

As one who studies Ethiopian history how do I see the life and
times of Haile Selassie? From a theoretical point of view I see
Haile Selassie as an Enlightend Absolute Monarch. There are two
key terms in this concept: Enlightend Monarch and Absolute
Monarch, whose application and use affects our judgement. An
Enlightend Monarch is a monarch whose policy is influenced and
dictated by “modern ideas” that had sharply
distinguished from what had gone before: improvements of
educational opportunities, social conditions and economic life.
The concept Absolute Monarch does not refer to the meaning a
personal rule, far from the idea of a dictator. It is an
institutional royal government which seeks to be systematic and
rational through the application of best recent knowledge to the
task of ruling, in an another word, an organisational technique
called bureaucracy. We have to see the thought and activities of
Haile Selassie at these two levels, and analyse their impact on
the Ethiopian society.

If we look the empirical evidences for the period 1917-1935,
Haile Selassie had made a reform as regards administration,
economy and social conditions. Improvements in the functions and
responsibilities of the ministries that were created by Menelik
in 1907; codification of the countries civil and criminal laws
aimed to avoid arbitrary judgement and punishment by governors;
printing press which facilitated and encouraged publications;
financially, giving regulation to a credit system that abolished
higher rent; establishment of a shareholder bank (Bank of
Ethiopia) Haile Selassie as one of the share holders; expansion
of infrastructure such as road, an import of air plane and cars
for transport; socially, establishment of hospital, schools and
construction of electricity; on religion, the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church for the first time elected her own patriarch (Abun),
breaking thousand years of tradition of appointment by Coptic
church of Egypt, thus asserting the sovereignty of the church;
and, secularization policy through the formation of an
independent central administration of the Ethiopian Church (the
Office of Bet Khnet at Addis Ababa), thus separating the church
from the state, and consequently his policy that religion is
“the private affair of human beings”; abolishing of
corvee labour (free exploitation of peasant labour for
cultivation of governors lands, fencing his house, grinding his
corn, etc.); etc… These are some of his domestic policies and
reforms in the period between 1917-1934; I have left out his
international policy and achievements of this period. You can
find both his internal and external policy and achievements
listed in Haile Selassie (1965), Heywetena Ye Etyopiya Ermga.
Addis Ababa Vol. I.chapt. 12 and passim.

The reforms undertaken between 1941-74 are innumerable.
Administrations and legal and fiscal systems were modified (see,
Worku Tafara, 1977. Judicial Administration in Ethiopia: A Reform
Oriented Analysis. Thesis on Law, Northewestern University,
School of Law, Chicago; Tzadu, Paulos, Organization of the
Central Administration in Ethiopia. Historical Profile; Markaksi,
John and Asmelsh Beyene, Representative institutions in Ethiopia.
This last article deals on the constitutions of 1931 and 1955);
commercial and economic development was encouraged, see Keller,
E.J. 1988. Revolutionary Ethiopia. From Empire to People’s
Republic. Indiana. Chap. IV.; efforts were made to improve
agriculture by way of fiscal means, see Taye Gulilat, 1968.
“The Tax in Lieu of Tithe and the New Agricultural Income
Tax: A Preliminary Evaluation”, Dialogue II, 1 (December);
establishment of Haile Selassie I University and many secondary
and primary education, etc. Externally, his achievements in the
post war period had earned him international recognition: support
for colonial subjugated people, founding of OAU, Non-Aliened
Movement, to mention but few. I wish I have time to list all of
his domestic and international policy for the benefit of the
readers.

It can be said that Haile Selassie had demilitarized the
traditional Ethiopian society and created a civil society. His
initial reforms had the intent to erode the power of the military
nobility (Mekwanent and Mesafint), and to bring an end to
“Fyudal Agezaz” (feudal rule), to borrow his words
(Haile Selassie 1965. p. 54). In his struggle he was supported by
educated Ethiopians (known as “Japanizers”), such as
Nagadras Gebre Hiwot Baykedagn. The spirit of his reform had
continued in the post war period; but the question is who
benefited from these reforms? Some claim that the reforms
favoured only the ruling elite, for instance, there was no equal
access to modern education. Even though there is some truth in
this claim, there are a number of factors we have to consider for
a balanced judgement. First one has to look the social origin of
Haile Selassie and the social base of his rule (royal aristocrats
and the middle class). Secondly we have to examine more
carefully, (in figures) his fiscal and economic policies in terms
of their effects on the living standards and opportunities of the
Ethiopian citizens, their effects on the income of the peasants,
their impact on trade and investment. This helps us to
distinguish between professed objectives and real intentions of
his act. For instance the concentration of education in Addis
Ababa was not the result of Haile Selassie intention to limit
educational access to the rural population, rather it is a result
of the desire to make Addis Ababa a modern imperial seat, which
in the process led to the concentration of public offices and
services. Thirdly, we have to distinguish effects that had come
as a result of a policy (or limit of the reform) and structural
problems rooted in the past.

I have in mind the Rist land holding system (ownership of land
by decent and birth right) of northern and central Ethiopia,
which was a hindrance to labour mobility, and which for centuries
resisted any accumulation of wealth in rural Ethiopia. Haile
Selassie is not responsible for the consequence of the Rist land
tenure system. As I understand, it is not because Haile Selassie
reforms were limited and biased, but they were not enough for a
vast country which had remained predominantly agrarian for
centuries. This is not to deny the fact that Haile Selassie was
an absolute monarch: royal monopoly of power and rule through a
bureaucracy.

In his speech on the promulgation of 1955 Constitution, he
said “all regions of the Empire are now closely knit
together under a single unified direction capable of guiding them
all along parallel lines of progress and integrating all into a
common national endeavour”. Haile Selassie has brought about
standardization and uniformity in the society. His reforms and
the amount of success achieved, ever since he was a regent
(1916), were remarkable in the context of his time, and the sense
of social responsibility which lay behind many of the reforms was
a novel one if one compares it with his past.

I think I have to stop here, for further reference, in
addition to those mentioned above, see:

Perham, Margaret, 1948. The Government of Ethiopia. London.

Hess, Robert, 1970. Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy.
Ithaca.

Schwab, Peter. 1972. Ethiopia and Haile Selassie. New York.

Spencer, J.H. 1984. Ethiopia at Bay: A Personal Account of
Haile Selassie Years.

Q.6. I would like to know more about Zemene Mesafint. What
was the source of this dark age of our history. What impact did
this period have on the political and social process of Ethiopia.
And finally, given the current events unfolding in Ethiopia,
would it be justifiable to say that we are yet to recover from
the effects of this period.

The final statement is not clear to me. I hope our discussion
may throw some light in the direction of your question. The name
Zemene Mesafint was taken from the Old Testament which refers to
a period of judges when “there was no king in Israel: every
man did that which was right in his own eyes”. Chroniclers
used the term to characterize a period in Ethiopian history which
resembled like that of the Old Testament judges. In some writings
the beginning of the event is associated when Ras Mikael Sehul,
governor of Tigre, was involved in the murder of King Iyoas I in
1769, and, instead, appointing the son of another king as the new
emperor. Following the use of the term and this event, scholars
developed a theory of “disintegration of state” in
their political analysis of the period. M. Abir’s book (Ethiopia:
The Era of Princes. 1969) was taken as a standard work. Following
him, some scholars like Sven Rubenson, adopted the theory in
their finest work (Rubensson, S. The Survival of Ethiopian
Independence. London 1976).

Recently, Shiferaw Bekele tried to refute the theory of
“disintegration” in his article: “Reflection on
the Power Elite of the Were Seh Mesafint 1786-1853”, in
Annale D’Ethiopie, vol. XV, 1990. He argued that Zemene Mesafint
was the era of the Were Seh lords ruling the country in the name
of the Solomonic dynasty. He constructed the pyramid of power in
the theory of Lord-vassal relationship. While I agree with
Shiferaw’s argument, I see Zemene Mesafint in a broader context.
Hitherto, the period is defined by its consequences (political
chaos, wars, plunder, etc.) not by its cause. I think this
approach is important for it covers not only northern but also
southern Ethiopia.

As I see it the Zemene Mesafint was caused by the events of
the major population migration and resettlement of the 16th and
the first half of the 17th centuries. In the historical writings
this event was referred as the Wars of Ahmed Gran which lasted
from 1527-1541, and the Oromo tribe resettlement into central and
northern Ethiopia starting from the early 1530s continuing up to
the beginning of the 17th century. This migration was permanent
in character and was better organized. An illustrative account of
this event is found in Ethiopia: A Cradle of History. Addis Ababa
1989. (Please correct the title in earlier reference list in
question one).

Population migration and resettlement of the 16th century had
elicited a profound effect on the organization of power structure
and governance of society both in north and south Ethiopia. I can
go to details, if available, please refer the 400-page volume of
Merid Wolde Aregay “Southern Ethiopia and the Christian
Kingdom, 1508-1708, with Special Reference to the Gala Migrations
and their Consequences”, Ph.D. thesis, University of London,
1971; Bairu Tafla, (ed.), 1987. Asma Giorgis and His Work.
History of the Galla and the Kingdom of Sewa. Stuttgart; Mohammed
Hassen 1990. The Oromos of Ethiopia a history 1570-1860.

In norther and central Ethiopia, Zemene Mesafint was
associated with the gradual militarization of earlier provinces.
Kings began to give new title called Dejazmach responsible for
campaign and safeguarding of troubled provinces. The holder of
the D!jazmac title gradually got control over the judicial and
fiscal administration of the provinces. By the second half of the
seventeenth century, this title had come to replace other tiles
in the hierarchical structure of the kings court (See, the title
of 1690 in Huntingford; See also the document of Serate Mangest).
Gradually the title of Dejazmac became a full prerogative of
certain provincial and local hereditary ruling families.

In the province of Tigre the development can be associated
with the time of the powerful noble man known as Blatta Michael
Sehul who proclaimed himself as ruler of Tigre after he fought
against and executed his master Ras Anda Haimanot in 1759.Michael
Sehul governed Tigre from the town of Adwa which lay on the
import- export trade between Gonder (the capital city) and the
Red Sea. When the child king Iyoas 1st (1755-1769) succeeded to
the throne upon the death of his father Iyasu 2nd (1730-1755),
Ras Mikael Sehul begun to challenge the central authority and
occupied the office of prime minister (Ras Bitweded). Later on
the powerful local magnets of Amhara and the new aristocrats of
the court (in both cases mainly Oromo origin) gathered forces and
disloged Ras Mikael out of Gonder in 1771. The Ras returned to
Tigre and died in 1779/80 and was succeeded by his son Wolde
Gabriel, who was defeated by Ras Aligaz of the Yejju family. From
1770 upto the coranation of king Tewodros in 1855 the
guardianship of the king was in the hands of the Yejju family.
This family was founded by Ras Ali Gwangwil, known as Ali the
Great, who was followed by six members of his family as Ras. In
the name of the king they controlled all higher appointments and
conducted foreign policy and gave leadership to the princes of
northern and central Ethiopia.

In Sewa there was an important development of the rise of the
Shewa dynasty. The founder of this dynasty was called Negasi
(1696-1703). He and his successors conducted a successful war
against rival local noble families and brought many districts
under their control. During the time of Amha Iyasu (174-575) the
aristocrats of Shewa were consolidating their power. His son and
heir Asfa Wasan (1755-1808) continued the crushing of smaller
nobilities and expanding his family control. The name itself
meant expanding the frontier. He succeeded by Wasan Seged
(1808-1813) who was given for first time the title of Ras by the
king of Gonder. In Gojjam we see an establishement of royal house
by Ras Hailu (the great) who died in 1794. Ras Hailu (the great)
was succeded by Ras Maderd (d.1821) Dej.Gwalu (d.1826) and
Dej.Goshu (d.1853.).

There was Zemene Mesafint in Southern Ethiopia during the
period under discussion. Though, this sounds odd, again, as I
have said, it is a mater of definition. After all Zemene Mesafint
means a rule by princes at a time when royal authority was in
decline or usurped. As with north and central Ethiopia, there
were princes in southern Ethiopia as well. Whether these princes
were royal descent or self-made aristocrats, that is another
question. Who were the princes and how the process came about?

The formation of princely rule in southern Ethiopia is the
synthesis of migration and existing political culture and social
organization. Before the migration of the Oromo tribes, the wide
area between Awash, Muger, Gibe, Abay, Didesa and Baro was
inhabited by people known in literatures as Peoples of Gonga
(See, Lange, W.J. History of Southern Conga, South Western
Ethiopia, pp. 1-18). The most important once were the kingdoms of
Damot, Enariya and Kaffa. By coming in touch with these
principalities (through war and assimilation politic
“Gudifecha”) the tribal confederation of the Oromo
people began to disintegrate and formed what has come to be
called Gibe States (See, Hassen Mohamed). In western parts of
Wollega and in other regions new centers of power were formed as
land and office began to be transfered to individual families.
For a hypotetical explanation of this process, see Tekalign Wolde
Mariam ” Land, Trade and Political Power Among the Oromo of
the Gibe Region, A Hypothesis” in Proceedings of the Third
Annual Seminar of the Department of History. 1986. For the
political organization and rule of Kefa princes, see Antoniyo
Cici, Keffa and Its History 1390-1897 (Amharic translation). For
the region of Harar, see Waldron, Sydney, “The Political
Economy of Harari-Oromo relationship, 1559-1874”, in North-
East African Studies. nos.1-2. 1984. There is a recent work on
the region of Awsa princes, for it is not my reach, I can not
give you the title.

The difference in the Zemene Mesafint in the North and South
is related to the very factors that shaped their process and
organizational make up. Northern princes were militarized as
there was no enough resource for the bulk of disintegrated
(“demobilised”) royal army (after the wars of Gran) and
displaced clergies who moved to the north. Resource acquisition
could then be at the cost of another, and thus needed a mediating
power, which we see in the role played by the Were Seh princes.
There was a relative stability in southern Ethiopia and princes
were engaged in the promotion of trade. This is in fact a
hypothetical suggestion and needs detailed empirical studies. Did
the internal competition in northern Ethiopia encouraged growth
of towns and trade? Or did the huge consumption of peasant’s
surplus by the military and clergy hinder urbanization process?
This require more empirical studies and until such a time, I
think, we have to be cautious in projecting Zemene Mesafint as a
wasteful social system which dislocated the economy. One aspect
of the Zemene Mesafint, which I believe to be the dynamic aspect,
namely, the art of organizing a military force, mobilization of
human and material resources for the accomplishment of military
ends was a great experience that helped Ethiopia defend its
independence during the colonial scramble for Africa.

Q.7. I have always been interested in finding out more
about Etege Taitu Bitul, Negist Zewditu and Etege Menen. I wonder
if you could discuss who these women were and what , if any
thing, these three women contributed in Ethiopian history?
Another thing that has always intrigued me is the battle of
Segele, what was this battle about, who was involved, where did
it happen and when?

Etege Tayitu’s (1856-1918) father was Dejazmach Betul Haylu
Maryam of Semen, and her mother was Wayzero Hirut Gugsa of Y!jju
aristocratic family. She had married a few times before Menelik
took her for his wife in 1883. She was crowned Empress in 1889
together with Menelik. She had a considerable influence in the
political scene even during her husband’s reign. When Menelik was
incapacitated, she became de facto power and made appointment and
dismissal of high government posts. She was removed from power in
1913 by the Shewan aristocratic plot, and retired to Entot
Mariyam church which she founded, and died in 1918. Tayitu was
the founder of Addis Ababa, and had uncompromising stand against
Italian colonialism. There is an interesting book on Tayitu
written by Rosenfeld, Chris Prouty 1986. Empress Taytu and
Menelik II: Ethiopia 1883-1910.

Zewditu was one of the two daughters of Menelik by a previous
marriage. She was born of Wayzaro Abechu of Wallo around 1876. At
the age of six, she was given in marriage to Ras Araya Selassie,
the son of Emperor Yohannes. After his untimely death in 1888,
she returned Shewa and married Wag Sum Guangul Zagaya, Dejazmach
Webe Atnaf Seged and Ras Gugsa Wale respectively. The Shewa
aristocrats forced her to separate from the last one, Ras Gugsa
Wale, nephew of Empress Tayitu, in 1916. She was crowned as
Empress in February 1917, four months after the battle of Segele.
The Empress was not politically active, and drew her support from
the “conservative” aristocratic circle, who stood
against the regent, Ras Teferi. The Empress died in 1930. Just
two weeks ago our library here has received a book (edited
chronicle) on the reigns of Lij Iyasu and Empress Zewditu. Please
read, Aleqa Gebre-Igziabiher Elyas, Prowess, Piety and Politics.
The Chronicle of Abeto Iyasu and Empress Zewditu of Ethiopia
1909.1930. Koln 1994.

I am sorry that I know little about Empress Menen, who was the
grand daughter of King Mikael of Wollo, whom we shall see later.
I wish living relatives take the responsibility to write a
biography of Empress Menen, if we do not have one yet. Shall we
be lucky enough to read this biography?

The question what the three empress contributed in Ethiopian
history lead us to the broader issue regarding Ethiopian Women in
History. This is the most neglected research part of social
history and as far as I know, it is a fresh field to study. At
this stage what I can share is the impression I have on the role
of Ethiopian women in military leadership. We can take Empress
Tayitu who was known as good strategist. On the way marching to
Adwa, the Ethiopian force was liberating Italian military post
stationed in southern Tigray. In Mekele, the Italians had strong
fortification, and engaged in artillery fighting. Seeing this
Empress Tayitu order one of her commander to study the Italians
water supply situation (by the way the Empress had her own army,
both artillery and riflemen, paid and clothed by the empress
herself). The commandant reported to her that there was 75 meter
distance between the water reservoir and the Italian
fortification. The Empress wanted to occupy the water supply and
cut off the Italians. She consulted her plan and asked Menelik
for a permission since he was the overall commander of the army.
Menelik agreed and the Empress sent her 600 soldiers at night and
seized the supply. The war and the siege lasted fifteen days, and
in all the times the empress was preparing and sending fresh food
to her army at night. Because of lack of water, the Italian army
was forced to surrender (See Gebre SElassie, Tarik ze-Dagmawi
Menelik, pp. 246-249). Once again, at Adwa, the Empress went
right into the battle when the Italian force seemed to break the
middle Ethiopian force (Gedam) where Emperors normally took
position. Seeing the Empress rushing on foot, soldiers, including
those wounded, dashed into the middle to revert the danger. Once
it was over, the Empress spent the rest of the days in treating
wounded soldiers.

This role of Tayitu represented the tradition of female
warriors leading troops on campaign. (For a documentation study
on this aspect, see Crummey, Donald, “Women, Property, and
Litigation among the Begemder Amhara, 1750s to 1850s” in
African Women and the Law: Historical Perspectives. Hay and
Wright (eds.). 1982). Military leadership was one the sphere of
activity in which Ethiopian Women achieved equality in an
environment dominated by men.

Now to the battle of Segele. It is the bloodiest battle since
Adwa, fought between the central army, about the size of 120 000
and the troops of Negus Mikael, numbering about 80 000 in 27
October 1916, at a place called Segele north-east of Addis Ababa.
On hearing the disposition of his son, Lij Iyasu, King Mikael of
Wollo and Tigre, marched to Addis Ababa with his army. In the
first encounter, 17 October 1916, the Wollo army was victories,
but when the central government send conciliatory messages and
mediators to buy time, the Wallo troop stopped advancing into
Addis Ababa, and King Mikael became relaxed. However, the Wollo
army without knowing what was to come, was caught off by
surprise, encircled and disbursed at Segele, and King Mikael was
captured.

The political back ground to this battle is so complicated to
be discussed here. In short it was orchestrated by both external
and internal forces. Externally, the Allies (Britain, France,
Italy and others) which were at war against Germany and Turkey
(W.W.I), did not like the policy of Lij Iyasu who was favouring
Germany and Turkey. Lij Iyasu favoured Germany and her allies to
get support in dismantling Britain, France and Italy which had
colony adjoining Ethiopia. His accommodation with the Muslims of
Harar and Ogaden, thus to win Turkish support, and probably,
obtain access to the see, was seen as a threat by the Allied
power. Their opposition was welcomed by the Shewan disgruntled
nobles who were disappointed by Iyasu’s appointment policy, and
intrigued to dispose him on religious pretext. (For a brief
account see, Bahru Zewde 1991. A History of Modern Ethiopia. pp.
120-128).

Ras Gobena (1821-1889)

Ras Gobena was one of the outstanding generals of Menelik
during the first reign of the emperor. He was one of the
prominent architects who brought about a fiscal and military
integration of the south and western provinces of Ethiopia under
a centralized imperial control. Gobena was born around 1821 of a
noble family of Oromo in Aman, Wegda, in Shewa. He was a close
relative of the Aba Mudda, a spiritual head of the Oromo. It is
not clear when exactly he started his career, but he came into
the picture when he rebelled against Theodros, at a time when the
later was trying to bring Shewa under imperial control. When
Menelik escaped from Meqedela and returned to Shewa, Gobena was
one of the nobles who welcomed him and joined his service. Gobena
had demonstrated his bravery, leadership and war tactic when he
rebelled against Theodros, and his appointee in Shewa. In the
court of Menelik he was given the office of Agafari, master of
the ceremonies, who received and introduced guests to Menelik.
Usually this office was given to a trusted person. Soon after his
appointment, Agafari Gobena was ordered to pacify a rebellion in
Meskala, southern Wollo, in which he succeeded. (Nadew, Y{-Ras
Gobena Tarik, a manuscript in private hands, p. 3. Hereafter
referred as Nadew). He established his Ketema (military camp) at
Bisi and began to “straighten out” (Hager Maqnat), all
lands up to Selale. He continued to conquer, that was Hager
Maknat, in the regions of Metta, Mecha, Ada, Cebo, Gulele and
Yeka, the last two regions are now in the city zone of Addis
Ababa. To boost his moral and power, Menelik gave him the title
of Dejazmach. At that time Menelik had only two Dejazmach (and no
Ras), the other person who was given the title of Dejazmach was,
Menelik’s paternal uncle, Darge. Dejazmach Darge was one of the
four sons of king Sahle Selasie of Shewa, a potential claimer to
the throne of Shewa.

As title holder of Dejazmach, Gobena had the right to appoint
his military officers with a rank of Fitawrari, and he gave this
title to his best military officers and left them in charge of
continuing their expansion. Dejazmach Gobena himself proceeded to
get the submission of the Balabats in the regions beyond Awash
river, just to mention, Dendi Maru, Weliso, Chebo, Dulal, Amya,
Nono, Sodo, Agemge, Qebene, Enemor. When Menelik got the title as
King of Shewa, confered by Emperor Yohannes IV in 1878, he gave a
rich feast at his town, Liche, and honoured Degazmach Gobena with
the title of Ras, thus enhancing further his popularity (the
other holder of the title of Ras was Dejazmach Darge). Ras Gobena
continued his campaign in the remaining regions in Gudru, Mecha,
Jebat and Gurage. He crossed the Gibe river and brought the
territories in the remote south under cetral control system.

King Tekle Haimanot of Gojjam had also sent his general, Ras
Deresu, who crossed Abay and campaigned in the regions of Gudru,
Leqa, part of Wellega. The Shewans and the Gojjame aristocrats
were rivals in control of the regions south of Abay. In their
advance into the south, the troops of Ras Deresu encountered the
force of Ras Gobena that was approaching from north. Ras Gobena
sent a message to Ras Deresu, to withdraw from the region leaving
behind the rich ivory and other items collected. Ras Deresu
complied, but King Tekle Haimanot of Gojjam was infuriated and
sent a message to Menelik to settle the problem in a battle,
known as the Battle of Embabo. The battle took place in 1881, and
King Tekle Haimanot was defeated. During this battle, Ras Gobena
employed an out manoeuvre tactic and attacked behind the rear
position, which led into the Gojame army into confusion and
disarray. (On the background and event of this battle, see Caulk,
R. “Territorial Competition and the Battle of Embabo”,
in Journal of Ethiopian Studies, IX, 2.)

Once the power of the Gojjam aristocrats was removed from the
scene, Ras Gobena continued his campagn in Cala, Lago Horo, Leqa,
Neqemt and Sayo, some of which had submitted to Ras Deresu. In
1883, he continued his campagn in the direction of Illubabor
until Gimira. Following the religious agreement among the
aristocracy of Ethiopia in 1878, known as the Council of Boru
Meda, Ras Gobena was ordred to establish churches in the regions
where he received submission. To this effect, he gave an order to
the Meslene and district governors, and he consulted with his
wife, Weyzero Ayelech, who, accordingly, founded fourty one
churches (See Nadew, 8-9).

In 1886, Menelik consulted Ras Gobena and appointed governors
along with central troops over the vast areas “straigten
out” (Y! Qena Hagar) by the later. (See, Bairu Tafla, 1987,
Asme Giorgis and His work: History of the Galla and the Kingdom
of Shewa. p. 757). Menelik then marched in to Arsi in which Ras
Gobena participated. When Menelik set out to march to Harar in
1887, Ras gobena was entrusted guarding the town of Entoto, and
he mobilized his Wellega troops and camped near Entoto. When
Menelik returned he gave him a warm welcome. Soon after, Ras
Gobena, together with Fitawrari Habte Giorgis marched in to the
region of Gurage to suppress a rebellion instigated by a leader,
who declared Jihad. They succeeded in suppressing the rebellion
and Ras Gobena returned into Entoto. In 1889, the governors on
the boarder of Wellega wrote a letter to Ras Gobena, that they
were attacked by the Mahdist of Sudan, the letter was shown to
king Menelik, and Ras Gobena left Entoto, on September 15,
crossed Gibe river on the 26th, mobilised his troops and engaged
war against the Mahdist on October 14. He defeated them and thus
checked their advance. While in Wellega he received a letter from
King Menelik informing him the intention of Emperor Yohannes to
invade Shewa.

Ras Gobena advanced with his troops to Shewa, and upon
consultation he was given the responsibility of guarding a route
coming from Abay. While he was there, Ras Gobena received a
letter from Menelik notifying him a rebellion once again in the
Gurage region. He returned with his army to Entoto and the Ras
accepted the order to march to Gurage region. Menelik then gave
Ras Gobena as present his horse, named Raswerq Ambaye, and Gasha
(shield) decorated with gold. No sooner had he received the
prize, Ras Gobena left for Gurage. According to the tradition,
Ras Gobena was expected to hold a banquet at his house for his
followers marking the prize award, but he did not. Instead, Ras
Gobena marched straight to Gurage region and crushed the
resistance there and sent a message of congratulation to King
Menelik. Ras Gobena heard the death of Emperor Yohannes while in
campaign, he was deeply touched and he ordered his soldiers to
fire into the air. When Menelik marched north to get the
submission of the northern nobles after the death of Emperor
Yohannes, Ras Gobena was as usual entrusted to guard the town.
One day, after he returned home, passing the whole day in
receiving appeals from the people, he suddenly felt ill, and died
after three days of treatment. He was buried at Debre Libanos in
July 1889 few months before the coronation of Menelik the II,
whom he had served devotedly for so long.

Questions 8:

1) How does History judge Atse Theodros and his
administration?

2) Was he actually as uncompromising and suspicious as he is
portrayed in literature against Europeans influence?

3) Who is the father of Aste Theodros? And how many children’s
did he, Aste Theodros father legitimately and illegitimately?

4) What is his most significant contribution for the
realization of the contemporary Ethiopia?

5) How did Atse Theodros managed to bring and rear Atse
Menelik in the castle of Fasiledes?

6) Why did Atse Menelik transfer the nation’s capital from
Gonder to Addis Ababa? And how was Menelik’s attitude as far as
Gonder and Gojjam are concerned?

The last question is not clear to me, and it is time wasting
to find an answer by guessing what it means. The answer to the
questions on the family background of Theodros can be looked for
in one of the references mentioned in an earlier posting. Please
read T!kle Tsadik Mekuria, Ase Theodros ena Y! Etiyopiya Endnet.
Addis Ababa 1981 EC. In the same column, I have outlined the
achievements and changes made by Theodros, and for further
discussion and points of view see again the reference, Taddese
Beyene, Pankhurst, R. and Shiferaw Bekele, Kasa and Kasa, Papers
on the Lives, Times and Images of Theodros II and Yohannes IV,
1855-1889″. Addis Ababa University, 1990. Both books are on
sale at the Book Center, Addis Ababa University.

If at all there is a serious discussion on the reforms of
Theodros, it emanates primarily due to lack of detailed social
historical studies concerning the period before him, and due to
the brevity which source materials (chronicles) impose on the
understanding of the reforms. We still lack a clear picture how
the nineteenth ccentury society functions, an unless we know
clearly the system that preceded Theodros, it is difficult to
measure the magnitude and quality of his reforms. Again as I said
this is a mater of detail study. I feel I am speaking in vague,
as I have not pointed out any point of disagreement among
scholars. Probably there is non that is so significant to raise,
besides, no one doubts the reign of Theodros marked a beginning
of a new period, and his reform, particularly, the administration
of taxes, was a break of at least two hundred years of practice.

As I see it, what could be controversial was the measure he
had undertaken to discipline his army in particular and the
society in general. This is the most neglected, unresearched
aspect of Theodros’s reign, as it was, of course, overshadowed
more by the highlights of the changes he introduced. Chroniclers
wrote some of the gruesome acts of Theodros, such as cutting of
hands, gunning of thieves, burning of convicts, and the like.
(See, Zenebe, Y! Theodros Tarik : The Chronicle of King Theodore
of Abyssinia, Litman, E. (ed.) 1902. Leipzig, passim; Aleqa Taye,
Ye- Gojjam Tarik, manuscript at the Institute of Ethiopian
Studies, no. 254, pp. 68, 72, 73, 74, 75). What was this other of
him?

My impression is that treason breaks the heart of Theodros and
he responded in revenge. At the beginning his reign in the
provinces of Gojjam, Wollo, Tigre and Shewa, Theodros appointed
governors belonging from the traditional ruling families of the
respective regions. These governors rebelled in his absence,
since they were deprived some of their earlier rights such as
their privileges of tax collection. Theodros marched to the said
region, chased the rebels and condemned them to be hanged. He
summoned their followers, pardoned those who were forced to raise
up arm against him (that is, those mobilized by decree of the
rebels) while he deliberately cut the hands of those soldiers who
belonged to the Dembe: those regulars who belonged to the command
he appointed,and ought to be loyal to him. In the case of
thieves, at his coronation, he made a declaration to end their
practice and return to normal life. In many instances he gunned
those thieves and robbers who continued with their former
activities ignoring his decree and amnesty.

As the intensity of the rebellion increased Theodros seemed to
lose his sense of common judgement. When Menelik escaped from
Meqdela in 1865, and received help from Workete of Wollo on his
way to Shewa, Theodros, upon hearing this report, came to Meqdela
and executed the son of Workete and other 23 prisoners who were
not in any way implicated in Menelik’s escape.

This came as a shock to his contemporaries, commoners and
officials alike. According to the custom, at least the Fetha
Negest, Law of the Kings, had to be consulted and the case had to
be tried by council of judges. Theodros seemed to be above the
law, unbounded by it. At one point, when a certain rebel implored
the king to sue his case in accordance with Fetha Negest,
Theodros replied to him ” Who is the Law, but me! What is
the Law, but myself ! I am the fountain of it” ( See,
Rassam, H. Narrative of the British Mission to Theodore. London
1869. V2, p. 18.)

As more rebellion erupted in every part of the country, and as
his soldiers became tired of the unending campaign, and as they
conspired deserting of him, Theodros became more suspicious, his
action became more sever, and indiscriminate. At one time he
gunned a corps of troops, about 700, reported to desert him.
(Al!qa Taye, p. 73) Another time, he rounded up another corps of
troops, and let them die denying them food and water for two
weeks. (See, Al!qa Taye, p. 73-74; This account of the chronicler
has to be checked against another independent source material).

The chronicler tells us that Theodros plundered the grain of
Begemder that caused hunger, and he began indiscriminate
punishment including civilians (ibid.). In one of his last
letters to the British Theodros wrote that “my country men
turned their backs against me, when I tried to led them to
modernization. Had Theodros felt betrayed? Was his the right
method to discipline soldiers and society at large? I wish I have
time to make research on this point.

Now to the other part of the questions, namely the
transferring of the seat of the government from Gonder to Addis
Ababa. The author of the question did not tell us from where he
got the evidence that state Menelik’s transfer of the capital
city. As far as I know, for that matter, it was Theodros himself
who formally (underline this word) made a decree that “the
town of Dabre Tabor hence forward be called Gonder” (See,
Al!qa Taye, pp 74-75). Dabra Tabor was founded by the Yaju family
in the late eighteenth century, and since then it was the seat of
the Rise Mekwanent, head of the military nobility of Ethiopia.
Theodros formally declared Dabr Tabor as a capital city, because
of his quarrel with the clergy of Gonder. Theodros had a contempt
of the Dabtara whom he saw as lazy, sitting idle and taking the
wife of soldiers while the later were in campaigns. The Debtera
lived on the lands held in the name of the church that was
exempted from tax due the state. Theodros limited the number of
clergy in a church to five and ordered the rest to pay tax on the
land they held. This had caused debate and eventually
disappointment, and the Dabtara were not thus on good terms with
the king. During my field study one informant told me that
Theodros deliberately avoided to stay at the town of Gonder, he
often camped far away at the outskirt looking toward the town. He
looked at it through his field glass and used to say it consisted
worthless people. It was thus no wonder when he plunder the town,
taking manuscripts numbering about 913, and deposited them at
Dabre Tabor and Maqdela (See Al!qa Taye, p. 75). Debre Tabor
continued to be the seat of the government, and Emperor Yohanes
used it as capital until he founded Meqele town in the early
1880s.

Anyway, the decline or development of a towns is not related
to an individual decision. Towns have their own laws of
development. Certain towns came into being following a particular
political developments. In the Zemene Mesafint, for instance, we
find development of towns serving as centers of political
administration and these towns declined with the shift occurring
in the power structure. Another example, can be the Katema,
military garrison towns, that flourished in southern Ethiopia
during the expansion of an imperial fiscal and military system at
the time of Menelik. Other towns developed along lines of trade
routes, and still others as centers of production. I think we
have to consider these complex factors which gave rise to towns,
and influenced their development. Those of you who are interested
in urban history read, Pankhurst, R. 1982, History of Ethiopian
Towns from the Middle Ages to the Early Nineteenht Century,
Wiesbaden; idem. 1985. History of Ethiopian Towns from the Mid-
Nineteenth Century to 1935. Stutgart.

Q. 9. “What is the Wichale Sememenet? Did Menelik sell
or lose Eritrea, as they say? or did Menelik save Ethiopia
becasue of it?”

The Wichale treaty was a treaty of amity and commerce signed
between Menelik and Count Pietro Antonelli of Italy at the town
of Wichale on 2 May 1889, two months after the corronation of
Menelik. The Wichale treaty was one of the many treaties of
commerce and frendship signed between the kings and the princes
of Ethiopia and European countries: Sahle Selasie of Shewa signed
a treaty with France and Bretain in 1841-43; Ras Wolde Selasie,
ruler of Tigray (1805), Ras Ali II of Yejju (1840s), Dejazmach
Wube of Semen and Tigray, Emperor Yohannes IV, to mention some.
(See, Rubenson, S. (1976), The Survival of Ethiopian
Independence, pp.29-54; Rubenson, Getachew Haile and Hunwick
(eds.) Acta Aethiopica: Correspondence and Treaties, 1800-1854.
Addis Ababa 1987; Public Record Office London, Ref. F.O.1-13, pp.
191-201, 232-237).

What makes the Wuchale Treaty different from the rest was the
historical period, the scramble for Africa, which inspired
European states to forge ulterior motives in shaping of treaties.
In the colonial thinking of the period, establishment of
protectorate over an African territory was closely tied up with
the exclusive right to conduct or control its foreign affairs.
And that was what Italy tried to achieve by giving different
version to article XVII of the treaty. The Italian text of this
article read:

“His majesty the king of Ethiopia consents to avail
himself (or use) of the Italian government for any negotiations
which he may enter into with all the other powers of
governments”. The Amharic version differ significantly:
“The emperor of Ethiopia, for all maters that he wants with
the kings of Europe, it is possible for him to communicate with
the assistance of the Italian government”. According to the
Amharic version, Menelik could, had the right or authority to
request the good office of the Italian government in matters of
foreign relations, if or when he so wanted. But the wording of
the Italian implied obligation. Italy wanted this article XVII in
order to claim protectorate over Ethiopia in conformity with
General Act of Berlin that made possible for a European power to
declare a unilateral claim of protectorate. (for further
discussion, see Rubenson, S. 1964. Wichale XVII. The Attempt to
Establish a Protectorate over Ethiopia. Addis Ababa).

The second part of the question, as I understand it refers to
the paradox why Menelik did not push the Italians out from Mereb
Melash (Eritrea) after his victory at the battle of Adwa? One
finds such paradoxical encounters even back to the period before
Adwa. Emperor Yohannes IV had defeated the Egyptian force, first
at the battle of Gundet (1875), and for the second time at the
battle of Gura (1876). The emperor, however, did not force the
Egyptian out from Keren and other regions, in spite of the modern
rifles he had captured from the enemy force. Rather the Emperor
preferred to renew friendship with Egypt (See, Zewde Gebre
Selassie, Yohannes IV of Ethiopia. chapter three). Once again, in
1888, this time against Italy, the Emperor mobilized 60 000 to 70
000 army and besieged the Italian force at Seati for months.
Instead of dislodging the Italians out of Saati, the emperor
decamped and returned to south. To remind you, earlier, January
1887, the Emperor’s chief general, Ras Alula had defeated the
small detachments of the Italian force at Dogali, a victory which
he could not pursue (See, Zewde Gebre Selassie, chapters IX &
X). What was this recurrent problem which repeated itself at the
battle of Adwa?

Every battle had its own given circumstance in the context of
which decisions were taken. But the paradox that the victor at
the same time stood as a loser must have certain explanation. As
I see it there was a common denominator to the recurrent problems
of the battles mentioned above. This was related to the very
system of military organization of the Ethiopian state of the
period. As you can imagine this is not the place to discuss the
structural problems of the army, but for your consideration I
shall raise the following points:

With regard to manpower, the Ethiopian army was based largely
on the peasantry. There was a massive recruitment of peasants in
return for tax exemption as field force and/or as auxiliary
forces. The regular part of the army, “professional”
troops, were attached to the Gibi-palace, and their number was
relatively small. In other words peasant-soldiers constituted
higher proportion in the composition of the military force.
(Indeed, it is very difficult to produce statistic as we have
only estimates, and, above all, the period was marked by a rapid
change and it is difficult to be precise on the format of the
army; for an insight to such structural problem and change see,
Tsegaye Tegenu, The System of Military Organization of the
Ethiopian State during the Nineteenth Century, Department of
History, Uppsala University, 15 December 1993). Peasant-soldiers,
according to the tradition, had only campaign obligation, and
once the campaign was over they wanted to go back to their family
and farm land.

Provisioning, the supply of food to a large and moving body of
army was another area of consideration. In the battle of Adwa
around 100 000 soldiers participated and fought, and these troops
were in the fields for about 150 days. During the time of
campaigns soldiers were supposed to bring Senq from their own
sources which would last for about twenty days, and for the rest
of the days they had to be feed by different means for which the
commandant Ras was responsible. The system of provisioning was
not modern, while the common soldiers prepare for the twenty
days, the Ras, generals organize their own supply system. The
following is an example how the Azaz of the Menelik palace
prepared food for the campaign:

a) to make Birz drinks 600-800 mules were packed with honey.
One mule carried two Gundo of honey (about 36 kilo), the total
pack would be enough for an average of 336 000 people.

b) For one month about 100 Tanika butter was packed, if
multiplied by a number of camapign days, a total of 500
Tanika-butter was needed.

c) 600-800 mules were packed with food stafs. If one Dawula
(92 Killo) was enough for 500 people, totally an avarage of 80
tons of food staff was packed for the camapaign.

d) three Frida cattle meat was needed for 1000 people for a
day. (For the figures see Zekre Neger, pp. 50-51, calculation is
mine).

I have left out items such as mutton, pepper, salt. Please
note that this preparation was only for Menelik. There were at
least ten generals with a large number of troops for whom a
provision had to be organized. In the figure 100 000, the large
number of followers such servants who prepared food and drinks,
men who fetched fire wood, and the many auxiliary forces of the
army were not counted, and they had to be feed as well. On top of
this you have tens of thousands of war horse, mules, cattle for
slaughter, sheep, donkeys and other transport animals. Imagine
the task of feeding all these animals: daily they need water and
fodder. Menelik aim was to march to Hamasen highlands, for the
province of Tigray could not support all these forces, who had
already exhausted their provision after four months of continues
march. It was when Menelik and his generals were discussing the
problems of provision and alternatives, that the Italians came
and surprised them with attack at Adwa. (See Gebre Selassie,
Dagmawi Menelik Tarik, pp. 257-261).

According to the tradition of battles, the Ethiopian troops of
the period had a strategical and tactical objectives based on the
urgency of bringing the enemy force to engagement and get, if
possible, decisive victory. In other words battles were not
fought only with limited means, but also for limited objectives.
Ignoring the problems around weapon and command hierarchy, what
alternatives could have been present for Menelik, if we consider
only the economic scale of the war: mobilising, moving and
supplying the large body of army, what may be termed the
“nuts and bolts” of war. I wish I have time to discuss
more, for today I wind up here. Please send me questions to make
a preparation for our next column.

With regard to manpower, the Ethiopian army was based largely
on the peasantry. There was a massive recruitment of peasants in
return for tax exemption as field force and/or as auxiliary
forces. The regular part of the army, “professional”
troops, were attached to the Gibi-palace, and their number was
relatively small. In other words peasant-soldiers constituted
higher proportion in the composition of the military force.
(Indeed, it is very difficult to produce statistic as we have
only estimates, and, above all, the period was marked by a rapid
change and it is difficult to be precise on the format of the
army; for an insight to such structural problem and change see,
Tsegaye Tegenu, The System of Military Organization of the
Ethiopian State during the Nineteenth Century, Department of
History, Uppsala University, 15 December 1993). Peasant-soldiers,
according to the tradition, had only campaign obligation, and
once the campaign was over they wanted to go back to their family
and farm land.

Provisioning, the supply of food to a large and moving body of
army was another area of consideration. In the battle of Adwa
around 100 000 soldiers participated and fought, and these troops
were in the fields for about 150 days. During the time of
campaigns soldiers were supposed to bring Senq from their own
sources which would last for about twenty days, and for the rest
of the days they had to be feed by different means for which the
commandant Ras was responsible. The system of provisioning was
not modern, while the common soldiers prepare for the twenty
days, the Ras, generals organize their own supply system. The
following is an example how the Azaz of the Menelik palace
prepared food for the campaign:

a) to make Birz drinks 600-800 mules were packed with honey.
One mule carried two Gundo of honey (about 36 kilo), the total
pack would be enough for an average of 336 000 people.

b) For one month about 100 Tanika butter was packed, if
multiplied by a number of camapign days, a total of 500
Tanika-butter was needed.

c) 600-800 mules were packed with food stafs. If one Dawula
(92 Killo) was enough for 500 people, totally an avarage of 80
tons of food staff was packed for the camapaign.

d) three Frida cattle meat was needed for 1000 people for a
day. (For the figures see Zekre Neger, pp. 50-51, calculation is
mine).

I have left out items such as mutton, pepper, salt. Please
note that this preparation was only for Menelik. There were at
least ten generals with a large number of troops for whom a
provision had to be organized. In the figure 100 000, the large
number of followers such servants who prepared food and drinks,
men who fetched fire wood, and the many auxiliary forces of the
army were not counted, and they had to be feed as well. On top of
this you have tens of thousands of war horse, mules, cattle for
slaughter, sheep, donkeys and other transport animals. Imagine
the task of feeding all these animals: daily they need water and
fodder. Menelik aim was to march to Hamasen highlands, for the
province of Tigray could not support all these forces, who had
already exhausted their provision after four months of continues
march. It was when Menelik and his generals were discussing the
problems of provision and alternatives, that the Italians came
and surprised them with attack at Adwa. (See Gebre Selassie,
Dagmawi Menelik Tarik, pp. 257-261).

According to the tradition of battles, the Ethiopian troops of
the period had a strategical and tactical objectives based on the
urgency of bringing the enemy force to engagement and get, if
possible, decisive victory. In other words battles were not
fought only with limited means, but also for limited objectives.
Ignoring the problems around weapon and command hierarchy, what
alternatives could have been present for Menelik, if we consider
only the economic scale of the war: mobilising, moving and
supplying the large body of army, what may be termed the
“nuts and bolts” of war. I wish I have time to discuss
more, for today I wind up here. Please send me questions to make
a preparation for our next column.

Question 10. The Aksumite civilization was founded by
people who had crossed the Red Sea from South Arabia. But various
historians have pointed out that there was a thriving
civilization present in the highlands of Northern Ethiopia by the
time the Semitic people of South Arabia arrived. Who were these
people? And what impact did they have on the kingdom of Axum?

My knowledge in Ancient Ethiopian history is old, but I am
glad to share what I have read before and what I have come to
know very recently. To begin with Aksum was not the first and
oldest Ethiopian civilization. Adulis, for instance had an older
existence than Aksum. There are archaeological discoveries
illustrating pre Aksumite civilization and culture, and these
were located at Coloe (some 20 km from Adi Qeyih), Yeha (near
Aksum), Tokanda (near Coloe, and many others. We have to wait for
the archaeological findings in Southern Ethiopia.

The question is whether this remote civilization was a product
of ancient immigrants from south Arabia or indigenous Ethiopians?
For long time scholars perpetuated a hypothesis on the South
Arabian origin and/or influence of the Ethiopian civilization.
This hypothesis is challenged by Ephraim Isaac and Cain Felder in
their extensive article “Reflections on the Origins of the
Ethiopian Civilization”, Eight International Conference of
Ethiopian Studies, November 1984. Without denying historical and
cultural ties between Ethiopian and South Arabian, they, however,
refuted “the concept of cultural domination directly or
indirectly”. In the first place, the hypothesis is based on
a Hegelian Euro-centric philosophical perspective which
entertains that no indigenous high culture developed in Africa
and as such major African civilizations are often attributed to
outsiders. Secondly the hypothesis contained “erroneous
historical, linguistic and archaeological assumptions”,
which the authors demonstrated in their article. It is beyond the
scope of this column to make a review, and readers are
recommended to refer the article for details.

Very recently I watched a video film recording the works and
views of a traditional Ethiopian scholar named Aba Tesfa Selassie
Moges. In what follows I present some of his views which I
patched up from his ecliptic and impressive discourse on
Ethiopians and ancient civilization. Aba Tesfa Selassie Moges has
done his education in the Ethiopian monasteries before he left
abroad for further studies. In Greek, at the University of Athen,
he studied theology and philosophy (M.A), and earned BA degree in
political science. It is said that he knows 16 languages,
including classical Greek, Latin, German and Arabic. He claimed
that he is the only person in the world who knows the Sabean
language, a dead language “of the Ethiopians”. He is
currently working on Ethiopian pre history and history starting
from the time of Lucy (Dinknesh) up to the period of 60 BC
(Before Christ). He said that he has written 12 of the 15 volumes
project work. Besides, he has collected over 10 000 books on
Ethiopia. When it comes to the issue of discussion at hand Aba
Tesfa Selassie’s view goes beyond the point of Ethiopians-South
Arabians relation. He believed that Ethiopians are the foundation
of mankind and the origin of its civilization. According to him
the first man is an Ethiopian, and he presented such
archaeological evidence as Lucy and a number of prophesies from
the Bible. He defined Ethiopians as a selected race: Ethiopians
differ from other races by their form (qers), skin (koda) and
texture (yezet). The identity of an Ethiopian is the three
colour. An Ethiopian, belonging to the same father and mother,
can have one of the three colour (Mulu Qey, Ye Qey Dama and Tekur
Dama, (in addition Mulu Tekur), In each family, and in every
linguistic/ethnic group, there are these three colour and these
colour make an Ethiopian different from black Africa, Arabs of
Middle East, white and yellow people. Accordingly Somalian,
people of Djibouti, Nubians of Sudan and Egypt are all
Ethiopians. Ethiopians are the origins of a skin colour. Based on
his archaeological and linguistic evidence, he claimed that
before 1900 BC, the Egyptian were Ethiopians. Egypt was the first
land where Ethiopians cultivated Lentils (Meser), thus called
Land of Meser. The Faros of Egypt, some of them who ruled between
3200 to 2000 from 1700-1500 were Ethiopians. Clieopatra was an
Ethiopian, as her facial features testify nothing other than an
Ethiopian. It was around 1900 BC that the Arabs came to Egypt
from Yemen and Iraq as slave for cultivation of agricultural
plantation. And since then they intermingled and lived with the
Ethiopians. Out of the 450 famous Farsan kings 250 were
Ethiopians. The Israelis were also Ethiopians, (and he
differentiated Israelis from Jews) and he said the land held by
the Ethiopian monasteries in Jerusalem was a continuation of the
old. For him Christ was an Ethiopian, and he does not accept the
white Christ.

According to him the Latin and Arabic alphabet had their
origin from the Ethiopian alphabet (Fidel), which was copied with
no or little modification. Only the letter “S” belonged
to Latin. This had been supported by a German scholar. The
Ethiopian alphabet was in existence since 4500 BC. The first
astronomer is an Ethiopian. Around 1900 BC an Ethiopian named
Ahamenet wrote about the existence of 16 planets, the kind of
life found in each of the planets. This tradition has continued
and today we have a book called Awde Negest (Book of Stars) which
remains mysterious to many Ethiopians. Henok who wrote about the
life and resources of the earth was an Ethiopian.

Ethiopians are the founders of Christian and Islamic
religions. As I have mentioned, Christ was an Ethiopian, Israel,
not a Jew. According to him Jews guarded the lands of Ethiopians,
Israel. The apostles were Ethiopians (Matthew, Marqos, etc.). The
founder of Islamic religion is an Ethiopian, his name was Belay
Gebremedhin, and he was a governor of Mecca (around 400 AD). The
evidence comes from an original hand written book of Quran. By
and large, the above statements summarise the views of Aba Tesfa
Selassie. Without agreeing to his racial view and ideologies, I
think the tenet of his hypothesis is as good as the once I have
so far read. As he claimed his evidences are based on documents
written by ancient Romans in ancient Greek language, for which he
has a good knowledge. He had collected a total of 10900 documents
in German language– documents whose content went as far back as
3000 BC. During his three years and seven months research stay in
Italy he managed to collect about 7000 documents written on
Ethiopia. He reads the inscriptions written in the Sabean
language, which he called an Ethiopian language. He said that he
has written 3000 pages (in another point he said 12 volumes)
which he planed to publish along with 500 pictures. If the
material he presented is solid as he asserted and if the
evidences are critically evaluated, I think his view can have a
profound effect not only on ancient Ethiopian history but also on
ancient world history. If you have not yet seen the video, it is
good to watch it. My warning is that his comment on some
religious group is offending, one which you do not expect from
him.

Question 11.

What is the Gada system? Was it a system used through out
Oromia or was it prevalent in one region of Oromia only? and the follow
up question is politically speaking, was there an Oromia nation before
Menelik?

The original homeland of the Oromo ethnic people is believed to be
in the present region of Bali and parts of Sidamo. Particularly, Guji
and northern Borena land areas seemed to be recognized as the cradle
land of Oromo culture. It was from these areas that the Oromo ethnic
groups migrated into the eastern, western, and central highlands of
Ethiopia and intermingled with the people inhabiting over these areas
starting from the second quarter of the sixteenth century. Prior to
their migration, the Oromo ethnic groups were pastorals and semi
agriculturalist, and their social organization was based on an
egalitarian socio-political and cultural institution called Gada.

The Gada system was a system of an age-grade classes (luba) that
succeed each other every eight years in assuming military, economy,
political and ritual responsibilities. Each Gada class remained in
power during a specific term (Gada) which began and ended with a formal
power transfer ceremony. Before assuming a position of leadership, the
Gada class is required to wage war against a community that none of
their ancestors had raided. This particular war is known as Butta and
is waged on schedule every eight years. (See, Asmarom Legesse (1973),
Gada: Three Approaches to the Study of African Societies. London, p.8;
Mohammed Hassen (1990), The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History 1570-1860).
Cambridge, pp. 9-17). The Gada system spread with the migration and
intermingle of the Oromo ethnic group and following their permanent
settlement the system began to shade its traditional egalitarian
socio-political character. (Refer our earlier discussion on the Zemene
Mesafint in Southern Ethiopia).

Regarding the second part of the question, “was there an Oromia
nation before Menelik”, I could not find literature specifically
addressing this point. During my stay at the 12th International
Conference of Ethiopian Studies, I asked this same question to one
scholar who is an Oromo by ethnic. He said “you have the Oromigna
language that has different dialects; you have a Gada system which
gives sense to an Oromo living in Welega and Hara”. I then asked him
bluntly if he meant by that an Oromia nation and he said yes.
Accordingly, he has considered two or three factors to define a nation:
common language, culture, and I suspect he had also in mind defined
geography. Others may have different definition, but what is the point
to try discuss and write on “Oromia nation”, for that mater on any
“non-dominant” ethnic group. What is the purpose behind the “scholarly”
interest to construct the historical past of an ethnic group and
attempts to mythology. And how are we able to analyse and understand
the various activities by national(ist) movements of a “non- dominant”
ethnic groups?

I would like to take this opportunity to raise some issues and
methods which I believe may help us to understand nation and
national(ist) movements by “non-dominant” ethnic groups. Looking back
to the history of Europe, and going through the bulk of literature on
nations and nationalism, one has the impression that “nation” is a
product of long and complicated process of historical development. To
all intents and purposes, “nation” is defined as “a large social group
integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of
objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural,
religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection
in collective consciousness”. Many of these ties could be mutually
substitutable, but, among them, three stands out as irreplaceable:

i) a memory of some common past, treated as destiny of the group,

ii) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher
degree of social communication within the group than beyond it,

iii) a conception of the equality of all members of the group
organized as a civil society.

If we follow this definition, then there was no “Oromia nation” in
the past. There were Oromo people, their history and socio-political
organization, but we do not find the ties in a “collective
consciousness”. That is why today we find activists both inside and
outside the government demanding national self determination, and the
discussion around “Oromia nation”, as part of an effort to create
“memory of some common past”. Ethnic national movement starts the
moment when selected groups within the non-dominant ethnic community
begin to discuss their own ethnicity and to conceive of it as a
potential nation-to-be. The demand for national self determination
could mean autonomy or statehood, and it all depends on the political
development. The growth from cultural national movement to a political
one (to a state nationhood) has at least three stages:

Phase One: the “patriotic stage”, at this stage the energy of the
activists is devoted to scholarly enquiry into and dissemination of an
awareness of the linguistic, cultural, social and sometime historical
attributes of the non-dominant ethnic group. At this stage the
activists may not press specifically national demands. Their
intellectual activity may not be called an organized social or
political movement. Some members of their group may not even believe
that their ethnic could develop into a nation. At this stage the
activists mainly collect information about the history, language and
custom of their ethnic group. They try to “discover” the ethnic group
and lay a base for the subsequent formation of a “national identity”.

Phase Two: is the stage of “national agitation”, a new range of
activists emerge seeking to win over as many of their ethnic group as
possible to the project of creating a future nation, by agitation to
awaken national consciousness among them.

Phase Three: the stage of “mass movement”, in which the major part
of the ethnic population store their special national identity. This
stage heralds the birth of the nation state.

The question is now does an ethnic movement which passed the first
two phases reach into the critical phase three? In other words what are
the objective circumstances which ultimately lead successfully in
passing over into a mass movement of phase three and attaining the
imagined nation. There are three factors:

i) the degree of success in creating and agitating the “memory of
former independence or statehood situated far in the past”. This could
stimulate not only historical consciousness and ethnic solidarity, but
the continuity of past history and “violation of a historical right”.
In Ethiopia, we have seen cases argued based on theory of colonialism
and colonial history.

ii) the degree of social mobility and communication: if more members
and activists from the ethnic group attain higher vertical social
mobility, “national agitation”, (phase two), has more appealing. In
other words increase in the number of educated elite from the
non-dominant ethnic group. In addition, the rate of literacy among the
peasant population (literary tradition of the ethnic group) facilitates
social communication as the transmission of information. (Activists of
the Oromo national(ist) movement have introduced Latin alphabet in the
Oromo language, have they considered this alphabet as an asset?)

iii) besides the above two circumstances, a weighing factor is the
degree of crisis and conflict of interests: absolute repression lives
no room for a developed form of political discourse or argument. In
this kind of system it is easy to articulate social contradictions or
hostilities in national language–as danger to a particular language or
ethnic group. In societies where you have a high level of political
culture and experience, conflicts of interests are often articulated in
political terms not in national terms. Issues of human and civil right
are, therefor, important for national integration.

To conclude, theoretically speaking, the basic precondition of all
national(ist) movements of ethnic group is a deep crisis of the order,
with the breakdown of its legitimacy, and of the values and sentiments
that sustained it. This crisis is combined with economic depression and
wide spread poverty, social decline, generating increasing popular
distress. A third crucial element of the situation is the prevalence of
low level of political culture and experience particularly among the
elite. The coincidence of these three conditions unleash ethnic
movements and once they acquire a mass character, they can not be
stopped by use of force. The remedy against this danger is prevalence
of unconditional democracy and economic prosperity.

Further Readings:

Hroch, Miroslav (1985), Social Preconditions of National
Revival in Europe,London.

Hobsbawn, E.J. (1990), Nations and Nationalism Since 1780.
Programme, Myth and Reality. Cambridge.

Question 12.

What is Gebar System? What is Gebar? What makes Gebar a
system?

In the discussion of Ethiopian past as a feudal society we
hear terms such as Rist, Gult, Gebar, etc. These terms represent
and depict a complex social history, whose essence and dynamics
still remained obscure to most of us.

In this issue I will briefly discuss Gebar as a system. Since
its period of emergence the term Gebar had been used and defined
in a number of conflicting ways by founders of the system,
scholars and common people alike. There are at least three ideas
expressed in the use of the term. In the dictionary it is defined
as “he who works because he must and gives the administrator
his strength (labour) and property (agricultural produce)”,
see, Kidane Wolde Kifle, Mezgebe Sewasew we Gis we Mezgebe Kalat
Hadis. (bracket is added). In the expression of contemporary
governors and advisor of Menelik such as Dejazmach Girmame, the
term Gebar refers to the special function assigned to Rist land
holding peasant who was assigned with the task of provisioning
(Senq Mechan) to the army (Tor Zemach). (See, Haile Zeleqe n.d.
Ye Dajazmach Girmame Hiwet Tarik). Mahteme Selassie, a former
higher court official (in1940s), who was the author of the book
Zekre Neger, used the term as defined in the dictionary. Gebre
Wolde Engda Work, former minister of agriculture during the
government of Haile Selassie, gives us a detail labour and
payment obligation of peasants, in his book, Ye Ityopia Meret na
Gebr Sem. Based on the work of these two traditional scholars,
some foreign and Ethiopian scholars take the term Gebar in
relation to the complex problem of land ownership and use it to
refer to the kind of land tenure prevalent in southern Ethiopia
(see Donham and James (eds.), The Southern Marches of Imperial
Ethiopia, 1986. Others who consider only the tax burden of the
peasant use the term in the sense of symbolizing an oppressive
social system particularly of the Menelik period (see, Lapiso G.
Delebo; Ye Ityopia Gebar Sereat na Gimr Kapitalism, 1900-1966.

The definitions mentioned above are correct, in so far as they
depended on one’s own view and subject of interest. The problem
is that they only explain partial phenomena, not essence, aspects
not totality, and the danger of emphasising (or exaggerating)
certain aspect, might lead to wrong and unbalanced judgement and
understanding of the past. To define Gebar as a system is not an
easy task that one can do away by making certain refernce or
accepting of things at their face value. For the last five years
I have been doing on this term and each time I come up with new
definition, and sometime I find the exercise quite frustrating.
In the first place Gebar was a dynamic system, and one has to
follow its development in time. It emerged in the region of
northern Shewa and central Wello during the beginning of the
eighteenth century, as an economic base of the military
aristocracy of the regions. Gebar emerged in areas where
Gonderain royal power was lest felt and where there was a
synthesis of Amhara social organization and newly settled Oromo
culture. It was the outcome of local and provincial arrangements
made by territorial lords of the area, in a word it was a system
that developed from below, not by royal decree or initiative of
Gonderain kings. In other words one has to know when and why was
the Gebar system emerged?

Secondly one has to make a difference between the Gebar system
and those systems that preceded it. The Gebar system was
different from the old Gult-Rist system which was dominant in the
highland regions of Eritrea, the region of Tigray, Begemder,
Gojjam, northern parts of Wello, and Shewa. The Gebar system, as
an economic base of the regional aristocracy, was also diferent
from the Amisho-Rim (one-fithe payment) system of Gonder and
central regions.

Unlike the Gult-Rist and Amisho-Rim systems, whose forms of
revenue allocation was negotiated or legally justified (as in the
documents of Serate Gebr and Serate Mengest), the Gebar system
rested initially on confiscation of communal and Balabat lands
and imposition tax payment on individual holdings. Confiscated
land was given as Maderiya, payment for service, for soldiers and
land tax was used for recruitment of transport corps. The
Maderiya land which was cultivated by tenancy arrangement, or the
kind aristocrats sponsored tenancy system, was different in its
tax assessment and payment and collection from Gult-Rist and
Amisho systems.

The point of mentioning this point is to bring into awarness
on the different mechanisms and various stages in the development
of Gebar system. When definig the term, one ought to consider not
only the questions when and why, but also how the system
functioned. What is true for its emergence, for all time and
stages of its development, is that basically Gebar is an
individual registration (identification) of holdings and
calculation of land tax payment on the size and/or fertility of
land. This type of tax system, first served as an economic base
of the Were Seh aristocratic family of Jejju, who were in power
from 1780s-1855, and Shewan aristocracy who dominated central
power from 1889-1974.

I differ further discussion on the Gebar system to a future
work, but I like to comment the relevance of raising the issue in
this column. I have two points in mind. The first one belongs to
an attempt to clarify misunderstanding and interpretation around
the power struggle between Yohannes IV (1872-1889) and Menelik
(1889- 1913). The second point is to redress unfair judgement
hitherto accredited to the Gebar system, particularly by
politician and ideologist. In some circles and writings the
conflict and power struggle between Yohannes and Menelik is
interpreted wrongly based on ethnic and regional perspective.
Menelik’s agreement with Egypt, Italy and Mahdist of Sudan
(points that can not be discuss here) are interpreted as a
conspiracy against Yohannes. Counter argument to this is
propounded that Yohannes had also collaborated with British
military expedition against Theodros. In such a way argument and
counter arguments continue, often appealing only to emotion. For
the purpose of categorization, I have labelled such discussion as
“conspiracy views” on history of the period (not
theories, since these views have not developed to reach status of
theory).

Exponents of the “conspiracy view” ignore that
during the second half of the 19th Century, diplomacy was not yet
in the exclusive sphere of the central government. Like the
period of Zemene Mesafint, princes had continued to foster
independent relationship with outside power, particularly to
procure firearms. Emperors had no monopoly over import of
firearms and had not yet established sovereign power over
diplomacy. These questions were in the process of making. Most
important for our purpose at hand is that, the conspiracy view
completely disregards comparing and considering the logistic base
of the two emperors. Even though emperors Yohannes and Menelik
had a considerable size of troop under their disposal, the
resource base of their troop was completely different. The army
of Yohannes was based on the Rist Gult system. In this system
kings were dependent on the local Gultgna lord and on the peasant
community for mobilization of an army. This system was
inefficient for the maintenance of troops on regular basis, and
any mobilization of troops was at the expense of peasant
community and Gultegna, which often result in rebellion. The
troops of Menelik was based on Gebar system which has the
advantage to increase the financial capacity of the state, and
mechanism to harmonize the military needs with the existing form
of the economy. (For a general discussion on the importance of
Gebar system as sound and efficient economic base of the
Ethiopian state, and its importance and difference with those
that preceded it see my article titled ” A Revolution from
Above? Change in the Fiscal and Military Organization of the
Ethiopian State, 1855-1913″, in New Trends in Ethiopian
Studies. Papers of the 12th International Conference of Ethiopian
Studies. Marcus, H. (ed.). 1994;

The various techniques used in the Gebar system in the
creation of resource to the state, will appear in a future work).
The shift of power from north to the center occurred not as
result of conspiracy of Menelik or shrewdness of the Shewan
Amhara as hitherto is propagated or believed, but in the very
formation of the logistic base of the state, in the techniques
and system of creating resource for a military state. And this is
explained by the Gebar system, defined as an individual
registration of holdings and land tax payment on the size and/or
fertility of land. The Gebar system constitute techniques which
enabled to increase the financial capacity of the state, and it
contained principles and flexibility important for the allocation
of resources for military ends. The continuation or fragmentation
of power lies on system of its economic base.

For the peasants the Gebar system was a burden. It demanded
their labour and what they produced. In the absence of external
finance (international loan) and internal system of credit, the
state had to depend internally on the peasant economy to defend
colonialism. Not all peasant economies defended colonialism. The
forces in Ethiopia were not only reactive, but also creative in
responding to the challenge. This can be explained partly by the
technique, principle and system of Gebar. After the death of
Yohannes, the Gebar system served as an alternative base of a
central power to continue the increasingly sophisticated and
tense challenge posed by colonialism.